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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between corporate governance, 
risk assessment and debt contracting within the Australian context where 
companies are heavily reliant on intermediated debt financing.  The Debt 
Contracting Model (DCM) posits that higher levels of corporate governance 
decrease the variability in cash flows and reduce the probability of default 
(reduce default risk) and correspondingly also increase the quality of value-
relevant information disclosed (reduce information risk).  As a result of 
influencing risk assessment, higher levels of corporate governance are expected 
to increase access to the quantity and type of debt and to lower cost of debt. 
The empirical evidence largely supports the relationships proposed in 
the DCM.  In particular, higher levels of corporate governance are associated 
with an increase in access to bank debt through the reduction of risk.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that higher levels of corporate governance lower 
the cost of debt for all debt types via the impact on risk assessment.  However, 
these results are driven by the larger companies.  The evidence shows that 
smaller companies do not access more quantities or types of debt nor do they 
pay lower cost of debt in the presence of higher levels of corporate governance.  
These results add to the body of accounting research by establishing the 
importance of corporate governance for debt contracting in markets that depend 
heavily on intermediated debt.  More importantly, the evidence suggests that 
there is a lower cost-benefit trade-off for smaller companies than larger 
companies at least in terms of increasing access to debt and reducing cost of 
debt.  Consequently, this study could assist regulators in raising questions about 
the merits of the universal adoption of costly corporate governance.    
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
The recent corporate collapses in the United States (US), United 
Kingdom (UK), Australia and other parts of the world raise questions about the 
efficacy of contemporary governance in corporations.  Regulators worldwide 
have responded with requirements for companies to adopt improved corporate 
governance practices.  Higher levels of corporate governance increase 
disclosure of financial information (Chen and Jaggi 2000; Eng and Mak 2003),  
enhance the quality of reporting and contribute to the reduction of information 
asymmetry between managers and capital providers (Lang and Lundholm 2000; 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999).  Furthermore, an increase in financial 
information facilitates monitoring of management and mitigates agency 
conflicts amongst corporate stakeholders (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003; 
Baiman and Verrecchia 1996; Botosan 1997; Core et al. 1999).  As a result, the 
informational advantages brought about by implementing higher levels of 
corporate governance enhance decision making quality, thereby contributing to 
the prevention of potential corporate crises (Johnson, Boone, Breach, and 
Friedman 2000).   
This thesis focuses on the impact of higher levels of corporate 
governance on the nature and cost of debt contracting relationships via the 
reduction of default and information risk.  For debt contracts, corporate 
governance affects borrowing parameters such as access to and cost of debt 
(Sengupta 1998; Bougheas, Mizen, and Yalcin 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
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and LaFond 2006; Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb 2004; Mansi, Maxwell, and 
Miller 2004a).  However, most of the research on debt contracting has largely 
focused on publicly traded debt.  To date, there is limited research addressing 
the impact of corporate governance on debt contracting in markets dominated 
by intermediated debt, a distinctive characteristic of the Australian market.  
This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by examining the relationship 
between corporate governance and access to debt and cost of debt, in the 
presence of default and information risks (risk assessment).  Additionally, this 
study explores the relationship between company size and debt contracting by 
examining whether higher levels of corporate governance benefit small 
companies in gaining greater access to debt at a lower cost.   
The rest of the chapter is partitioned into six sections.  Section 1.2 
provides the motivation for the thesis.  Section 1.3 addresses the research 
question, which guides this thesis.  Sections 1.4 and 1.5 discuss the conceptual 
framework and the methodology used in this study.  Section 1.6 lists the 
objectives that this thesis aims to achieve.  Section 1.7 describes the 
contributions of this study.  Finally, section 1.8 presents the organization of the 
thesis.    
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE THESIS  
Three factors motivate the exploration of this topic.  The first motivating 
factor is the sparse accounting research on the relationship between corporate 
governance, access to and cost of debt.  The majority of literature focuses on 
partial aspects of the relationship between corporate governance and debt 
contracting (Anderson et al. 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj and 
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Sengupta 2003; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 2005; Abor 2007; Berger, Ofek, 
and Yermack 1997; Wen, Rwegasira, and Bilderbeek 2002).  An exception is a 
study by Funchal, Galdi, and Lopes (2008) which addresses the impact of 
corporate governance on both access to debt and cost of debt.  Similarly, the 
current research stresses the importance of studying the relationship between 
corporate governance and access (quantity and type) and cost of debt 
contracting.  The relevance of exploring the two debt dimensions in the one 
study lies in the sequential structure of debt contracting.  Companies attempt to 
access debt capital and then negotiate the cost of that debt. 1  The lack of 
empirical examination on the impact of corporate governance on both access to 
debt and cost of debt has prompted this study.  
The second motivating factor focuses on the method used to examine 
the association between corporate governance, risk assessment and debt 
contracting.  Unlike prior research that assumes a direct relationship between 
corporate governance and debt contracting, the current study theorises that 
corporate governances operates via risk reduction thereby influencing access to 
and cost of debt.  A significant empirical implication of the underlying theory in 
this thesis is the use of a two stage least squares (2SLS) regression in addition 
to an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the impact of 
corporate governance on the debt contracting dimensions.  
The third motivating factor centres on the absence of a study that 
examines the relationship between corporate governance and debt contracting 
within an Australian context.  Prior studies examine partial aspects of the latter 
                                                
1 This thesis is focused on the companies that are able to access interest bearing debt and 
explores the governance and risk impacts on the quantity, type and cost of debt for those 
companies.  It is left to future research to examine the influence of corporate governance and 
risk characteristics on those companies that are unable to access interest bearing debt (see 
discussion in chapter five).  
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relationship in countries such as the US (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Mansi et 
al. 2004a; Pittman and Fortin 2004).  However, little attention has been placed 
on studying the impact of corporate governance on debt contracting within the 
Australian financial market, which has distinct corporate finance and 
governance structures relative to other markets.   
Debt financing is an integral component of Australian companies’ 
capital structure.  The current study finds that the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets for Australian companies is approximately 45%, which indicates that 
nearly half of corporate assets are financed by debt.  Since this is a strong signal 
that debt contracting is vital for corporate Australia, it warrants further study 
and analysis.  Furthermore, the results reported by this research indicate a 
predominance of intermediated debt over other debt types.  Findings indicate 
57% of interest bearing debt is sourced through financial intermediaries.
2
   
Australian companies have traditionally relied on intermediated debt, 
also known as private debt, to finance their operations (Reserve Bank of 
Australia 2005a).  In September 2008, intermediated debt was recorded at 
AU$1,575.5 billion, which represents 45% of total lending in Australia 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2008c).
3
  This form of borrowing is transacted via 
financial intermediaries such as commercial and merchant banks which are 
considered the most common financial institutions in Australia (Reserve Bank 
of Australia 2008c, 2005a, 2005b).  Loans by Australian banks totalled 
AU$1363 billion in September 2008, which represents nearly 39% of total 
lending in Australia (Reserve Bank of Australia 2008a, 2008c).  In recent years, 
                                                
2 The ratios of total liabilities to total assets and the interest bearing debt to intermediated debt  
reflect the nature of debt contracting for the sampled companies which are non-financial 
companies with June 30 balance date (see chapter four for more details).  
3 The reason for using September 2008 data is that it represents the most recent data prior to the 
Global Financial Crises in late 2008.  
 5 
syndicated lending, where two or more lenders provide funds to the borrower, 
has rapidly emerged as an important intermediated debt mechanism (Reserve 
Bank of Australia 2005b).  However, some Australian companies do employ 
other sources of debt financing, such as non-intermediated, or public debt 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2005a).   
 This form of non-intermediated borrowing is likely to become an 
alternative source of debt capital for larger publicly listed companies in 
Australia.  The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) is 
considering allowing companies to issue corporate bonds to investors under a 
simplified prospectus in order to provide opportunities to refinance existing 
bank debt and to develop the Australian quoted debt market (Australian 
Securities and Exchange Commission 2009).  In September 2008, long-term 
non-government securities issued by non-financial Australian corporations were 
recorded at AU$135.6 billion, a 100% increase from the year 2000 (Reserve 
Bank of Australia 2008b).  Larger companies are more capable of accessing 
public debt relative to smaller companies, due to their ability to absorb fixed 
costs associated with public debt issues and their minimum issuance 
requirements (Reserve Bank of Australia 2005a).  Nevertheless, intermediated 
debt currently remains the primary source of financing for Australian 
companies.  In this sense, the Australian debt market is dissimilar to the debt 
market in the United States and more in line with European markets which 
depend heavily on intermediated debt (European Central Bank 2002). 
In contrast, the United States’ debt market is heavily reliant on non-
intermediated debt (Teplin 2001).  In 2008, corporate bonds issued by non-
financial US businesses totalled $3685.3 billion, which represents 20.2% of 
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debt financing for that sector (Federal Reserves Statistical Release 2008).  
Furthermore, bank loans for the same sector totalled $1647.9 which represents 
9% of total debt financing for non-financial US businesses (Federal Reserves 
Statistical Release 2008).  Prior studies have mostly analysed US companies; 
hence much of the literature pertains to markets that are similar to the United 
States (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Anderson et al. 2004; Mansi et al. 2004a; 
Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003).  Other debt markets, such as the 
European market, share similar lending trends with the Australian market.  
However, European companies are moving slowly towards issuing their own 
securities, although bank debt remains the primary source of debt financing 
(European Central Bank 2002).   
Australia also has a distinct corporate governance regulatory 
environment relative to the United States.
4
 The Australian corporate governance 
principles and recommendations are guideline-based, which means that 
companies can deviate from best practice recommendations conditional upon 
providing a reason for the departure (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002; Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2003b).  Australia’s 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 
(hereafter PGCG) are in direct contrast with the rule-based corporate 
governance regime in the United States (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002; Anand 
2005).5   
                                                
4 The distinction between US and Australian corporate governance structures became more 
apparent in 2002 and 2003 when the two countries issued their respective corporate governance 
regulations and principles. 
5 The ASX issued the second edition of PGCG, entitled the Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations (hereafter CGPR) in 2007 (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council 2007b). 
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The sparseness of accounting studies that examine the impact of 
corporate governance on the access and cost dimensions of debt contracting has 
stimulated this investigation.  Furthermore, the idiosyncrasies of the Australian 
financial market, in terms of intermediated debt financing and guideline-based 
corporate governance practices, warrant the exploration of this topic within an 
Australian context.     
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance, via risk 
assessment, on debt contracting in the Australian debt market, which is 
dominated by intermediated debt.  Higher levels of corporate governance are 
expected to decrease default and information risks, thereby increasing access to 
debt and lowering the cost of debt.  The study, therefore addresses the 
following research question: 
 
“In a corporate debt contracting market characterised by intermediated debt 
financing, do higher levels of corporate governance impact risk assessment, 
thereby influencing the access to and cost of debt?”  
1.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The study develops a Debt Contracting Model (DCM) which proposes 
that higher levels of corporate governance impacts debt contracting by 
influencing the risk assessment process (Sengupta 1998; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2006).  Corporate governance bridges the information gap, improves the 
likelihood of monitoring management and increases the disclosure of value-
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relevant information (Anderson et al. 2004; Pittman and Fortin 2004; Bhojraj 
and Sengupta 2003).  Consequently, companies experience a reduction in 
agency conflicts and information asymmetries which in turn contribute to 
decreasing default and information risk.   
A company’s debt contracting parameters are influenced by many 
internal and external factors.  Nevertheless, the two most important factors in 
debt contracting are default and information risks (Easley and O'Hara 2004; 
Vassalou and Xing 2004; Fisher 1959; Duffee 1999; Bougheas et al. 2006; 
Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2009, 2007; Francis, LaFond, Olssona, and 
Schipper 2005).  The informational benefits of corporate governance reduce the 
perceived default and information risks, thereby increasing the company’s 
access to debt (quantity and type) and lowering cost of debt (Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Sengupta 1998; Anderson et al. 2004).  
In the presence of higher levels of corporate governance, the debt 
contracting outcomes are expected to vary depending on the company size.  
Small firms have higher levels of default risk and information asymmetry 
relative to their larger counterparts (Binks, Ennew, and Reed 1992; Lean and 
Tucker 2001; Elfakhani and Zaher 1998; Brewer 2007).  Additionally, smaller 
companies have a lower following by financial analysts, which further increases 
information asymmetry in these companies (Easterday, Sen, and Stephan 2008; 
Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary 2006).  As a result, smaller companies access less 
debt and at a higher cost in comparison to larger companies (Bougheas et al. 
2006; Minton and Schrand 1999).  This thesis posits that higher levels of 
corporate governance reduce default and information risks by lowering 
information asymmetry and increasing financial transparency.  Consequently 
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smaller companies should be able to contract greater quantities and types of 
debt at a lower cost when higher levels of corporate governance are 
implemented. 
1.5 METHODOLOGY  
This thesis employs cross-sectional data from 2007 for 1,239 non-
financial companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange with a June 30 
balance date.  The archival data was collected from annual reports and database 
information from AspectHuntley’s FinAnalysis and DatAnalysis as well as 
Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH).  After excluding companies from the 
banking, insurance and financial sectors, as well as companies with missing 
data and extreme outliers, the sample used contained 595 companies.6 
The research empirically tests the impact of corporate governance, via 
risk assessment, on access and cost to debt contracting dimensions by 
estimating OLS and 2SLS regression models.  The dependent variables are 
access to debt and cost of debt.  Access to debt is composed of two sub-
components.  The first is the quantity of debt, which is measured by the ratio of 
total interest bearing debt to total liabilities (Bougheas et al. 2006).  The second 
is the type of debt, which is measured as the proportion of each debt source 
amount to the total interest bearing debt.  The four debt types are asset finance 
debt, bank debt, non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt.  Cost of debt is 
measured as the calculated weighted average interest rate for the company’s 
interest bearing debt as disclosed in the notes to the financial statements.  
                                                
6 The 595 companies comprise the main sample used in the study.  However, the inclusion of 
the information risk variable causes the exclusion of 390 companies due to missing data and 
extreme values which results in a sub-sample of 205.  The sub-sample is only used when the 
information risk variable is introduced into the analysis. 
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Corporate governance is represented by a composite score (Defond, 
Hann, and Hu 2005).  The composite is derived from fourteen individual 
corporate governance variables, which proxy for management oversight, 
financial quality, and equity control dimensions of corporate governance.  The 
corporate governance composite variable aggregates the individual corporate 
governance variables to produce an indicator of the company’s corporate 
governance structure (Defond et al. 2005).  A value of fourteen indicates strong 
corporate governance and a value of zero indicates weak corporate governance.    
The study includes default risk and information risk as independent 
variables.  Default risk is measured by constructing a default risk model that 
uses failed and non-failed Australian companies to produce a Z-score similar to 
the score estimated by Altman (1968, 1983).  Information risk is measured by 
calculating accruals quality, which focuses on the mapping of working capital 
into operating cash flows (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2005).   
The testing of the DCM requires the inclusion of additional variables to 
control for other factors that could impact on debt contracting.  Prior research 
finds that reputation, collateral level and company size are important drivers of 
access and cost dimensions of debt contracting (Abor 2007; Cantillo and 
Wright 2000; Wen et al. 2002; Funchal et al. 2008).7  The current study uses 
company age as a proxy for reputation.  Collateral level is measured as the ratio 
of fixed assets to total assets.  Company size is represented by the log of total 
assets.  This study also includes small and large company size dummy variables 
when examining the relationship between corporate governance and debt 
contracting for different sized companies. 
                                                
7 Profitability is not represented in the current study due to the inclusion of return on assets, 
which is a primary profitability variable, in the Z-score variable.   
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1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This study aims to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To develop a conceptual framework that explains the interaction between 
corporate governance and debt contracting. 
2. To contribute to the accounting literature by providing empirical evidence 
on the relationship between corporate governance and two debt contracting 
dimensions. 
3. To fill the gap in the literature by focusing on the interactions between 
corporate governance and debt contracting within an Australian context, 
where the financial markets are characterised by intermediated debt 
financing. 
1.7 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis contributes to the existing body of knowledge in two ways.  
First, this study reduces the gap in the accounting literature, which to date has 
been limited either to the relationship between corporate governance and access 
to debt or cost of debt, but not to both.  It builds on Funchal et al. (2008)  by 
addressing the impact of corporate governance, via risk assessment, on several 
debt contracting dimensions.  Second, this research is amongst the first 
Australian studies that identify the effect of corporate governance on access to 
debt and cost of debt.  The Australian financial market has a unique financing 
and corporate governance framework.  The Australian debt market is 
characterised by intermediated financing.  Additionally, the Australian 
corporate governance practices are principle-based which implies that 
companies have a choice with respect to implementation thereof.  Most studies 
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that focus on corporate governance and access to, and cost of debt are from the 
United States where companies largely depend on traded debt for debt 
financing and abide by rule-based corporate governance practices (Anderson et 
al. 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Sengupta 
1998; Klock et al. 2005).     
Accounting firms and financial advisers can draw on the results of this 
study to provide their clients with informed advice.  In Australia, non-audit 
services, which include financial counsel on risk management, are a significant 
source of revenue for accounting firms (Green, Hutchinson, Koh, and Walker 
2007).  These firms could use the evidence from this study to demonstrate the 
key drivers of access and cost dimensions of debt contracting to their clients.  
Furthermore, accounting firms could counsel their clients about the relevance of 
financial disclosure and reporting quality within the context of corporate 
governance.  The evidence from this study could be used to highlight the 
benefits of implementing higher levels of corporate governance on the debt 
contracting dimensions.  Additionally, the default and information risk models 
used in this study could offer clients information on the impact of risk 
assessment on access to and cost of debt.   
Finally, this research will assist regulators to understand the impact of 
corporate governance regulations on business finance and will also improve 
future regulations.  One of the important issues that are addressed is the 
differential impact of regulations on small and large companies.  The ASX 
Corporate Governance Council Implementation Review Group (2005) focused 
on governance issues faced by small companies.  The ASX Corporate 
Governance Council (2007a) responded to the claims that PGCG adversely 
 13 
impose costs on small companies by amending some of the recommendations 
that were issued in 2003.  This study will provide empirical evidence to 
regulators regarding small companies’ adoption of higher levels of corporate 
governance and the impact thereof, which could contribute to the debate 
regarding future regulatory changes. 
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
Chapter two reviews literature relevant to this study.  The chapter 
identifies the theoretical foundation for the research and produces hypotheses 
that test the relationship between corporate governance, access to debt and cost 
of debt. 
 Chapter three presents the research design which details the data 
collection, and the empirical measures used to test the hypotheses.  The chapter 
focuses on operationalising the constructs that are developed in chapter two. 
 Chapter four provides the analysis of the data.  The chapter focuses on 
the results of the model developed in chapter three.  It concludes with a 
sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the results. 
 Chapter five provides a discussion of the results.  The chapter offers 
limitations of the study, along with suggestions for future research.  The chapter 
presents the conclusion, which summarises the results and the contribution of 
the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  THEORY 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION   
 
Chapter two develops the DCM, which represents the relationship 
between corporate governance, the default and information components of risk 
assessment and the access to and cost of debt contracting.  The chapter reviews 
prior literature and distils the key theoretical relationships between corporate 
governance, risk assessment and debt contracting.  Finally, the chapter presents 
five hypotheses to test the DCM, drawing on the established theoretical 
relationships. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured into six sections.  Section 2.2 
provides an overview of the DCM.  Section 2.3 discusses the access and cost 
dimensions of debt contracting and their drivers.  Section 2.4 explains the role 
of risk assessment in the DCM.  Section 2.5 details the role of corporate 
governance in the DCM.  Section 2.6 discusses “company size” effect.  Section 
2.7 provides the summary for the chapter.  
2.2 DEBT CONTRACTING MODEL (DCM) 
  
The DCM, shown in Figure 2.1, represents the effect of corporate 
governance on the access (quantities and types) and cost dimensions of debt 
contracting by influencing risk assessment (default and information risks).  
Previous research shows that default risk is a key driver of debt contracting 
outcomes, specifically access to debt and cost of debt (González, Lopez, and 
Saurina 2007; Vassalou and Xing 2004; Fisher 1959; Duffee 1999; Bougheas et 
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al. 2006).  A reduction in perceived default risk leads to an increase in access to 
debt and a decrease in cost of debt (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003; Sengupta 1998; Anderson et al. 2004).  More recently, the 
information risk literature finds information asymmetry also impacts on debt 
contracting, primarily cost of debt.  Investors with lower levels of information 
tend to require a higher return on their investment (Francis et al. 2005; Lambert 
et al. 2009, 2007; Easley and O'Hara 2004).  However, the information risk 
literature has not closely examined the impact of information risk on access to 
quantity and type of debt.  The DCM posits that access to debt is influenced 
adversely by the variability in the level and precision of accounting 
information, and therefore companies are expected to access greater debt 
quantities and types in the presence of low information risk. 
 
Figure 2.1: Debt Contracting Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate governance, a multi-dimensional concept that includes 
management oversight, financial transparency and equity control dimensions, is 
also expected to influence debt contracting via its impact on risk assessment. 
Higher levels of corporate governance mitigate agency conflicts between 
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Default Risk 
 
Debt Contracting 
Dimensions  
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managers and stakeholders which results in a reduction in perceived default risk 
and decreases information asymmetry which leads to lowering information risk 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; 
Beekes and Brown 2006; Klein 2002; Easley and O'Hara 2004).  As a result of 
higher levels of corporate governance, default and information risks are reduced 
thereby increasing access to quantity and type of debt and decreasing cost of 
debt. 
Finally, the relationship between corporate governance, risk assessment, 
and debt contracting is likely to vary across company size.  Although company 
size per se is not a driving factor in the debt contracting relationship, it does 
provide insight regarding the company’s default and information risks (Minton 
and Schrand 1999; Byun 2007; Brewer 2007; Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2006; Bougheas et al. 2006; Cantillo and 
Wright 2000).  Smaller companies tend to have greater default risk and 
information asymmetry, and thus they are expected to experience greater debt 
contracting benefits due to implementing higher levels of corporate governance 
relative to larger companies (Elfakhani and Zaher 1998; Binks et al. 1992; Lean 
and Tucker 2001; Brewer 2007).   
2.3 DEBT CONTRACTING DIMENSIONS 
  
 The DCM focuses on two dimensions of debt contracting which are 
access to debt (both quantity and type) and cost of debt.  The access and cost 
dimensions represent two different, yet linked aspects of the debt procurement 
process (Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri 1998).  Initially, the board of directors 
decides on the level of debt required to finance prospective projects.  The firm 
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then enters a negotiating process with creditors in an attempt to obtain the 
required debt capital via the various debt types.8   This process is typically 
followed by further negotiations that address the cost and other terms of debt.  
As a result of this sequence of events, access to debt is regarded as a first order 
effect of debt contracting, while cost of debt is considered as a second order 
effect.  However, it is not uncommon for the two debt dimensions to overlap 
each other (Hyytinenn and Pajarinen 2007; Angelini et al. 1998). 
Access to debt financing comprises two sub-components, which are the 
quantity and type of debt accessed.  The first sub-component of access is the 
aggregate quantity of interest bearing debt that the company has secured 
relative to other financial liabilities (Abor 2007; Wen et al. 2002; Berger et al. 
1997; Friend and Lang 1988; Funchal et al. 2008).  The justification behind 
studying interest bearing debt in isolation to other liabilities (i.e. non-interest 
bearing liabilities) is mainly due to its sensitivity to default and information 
risks which are assessed and priced by lenders in the debt financial market.  As 
a result, changes to risk assessment will impact directly on the access to interest 
bearing debt (González et al. 2007; Bougheas et al. 2006).  Furthermore, the 
extant literature typically examines debt quantity as a component of capital 
structure analysis, usually in the form of leverage ratios such as total liabilities 
to total assets or total equity (Abor 2007; Wen et al. 2002; Berger et al. 1997; 
Friend and Lang 1988).  This thesis is not interested in capital structure issues 
per se, but rather in the drivers of the level of interest-bearing debt, where debt 
is the chosen funding mechanism.    
                                                
8 The current study is concerned with companies that have interest bearing debt.  However, 
future research could investigate the various characteristics of companies that have interest 
bearing debt versus companies that are unable to access interest bearing debt (see discussion in 
chapter five).  
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The second sub-component of access is the type of debt accessed which 
refers to the company’s source and composition of interest-bearing debt 
(González et al. 2007; Bougheas et al. 2006; Cantillo and Wright 2000; Denis 
and Mihov 2003).  Previous studies broadly categorise debt types into 
intermediated debt and non-intermediated debt (Cantillo and Wright 2000; 
Bougheas et al. 2006; Denis and Mihov 2003).   
Intermediated debt is typically private debt that requires the presence of 
a third party to facilitate the debt contracting process between lenders and 
borrowers (Warner 1989).  In the intermediated debt market the third party 
assumes, in part, the role of the market place through contracting and 
monitoring activities (Diamond 1984).  Intermediated debt is often categorised 
as highly monitored debt due to the level of supervision that is carried out by 
lenders (Majumdar and Sen 2006; Rauh and Sufi 2008; Majumdar and Sen 
2007).  Lenders undertake the task of monitoring to assess the borrower’s risk 
position which centres on default and information risk.  The scrutiny of 
intermediated debt provides alternative governance that reduces the need for a 
formal corporate governance structure (James 1987; Leland and Pyle 1977; 
Bhattacharya and Chiesa 1995; Diamond 1984; Berger and Udell 2002; Fama 
1985).   
Intermediated debt often includes debt instruments that undergo intense 
supervision such as asset finance debt, bank debt and non-bank debt.  Asset 
finance debt includes finance leases and hire purchases.  Bank debt is composed 
of bank loans, facilities and overdrafts.  Non-bank debt includes loans from 
non-bank financial institutions, directors and related entities.  This thesis is 
primarily concerned with intermediated debt because it represents the 
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predominant types of debt used by Australian companies (Reserve Bank of 
Australia 2005a).   
Non-intermediated debt is characterised by a lower monitoring intensity, 
which reflects the borrower’s risk position (Diamond 1991; Cantillo and Wright 
2000; Denis and Mihov 2003).  This type of debt includes publicly traded debt 
instruments that are issued directly to lenders without intermediations such as 
corporate bonds.  Additionally, non-intermediated debt also includes 
convertible and non-convertible commercial papers and notes that are privately 
issued.  The low level of monitoring could result in increased information 
asymmetry between the debt contracting parties which raises the company’s 
information risk and adversely impacts access and cost dimensions of debt 
contracting.   
The final aspect in the debt contracting process is negotiating the cost of 
debt.  Negotiations between lenders and borrowers on the cost of debt follow, 
but often overlap, negotiations on the quantity and type of debt (Hyytinenn and 
Pajarinen 2007).  Previous literature defines cost of debt as the equilibrium 
required rate of return on traded debt such as corporate bonds (Chen 1978).  
However, due to the nature of the Australian debt market, this research defines 
cost of debt as the rate of return required by issuers of intermediated and non-
intermediated debt (Reserve Bank of Australia 2005a; Damodaran 2002).   
The diverging characteristics exhibited by the two debt types, 
intermediated and non-intermediated debts, influence their respective cost of 
debt (Bonfim, Dai, and Franco 2007; Berger and Udell 1995; Elsas and 
Krahnen 1998; Denis and Mihov 2003; Niskanen and Niskanen 2010).  Prior 
research finds that the cost of intermediated debt is greater than non-
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intermediated debt for two reasons.  Firstly, companies that obtain 
intermediated debt financing have higher default risk relative to other 
companies (Denis and Mihov 2003; Diamond 1991).  Secondly, the potential 
bargaining power by lenders of intermediated debt is higher due to their 
possession of borrowers’ private information in comparison to other companies 
(Rajan 1992). 
The DCM suggests that there are multiple and overlapping drivers of the 
quantity and type of debt accessed as well as cost of debt.
9
  The primary drivers 
are risk assessment, which consists of default and information risks, and 
corporate governance practices.  However, other drivers such as reputation, 
collateral level and company size (Abor 2007; Cantillo and Wright 2000; Wen 
et al. 2002; Funchal et al. 2008) also impact on debt contracting, and therefore 
should be controlled for by the study.  The following section details the impact 
of risk assessment on the access and cost dimensions of debt contracting.      
2.4 THE ROLE OF RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
The default and information risk components of risk assessment play an 
integral role in determining access to and cost of debt (Bernoth and Wolff 2008; 
Sengupta 1998; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  Previous literature has identified 
that risk assessment has two core aspects which include default risk and 
information risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Francis, LaFond, Olssona, and 
Schipper 2004).  The model posits that lenders examine default risk to form an 
expectation about the firm’s future cash flows.  Furthermore, the model 
suggests that investors rely on the quality of accounting information to assess 
                                                
9 Refer to Appendix A for a detailed review of literature that focuses on the access and cost of 
debt contracting dimensions. 
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information risk.  Lower levels of default and information risks lead to greater 
access to debt financing at a lower cost. 
2.4.1 DEFAULT RISK 
   
Debt contracting outcomes are heavily influenced by the borrower’s 
level of default risk (Bougheas et al. 2006; Denis and Mihov 2003; Byun 2007; 
Klock et al. 2005; Anderson et al. 2004).  A firm defaults when it is unable to 
service its debt obligations by failing to repay the principal and/or the interest 
on the principal.  One of the significant determinants of the risk of default is the 
company’s cash flow position (Scott 1981; Gentry, Newbold, and Whitford 
1985; Aziz, Emanuel, and Lawson 1988; Trueman and Titman 1988).  Prior 
research finds that a negative relationship exists between cash flows and default 
risk (Zeitun, Tian, and Keen 2007).  Minton and Schrand (1999) show that cash 
flow fluctuations defer capital expenditures and delay debt repayments thereby 
increasing default risk and cost of debt.   
Agency conflicts between managers and stakeholders increase the 
variance in expected cash flows thereby increasing default risk (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006). 10  Managers that are focused on 
advancing their self-interest are likely to engage in shirking, over-consumption 
of perquisites, empire building and unprofitable investments in projects that 
yield negative net present value (Sengupta 1998; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; 
Dechow and Sloan 1991; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Farinha 2003; Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003; Fan 2004).  The adverse effects of self-seeking managerial 
behaviour result in reducing the company’s expected cash flows and increasing 
                                                
10 Refer to Appendix B for the discussion on agency conflict and debt contracting. 
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default risk (Sengupta 1998; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife 
and LaFond 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
A company’s ability to access quantities of debt is primarily influenced 
by default risk as well as other secondary factors, such as company size, 
profitability, and collateral (Abor 2007; Cantillo and Wright 2000; Wen et al. 
2002; Funchal et al. 2008).  Prospective debtholders base their lending 
decisions on the borrower’s ability to repay their debts, and thus access to debt 
is highly influenced by default risk (Abor 2007; Cantillo and Wright 2000; Wen 
et al. 2002; Funchal et al. 2008).  The DCM suggests that default risk is 
associated with the quantity of debt accessed. The following hypothesis states 
that default risk is negatively related to the quantity of debt accessed. 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Default risk is negatively related to the quantity of debt 
accessed. 
 
The type of debt is also influenced by default risk, along with other 
secondary factors such as reputation, profitability, collateral level and size 
(Vassalou and Xing 2004; Denis and Mihov 2003; González et al. 2007; 
Bougheas et al. 2006; Cantillo and Wright 2000).  Grenadier (1996) finds that 
higher levels of default risk impact negatively on secured debt types such as 
finance lease contracts.  Additionally, Smith (1987) suggests that firms with 
high default risk encounter difficulties in obtaining bank debt.  Furthermore, 
prior studies find that companies that have low default risk and are larger, older 
and more successful, tend to access non-intermediated debt such as corporate 
bonds and notes (Diamond 1991; Cantillo and Wright 2000; Denis and Mihov 
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2003).  Following the evidence presented by prior research, the DCM expects 
higher levels of default risk to increase the restrictions on accessing all types of 
debt. The following hypothesis formally states the relationship between default 
risk and the access to the different types of debt.  
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Default risk is negatively related to the access to the 
different types of debt. 
 
The cost of debt is influenced by several key factors, most important of 
which is default risk (Bougheas et al. 2006; Denis and Mihov 2003; Byun 2007; 
Klock et al. 2005).  Investors require a spread over the risk-free rate to 
compensate them for the possibility of default (Vassalou and Xing 2004; Fisher 
1959; Duffee 1999).  Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) state that debt yields are 
primarily determined by the firm’s ability to meet its debt obligations.  
Anderson et al. (2004) find that higher default risk results in an increase in cost 
of debt.  Similar results are reported by Klock et al (2005) who show that higher 
debt usage increases default risk, thereby increasing cost of debt.  It is therefore 
expected that the greater the firm’s chance of not being able to service its debt, 
the higher the required return demanded by its investors.  The following 
hypothesis states the association between default risk and cost of debt. 
 
Hypothesis 1c:  Default risk is positively related to cost of debt. 
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2.4.2 INFORMATION RISK 
 
Recent theoretical studies expand beyond default risk to include 
information risk as a key risk element (Easley and O'Hara 2004; Lambert et al. 
2007, 2009; Francis et al. 2005).  Default risk is the possibility of not repaying 
the debt while information risk is defined as the variability in both the level and 
the precision of information across investors (Easley and O'Hara 2004; Lambert 
et al. 2007, 2009; Francis et al. 2005).  Prior research finds that information 
asymmetry (Easley and O'Hara 2004) and poor accounting quality (Lambert et 
al. 2009) impact adversely on the pricing of debt contracts and increase the 
required return demanded by debtholders.  However, there is a deficiency in 
accounting literature with respect to the relationship between information risk 
and other debt contracting dimensions such as access to the quantity and type of 
debt. 
Previous literature on the relationship between information risk and 
access to quantity and type of debt has been scarce with the exception of capital 
structure literature which focuses on the influence of information asymmetry on 
the choice between debt and equity capital (Flannery 1986; Narayanan 1988).  
However, the current study is not concerned with capital structure because it 
assumes that a decision to select debt as a financing mechanism has been taken 
by the company.  As a result the focus is on the nature and structure of debt 
contracting outcomes and their relationship to information risk. 
The quality of accounting information has an impact on the process of 
forming expectations about future payoffs in debt contracting situations 
(Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008).  Accounting information (private or 
public) is used to form expectations about the borrowers’ future cash flow and 
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their ability to service the debt in future periods (Bharath et al. 2008).  
Variability in the level and precision of accounting information increases the 
variance of expected cash flows which impacts negatively on the negotiated 
terms and conditions in debt contracts (Bharath et al. 2008). 
In the presence of higher levels of information risk there are three 
possible debt contracting outcomes to consider.  Firstly, companies that are 
inherently risky are unable to access interest bearing debt.  These companies are 
restricted to different funding sources such as equity and/or non-interest bearing 
debt.11  Secondly, companies with high information risk are restricted in the 
quantum and type of interest-bearing debt they can access.  High information 
risk companies are less likely to access debt that is reliant on publicly available 
information but more likely to access debt where alternative information is 
available to lenders. Thirdly, information risk is priced into the debt contract 
whereby high information risk companies pay a higher cost of debt.  
Information risk, therefore, has the potential to impact the access (quantity and 
type) and cost dimensions of debt contracting.  
At an aggregate level, the presence of information risk will depress a 
company’s ability to access interest-bearing debt due to the fundamental 
sensitivity of debt providers to risk of any kind.  Garcia-Teruel, Martinez-
Solano and Sanchez-Ballesta (2008) find that companies with higher accruals 
quality (lower information risk) maintain lower levels of cash holdings because 
they have easier access to interest bearing debt to meet their cash needs.  
Furthermore, an imbalance of information is interpreted by disadvantaged 
debtholders in the debt contracting process as a signal of possible variability in 
                                                
11 Of the sampled companies, 49.9% do not have interest-bearing debt reported in their balance 
sheet.  As discussed earlier, chapter five explores potential future research focused on the 
attributes of those companies that are unable to access interest bearing debt.  
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expected cash flows (Bharath et al. 2008).  Consequently, debtholders factor the 
increase in information risk into their lending decisions and in aggregate the 
borrowers have less access to interest-bearing debt.  The following hypothesis 
states the negative relationship between information risk and access to the 
quantity of debt. 
 
Hypothesis 2a:  Information risk is negatively related to the quantity of 
debt accessed. 
 
Hypothesis 2a is a fairly weak hypothesis as it examines an aggregate 
access to interest bearing debt effect.  Debt contracting is likely to be more 
complex in that information needs will vary across different debt types and 
different debt providers.  The tolerance of each debt type to variations in the 
level of accounting information quality will differ based on the degree to which 
lending decisions are sensitive to the underlying information risk of the 
company. 
In the Australian financial market, the four main types of interest 
bearing debt to consider are asset finance debt, bank debt, non-bank debt and 
non-intermediated debt.12  Lenders of each debt type have different information 
needs and hence there will be a differential impact of information risk on the 
debt contracting outcomes.  It is possible that the reduced reliance on 
accounting information and in particular on the quality of that information 
might make access to certain debt types, such as asset finance, more attractive 
to some companies. Research has shown that small companies and young 
                                                
12 The aggregate proportions of each debt type to total interest bearing debt for companies in the 
main sample are as follows: asset finance debt 3.4%, bank debt 33.9%, non-bank debt 19.3% 
and non-intermediated debt 43.3%. 
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companies with collateral (particularly plant and equipment) will tend to have 
proportionately more asset finance than large and older companies (Realdon 
2006; Slotty 2008).  The latter have greater access to alternative sources of debt 
such as non-intermediated debt and hence have a lower proportion of asset 
finance in place (Denis and Mihov 2003; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic 2008; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006).   
Asset finance debt is secured with a charge over the assets pledged by 
the borrowers (Grenadier 1996). This loan collateral enhances the recovery 
value of the debt in the event of default and thus reduces the potential losses 
and risk of lending (Realdon 2006).  Companies with high levels of information 
risk may still obtain access to asset finance because lenders can reclaim at least 
a portion of the funds owed by repossessing the secured asset (Beatty, Liao, and 
Weber 2008).  Because of this collateral relationship, the information risk 
associated with the public financial information is less likely to be a factor in 
deciding whether or not to lend asset finance.  It is therefore expected that 
companies with high information risk have greater access to asset finance debt 
than to other debt types. 
In contrast, while bank and non-bank intermediated debts can also be 
secured over assets (Realdon 2006), there is much more reliance on the 
borrower’s private and public accounting information.  Prior evidence indicates 
that financial intermediaries (bank and non-bank financial institutions) have 
access to higher levels of information in relationship to debtholders which 
allows them to screen borrowers (Fama 1985; James 1987; Bharath, Sunder, 
and Sunder 2004).  Additionally, financial intermediaries’ ability to obtain and 
process both public and private information enables them to better predict and 
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monitor the borrowers’ cash flows.  This superior information access and 
processing in turn influences the flexibility with which financial intermediaries 
customise the terms and condition of the debt contract (Bharath et al. 2008).  
Furthermore, financial intermediaries are well positioned to renegotiate debt 
contracts to reflect and respond to changes in the borrower’s information risk 
by altering the price and non-price terms in the debt contract.  This ability to 
acquire information from sources other than financial public sources and the 
ability to build in terms and conditions to the loan (Diamond 1991) mitigates 
information risk.  Nevertheless, it is expected that information risk has a 
residual negative impact on the access to bank and non-bank debt.   
Finally, non-intermediated debt relies heavily on disclosed public 
information due to the lack of immediacy between the debt contacting parties 
(Arikawa and Miyajima 2005; Bharath et al. 2008).  Lenders of non-
intermediated debt view variability in the level and precision of public 
accounting information as having a negative impact on expected cash flows.  
Furthermore, due to the lack of information sources other than public 
information, lenders of non-intermediated debt react to high levels of 
information risk by limiting the amount of debt to be granted to borrowers.  As 
a result, a negative relationship is expected between information risk and the 
access to non-intermediated debt.  
The general expectation reflects a negative relationship between 
information risk and access to debt types.  However, prior studies by Krishnan 
and Moyer (1994) and Realdon (2006) show that companies with high levels of 
risk tend to take on collateralised debt such as finance leases.  Additionally, the 
effect of information risk is expected to be mitigated by the availability of other 
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sources of information which can be sourced by lenders such as banking and 
non-banking financial institutions.  However, the overall access to bank and 
non-bank debt is still expected to be reduced in the presence of information 
risk.  Furthermore, for debt types that rely heavily on public accounting 
information such as non-intermediated debt, information risk is expected to 
have a negative influence on access to this specific debt type.  The current 
research posits that higher levels of information risk are positively related to 
asset finance debt and negatively related to bank debt, non-bank debt and non-
intermediated debt.  The following hypothesis formally states the relationship 
between information risk and the access to the different debt types.  
 
Hypothesis 2b:  Information risk is positively related to the access to asset 
finance debt and negatively related to the access to bank debt, non-bank 
debt and non-intermediated debt. 
 
Recent studies propose that information risk is also priced in debt 
contracting via the required return demanded by debtholders (Easley and 
O'Hara 2004; Lambert et al. 2007, 2009; Francis et al. 2005).  Easley and 
O’Hara (2004) examine the composition of information amongst different 
investors and conclude that availability of information impacts on cost of 
capital.  They argue that higher levels of private information lead to some 
investors possessing more information than others.  The uninformed investors 
recognise that they are at a disadvantage and demand a higher return to 
compensate them for bearing an information risk. 
 30 
Francis et al. (2005) empirically test the relationship between 
information risk and cost of capital.  They show that information risk, 
represented by poor accruals quality, is priced by the market and is reflected in 
higher costs of capital.  Additionally, Francis et al. (2005) separate accruals 
quality into a discretionary component that is affected by managements’ 
reporting and implementation decisions (Francis et al. 2004) and an innate 
component which reflects the company’s business model and operating 
environment.  Francis et al. (2005) conclude that both the innate and 
discretionary components of accruals quality influence cost of debt.  However, 
the innate component is reported to have a greater effect on cost of debt.             
Lambert et al. (2007) find that accounting information has a direct and 
indirect influence on cost of capital.  The direct effect of the quality of 
accounting information is evident in the market participants’ assessment of risk 
which is reflected in the distribution of future cash flows.  However, the 
indirect effect of accounting information impacts the firm’s real decisions 
which focus on the management’s appropriation of cash flows. 
Lambert et al. (2009) show that information risk, which is determined 
by the precision of information, affects cost of capital.  They assume that in 
perfect competition, the average quality of information about the expected cash 
flows impacts on the required return demanded by investors.  A major 
contribution of Lambert et al. (2009) is their focus on information precision 
rather than information asymmetry as the determinant of information risk. 
While US empirical research has shown that information risk impacts on cost of 
debt (Lambert et al. 2007, 2009; Francis et al. 2005), the Australian evidence, in 
a debt market characterised by private debt, is less clear.  
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Gray et al. (2009) posit that Australia provides a unique setting to study 
the impact of information risk on cost of capital due to two market factors. 
Firstly, corporate Australia typically relies more heavily on private debt which 
implies a generally lower information asymmetry.  Secondly, Australia’s 
continuous disclosure regime which requires listed companies to immediately 
disclose price-sensitive information to the public as soon as that information is 
known to the company also reduces information asymmetry.  Gray et al. (2009) 
find that information risk increases the cost of debt (and equity) capital in 
Australia.  However they find that it is the innate risk rather than the 
discretionary risk component of information risk that drives this result. Further 
evidence is needed to establish the exact nature of the risk factors that are 
priced in a private debt-dominated market such as Australia. 
Following Francis et al. (2005) and Gray et al. (2009), this study expects 
the quality of accounting information to decrease information asymmetry and 
information risk, thereby lowering the required rate of return demanded by 
investors.  The following hypothesis states that higher levels of information risk 
are positively related cost of debt.  
 
Hypothesis 2c:  Information risk is positively related to cost of debt. 
 
Some researchers, such as Francis et al. (2005) and Gray et al. (2009), 
partition information risk into innate and discretionary components and found 
that cost of debt is related to innate risk.  However, it is not theoretically clear, 
how the access to debt contracting will react to the two separate components.  
As a result, the aggregate information risk concept is decomposed and tested in 
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relationship to the debt contracting dimensions as part of the current study’s 
sensitivity analysis.  Following the findings of Francis et al. (2005) and Gray et 
al. (2009), the two components of information risk are expected to increase cost 
of debt.  However, due to the fundamental importance of the company’s innate 
information risk, it is expected to have a greater impact on cost of debt relative 
to the discretionary component (Francis et al. 2005).    
 
2.5 ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
Higher levels of corporate governance are expected to impact access to 
and cost of debt via their influence on default and information risks (Chen and 
Jaggi 2000; Eng and Mak 2003).13 It is useful at this juncture to consider what 
aspects of corporate governance are important in relationship to debt 
contracting.  For the purpose of this study, corporate governance is defined as 
the methods employed by the owners via the board of directors to mitigate the 
debt agency conflict and to align the interests of managers and owners with 
those of the debtholders.  
2.5.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS  
 
Corporate governance is a multi-dimensional construct that consists of 
many systems and processes that elevate the monitoring and control functions 
in the firm.  Prior literature presents several key dimensions to corporate 
governance such as ownership and board structures and financial disclosure 
                                                
13 Appendix C presents a discussion on corporate governance which includes the definition of 
corporate governance, developments in corporate governance practices and the ASX corporate 
governance principles and recommendations. 
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(O’Sullivan, Percy, and Stewart 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Standard & 
Poor 2002b, 2002a).  This thesis focuses on three corporate governance 
dimensions, which are management oversight, financial quality and equity 
control.  Figure 2.2 summaries the corporate governance construct used in this 
study and relates it to other constructs. 
 
Figure 2.2: Corporate Governance Constructs 
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Standard and Poor (S&P) developed a corporate governance 
transparency and disclosure (T&D) score in 2002 (Standard & Poor 2002b).14 
T&D is composed of board and management structure and process, financial 
transparency and information disclosure, ownership structure and investor 
rights (Standard & Poor 2002b).  More recently, an Australian study by 
O’Sullivan et al. (2008) adopted a corporate governance construct that maps 
broadly to the T&D score.  O’Sullivan et al. (2008) classify corporate 
governance attributes into board autonomy, presence and quality of the board, 
audit quality and independent ownership. 
The corporate governance construct used in this thesis draws from the 
T&D score and the O’Sullivan et al. (2008) classification of corporate 
governance.  The construct is represented by management oversight, financial 
quality and equity control dimensions.
15
  Management oversight maps into the 
classification developed by O’Sullivan et al. (2008) which consists of board 
autonomy and presence and quality of the board dimensions.  It also relates to 
the board and management structure and process dimension used by T&D.  
Financial quality is associated with audit quality from O’Sullivan et al. (2008) 
and financial transparency and information disclosure from T&D.  Finally, 
equity control is linked to independent ownership used by O’Sullivan et al. 
(2008) and the ownership structure and investor rights dimension used in T&D.  
The following section relates the three corporate governance dimensions, 
                                                
14  In 2002, S&P also developed Corporate Governance Score (CGS) which assumes that 
corporate governance is represented by ownership structure and influence, financial stakeholder 
rights and relationships, financial transparency and board structure and processes (Standard & 
Poor 2002a).  However, the current study utilises the constructs developed in T&D.  
15  Refer to the Appendix D for a detailed discussion of the elements in each corporate 
governance dimension. 
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management oversight, financial quality and equity control, to default and 
information risk elements of risk assessment. 
 
2.5.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS 
AND RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
It is expected that the three corporate governance dimensions, 
management oversight, financial quality and equity control lower default risk 
and information risk.  The DCM argues that higher levels of corporate 
governance mitigate agency conflicts, curb opportunistic managerial behaviour 
and reduce information asymmetry thus influencing default and information 
risks.   
The management oversight dimension of corporate governance is the 
board’s monitoring of management.  This monitoring is facilitated by the 
structure and processes of the board of directors.  The second principle of 
PGCG emphasises the importance of the board by recommending that 
companies have a majority of independent directors and separating the roles of 
board chair and CEO  (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council 2003b). 
Shareholders elect the board of directors and provide them with 
incentives to  maximize shareholders’ wealth or face the possibility of dismissal 
(McColgan 2001).  Prior research finds that the board of directors is the most 
significant internal corporate governance mechanism available to the company 
(Kent and Stewart 2008; Fama and Jensen 1983b, 1983a; Davidson, Bouresli, 
and Singh 2006).  The role of the board of directors is to monitor potential 
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agency conflicts and to reduce information asymmetry between stakeholders by 
establishing sub-committees that scrutinize the audit process and the hiring and 
remuneration procedures for senior company officers and board members 
(McColgan 2001). 
 
Figure 2.3: Corporate Governance Dimensions and Elements  
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The financial quality dimension of corporate governance is determined 
by the quality of the audit process.  The audit process centres primarily on the 
effectiveness of the audit committee as well as on the identity of the external 
auditor.  The Best Practice Recommendations suggest that companies should 
have an audit committee; however the ASX listing rules mandate that an audit 
committee is required only for the Top 300 companies (Australian Securities 
Exchange 2007).   
An audit committee provides specialized attention to issues such as the 
company’s financial reporting, internal control systems, risk management, and 
appointment of external auditors (Australian Institute of Company Directors 
2007).  The main function of an audit committee is to review financial 
statements and the internal control system (Klein 1998; Azim and Shailer 
2006).  The committee facilitates communication between management, 
internal auditors, and external auditors and thus makes the internal audit process 
more reliable (Zain, Subramaniam, and Goodwin 2004).  The audit committee 
protects shareholders’ interests by ensuring the company’s compliance with 
disclosure regulations (Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, and Kent 2005; Kent and 
Stewart 2008).  The existence and effectiveness of an audit committee plays a 
vital role in alleviating the agency problem through its role in reducing 
information asymmetry (Klein 1998).  An audit committee’s effectiveness is 
measured by its independence, accounting and finance expertise of its members, 
the number of times it meets per year and its size (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993; 
Yatim et al. 2006; Azim and Shailer 2006; Zain et al. 2004; Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent 2006; Kent and Stewart 2008; Marsh and Powell 1989).   
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Another important aspect of financial quality centres on the external 
auditor.  Auditors assess the truth and fairness of their clients’ financial 
information, thereby performing a monitoring role which enhances the financial 
quality of the audited client (Chow 1982).  Larger audit companies have greater 
expertise and resources which enable them to be more effective and detailed in 
investigating their clients’ financial disclosures (Kent and Stewart 2008).  
Previous research has documented the positive impact of a high-quality audit on 
the cost of raising new capital (Copley and Douthett Jr 2002; Beatty 1989; 
Balvers, McDonald, and Miller 1988).  Pittman and Fortin (2004) found that 
retaining a Big Six auditor reduces the company’s cost of debt.   
The financial quality dimension of corporate governance, as shown in 
Figure 2.3, is represented by the independence of the audit committee, the 
financial expertise of audit committee members, the audit committee meetings, 
the size of the audit committee, the existence of an audit committee charter and 
the identity of the external auditor (Francis and Krishnan 1999; Warrick 1999; 
McMullen and Raghunandan 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; DeZoort 1998; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2002; Kalbers and Fogarty 1993; Kim, Liu, and 
Ghon Rhee 2003; Pittman and Fortin 2004).   
The equity control dimension of corporate governance is a control 
mechanism which, unlike other governance practices, is focused on ownership 
concentration rather than on board dynamics.  Research by Ang, Cole, and Wuh 
Lin (2000) investigate the relationship between the ownership structure and the 
agency costs for small businesses and show that management ownership 
reduces agency costs.  Singh and Davidson (2003) replicate the study by Ang et 
al. (2000) on large public companies and arrive at similar results, which show 
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an inverse relationship between insider ownership and agency costs.  Results 
reported by Davidson et al. (2006) support previous findings that relate agency 
costs to ownership structure.  They show that companies with higher levels of 
CEO ownership have lower agency costs.  Another form of governance control 
mechanism is via family and founder ownership structure.  Family firms rely on 
the concentration of ownership to achieve the same objectives set out by 
mandated corporate governance practices.  Research by Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that family-dominated firms 
outperform non-family firms.  Anderson et al. (2003) show that family firms 
incur lower debt cost relative to non-family firms.     
Australian evidence also indicates that agency costs are affected by 
ownership structure.  Fleming, Heaney, and McCosker (2005) show that low 
levels of management and employee ownership result in high agency costs.  
Henry (2007) finds that greater institutional ownership reduces agency costs 
and that ownership structure can serve as a substitute to formal corporate 
governance structures.  The current thesis focuses on two major ownership 
categories.  These consist of blockholders and insider ownership as shown in 
Figure 2.3 (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Holderness and Sheehan 1985; Denis 
2001; Jensen 1993; McConnell and Servaes 1990; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
1988; Kole 1995).  Blockholders that own more than five percent of the total 
shares of their companies have incentives to monitor management’s actions 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  Additionally, executives and managers that own 
their company’s stocks are interested in enhancing the company’s performance 
(Jensen 1993).   
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Higher levels of corporate governance are expected to mitigate agency 
conflicts and reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors, 
thereby reducing default risk.  Prior research finds that the company’s cash flow 
position is a primary determinant of default risk (Scott 1981; Gentry et al. 1985; 
Aziz et al. 1988; Trueman and Titman 1988). Furthermore, agency conflicts 
increase the likelihood of variances in expected cash flows thereby impacting 
on the level of default risk (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2006).  Corporate governance increases the monitoring of management which 
reduces self-seeking managerial behaviour and agency conflicts between 
managers and stakeholders, thereby influencing variances in expected cash 
flows and default risk.  The following hypothesis states that higher levels of 
corporate governance are negatively related to default risk.         
 
Hypothesis 3a:  Higher levels of corporate governance are negatively 
related to default risk.   
 
Higher levels of corporate governance reduce information asymmetry, 
thereby influencing the level of information risk (Strydom, Navissi, Skully, and 
Veeraraghavan 2009).  Prior studies identify information risk as the possibility 
that different investors receive varying information from the company (Easley 
and O'Hara 2004; Lambert et al. 2007, 2009; Francis et al. 2005).  Francis et al. 
(2005) find that information risk and disclosure quality are priced by the market 
which indicates the relevance of financial reporting for investors.  Prior 
research by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Healy, Hutton and Palepu 
(1999) show that higher levels of reporting quality reduce information 
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asymmetry.  More recently, Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007) established a link 
between weakness in internal controls and accruals quality.  Furthermore,  
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and LaFond (2008) support the findings of 
Doyle et al. (2007) by concluding that internal control weaknesses reduce 
accruals quality.  Past research also finds that corporate governance improves 
accruals quality and hence impacts on information risk (Strydom 2008; 
Strydom et al. 2009; Kent, Routledge, and Stewart 2010).  The current study 
posits that higher levels of corporate governance increases the quality of 
accounting information and reduces the level of information asymmetry which 
decreases information risk.  Consequently, the DCM proposes that higher levels 
of corporate governance are negatively related to information risk as stated in 
the following hypothesis.16  
 
Hypothesis 3b:  Higher levels of corporate governance are negatively 
related to information risk.   
 
2.5.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DEBT 
CONTRACTING 
 
The combination of management oversight, financial quality and the 
equity control dimensions of corporate governance are expected to impact on 
the access and cost of debt via the reduction in default risk and information risk 
(H3a and H3b above).  Higher levels of corporate governance mitigate agency 
conflicts amongst managers and other stakeholders which in turn lower default 
                                                
16 The sensitivity analysis partitions the aggregate information risk into innate and discretionary 
components which are then tested against corporate governance. 
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risk.  Additionally, higher levels of corporate governance also decrease 
information asymmetry between the company and its investors which reduces 
information risks (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Beekes and Brown 2006).  As a 
result of the impact corporate governance has on risk assessment, the DCM 
expects debtholders will access more quantities and types of debt at lower costs 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003). 
Higher level of corporate governance increase management oversight by 
encouraging board independence, the separation of the role of chair and CEO, 
frequency of board meetings and the establishment of subcommittees such as 
nomination and remuneration committees (Kent and Stewart 2008; Anderson et 
al. 2004; Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley 1996; Daily and Dalton 1994; Yatim et 
al. 2006; Vafeas 1999b; Main and Johnston 1993; Conyon and Mallin 1997; 
Chiange 2005).  The board structures and processes aspect of corporate 
governance allows for the supervision of actions and decisions taken by 
management, which could lower future cash flows and increase default risk.  
Additionally, corporate governance influences the financial review process by 
ensuring the establishment of an active and independent audit committee 
(Francis and Krishnan 1999; Warrick 1999; Dechow et al. 1996; Cohen et al. 
2002; Kalbers and Fogarty 1993; Pittman and Fortin 2004).  Finally, equity 
shareholder concentration allows the owners to take on a more proactive 
approach in the company’s decision making processes which assists in 
mitigating the agency conflict between the managers and owners (Ang et al. 
2000; Singh and Davidson 2003).  Higher levels of corporate governance curb 
managerial tendencies towards self-serving actions which increase default risk 
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and lower access to debt (quantity and type) and increase cost of debt (Sengupta 
1998; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bougheas et al. 2006; Funchal et al. 2008). 
The quality of accounting information is expected to impact 
significantly on information risk in several ways.  Firstly, accounting 
information allows investors to form expectations about the firm’s expected 
cash flows (Lambert et al. 2009).  Companies with higher levels of transparency 
tend to release value-relevant information, which is used in assessing the 
company’s cash flow position (Sengupta 1998).  Secondly, accounting 
information facilitates the coordination between investors and managers with 
respect to capital investments (Lambert et al. 2007; Francis et al. 2004).  
Aligning the expectations of investors and managers contributes to the 
reduction of information risk.  Thirdly, accounting information plays an integral 
role in reducing information asymmetry amongst the company’s stakeholders 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2005).  Greater transparency leads 
to better monitoring of management, thereby mitigating the moral hazard 
problem which reduces information risk (Easley and O'Hara 2004; Lambert et 
al. 2007). 
The firm’s level of corporate governance influences the quality of 
accounting information which affects information risk (Bushman and Smith 
2003; Bushmana and Smith 2001).  Klein (2002) and Beasley (1996) find that 
corporate governance reduces earnings management and fraudulent reporting.  
As a result, higher levels of corporate governance lead to increased financial 
transparency and disclosure.  The empirical results of Beekes and Brown (2006) 
show that corporate governance increases informative disclosure.  Kent et al. 
(2010) find that higher levels of corporate governance are negatively related to 
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the innate and discretionary components of accruals quality.  Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. (2006) show that accruals quality, determined by the divergence between 
accruals and cash flows, is a proxy for financial transparency, which impacts 
the company’s credit ratings.  An increase in financial transparency results in 
higher quality reported information, which impacts on the company’s expected 
value of cash flows (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  The DCM, depicted in 
Figure 2.4, posits that higher levels of corporate governance reduce default and 
information risks, thereby increasing access to quantity and type of debt and 
lowering cost of debt. 
   
Figure 2.4: Dimensions in the Debt Contracting Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The association between corporate governance and the quantity of debt 
accessed is evident in a number of prior studies.  One recent study is Funchal et 
al. (2008) which find that higher levels of corporate governance increase the 
access to debt and lower cost of debt for Brazilian firms.  Abor (2007) 
examines the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure 
decisions for Ghanaian companies and finds a positive relationship between 
debt levels and corporate governance practices.  Wen et al. (2002) explore the 
impact of corporate governance on the company’s capital structure in China and 
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find a negative relationship between leverage ratio and board composition and 
CEO tenure.  Berger et al. (1997) examine the association between managerial 
entrenchment and capital structure decisions in the United States and show a 
negative relationship between capital structure and managerial entrenchment.  
Friend and Lang (1988) investigate the relationship between managerial 
ownership and the company’s debt levels in the United States and find a 
negative relationship between debt levels and managerial ownership.   
Nevertheless, the relationship between higher levels of corporate 
governance and the quantity of debt accessed is theorised differently in the 
DCM relative to past studies.  A common factor between prior studies is their 
assumption that risk alongside corporate governance drive debt contracting.  
However, unlike prior literature which discounts the intervening effect of risk, 
the DCM argues, based on prior theory, that corporate governance through its 
influence on default risk and information risk, impacts the quantity of debt 
accessed.  Higher levels of corporate governance mitigate the agency conflict 
between managers and debtholders which lowers the risk of default (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003).  Additionally, companies that 
adopt higher levels of corporate governance tend to have greater financial 
transparency and lower information asymmetry relative to other companies 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; 
Beekes and Brown 2006).  This prompts lenders to grant companies greater 
access to quantities of debt (Abor 2007; Funchal et al. 2008). The relationship 
between higher levels of corporate governance and the access to quantities of 
debt is expressed in the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 4a:  Higher levels of corporate governance impact positively on 
the quantity of debt accessed via the reduction of default risk and 
information risk. 
 
Access to debt types is influenced by several firm specific factors, one 
of which is corporate governance.  Prior studies find that default risk, age, 
collateral level, size, leverage level and profitability are the main drivers of 
access to type of debt (González et al. 2007; Bougheas et al. 2006; Denis and 
Mihov 2003; Cantillo and Wright 2000).  Bougheas et al. (2006) examine the 
determinants of debt sources for British companies and show that small, young, 
risky, and indebted firms access bank financing.  Denis and Mihov (2003) 
examine the determinants of public and private financing of United States 
companies and show that companies with the highest credit quality access 
public debt, firms with medium credit quality access bank debt, and firms with 
the lowest credit quality access non-bank debt.  In addition, firms that access 
public debt are larger, more profitable, more highly leveraged, have higher 
proportions of fixed assets relative to total assets, and fewer growth 
opportunities than firms that rely on bank debt.  Cantillo and Wright (2000) 
explore the relationship between financing sources and various company 
characteristics for United States companies.  The results show that large 
companies with high collateral and high cash flows borrow from public lenders.  
Although the links between access to debt types and firm specific factors are 
well documented in the literature, only few studies address the association 
between corporate governance and access to debt types.   
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The DCM suggests that higher levels of corporate governance impact on 
default risk and information risk and thereby influence the type of debt accessed 
as shown in Figure 2.4.  It could be argued that corporate governance has a 
differential impact on the four types of debt depending on the degree of risk 
mitigation that governance has on each debt type.  At the heart of this argument 
is the expected impact of corporate governance on non-intermediated debt.  A 
study by Uppal (2007) finds that extensive disclosure requirements and 
standards of liability (better governance) are associated with larger bond 
markets (greater access to non-intermediated debt).  On the other end of the 
spectrum, access to asset finance debt is not expected to increase in the 
presence of higher levels of corporate governance.  Lenders of asset finance 
debt are assured that borrowed capital is secured with assets pledged by 
borrowers (Grenadier 1996).  As a result of this collateralised debt agreement, 
the monitoring and informational advantages associated with implementing 
higher levels of corporate governance are less likely to be a factor in asset 
finance lending decisions.  However, a study by Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon 
(2008) find that higher levels of corporate governance increase access to lease 
financing.  Based on prior findings, the DCM discounts the differential 
corporate governance argument and instead suggests that higher levels of 
corporate governance, through the reduction of risk, have a positive influence 
on all debt types.     
Higher levels of corporate governance are expected to decrease default 
risk and information risk, thereby increasing access to all debt types.  Corporate 
governance reduces managerial opportunistic behaviour which reduces default 
risk (Byun 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  A reduction in default risk 
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permits borrowers to access a wider variety of debt types (Diamond 1991; 
Cantillo and Wright 2000; Denis and Mihov 2003; Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein 1993).  Additionally, higher levels of corporate governance assist in 
the discharge of quality financial information, thereby bridging the information 
gap between stakeholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Sengupta 1998; 
Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Beekes and Brown 2006).  As a result, the 
company achieves greater transparency, which contributes to reducing 
information risk by enabling creditors to assess value-relevant information 
(Bernoth and Wolff 2008).  The relationship between higher levels of corporate 
governance and the access to debt types is expressed in the following 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4b:  Higher levels of corporate governance impact positively on 
the access to the different types of debt via the reduction of default risk and 
information risk. 
 
There is a body of research that investigates the association between 
corporate governance and cost of debt.  Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) study the 
impact of corporate governance on credit ratings for United States companies 
and find that higher credit ratings, which are proxies for cost of debt, are 
positively related to financial transparency, board independence, board stock 
ownership, and board expertise.  Additionally, higher credit ratings are 
negatively associated with blockholders that owned at least 5 percent of total 
shares and CEO power on the board.  Klock et al. (2005) investigate the 
relationship between a corporate governance index and the cost of debt 
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financing for United States companies and find that a negative relationship 
exists between the corporate governance index and cost of debt financing.  
Mansi et al. (2004a) study the relationship between auditor characteristics and 
cost of debt for United States companies and show that auditor quality and 
tenure are negatively related to cost of debt.   
Other leading studies also focus on the influence of corporate 
governance on cost of debt.  Pittman and Fortin (2004) examine the association 
between auditor choice and cost of debt for initial public offerings for United 
States companies and show a negative relationship between hiring a Big Six 
auditor and cost of debt for young companies.  Anderson et al. (2004) 
investigate the relationship between board structure and the cost of debt for 
United States companies and finds that independent boards, larger boards, and 
fully independent audit committees are associated with a lower cost of debt.  
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) examine the association between corporate 
governance and bond ratings and yields for United States companies and show 
that large institutional ownership is associated with higher ratings and lower 
yields.  In addition, as the concentration of institutional investors increases, the 
bond ratings decrease and the bond yields increase.  The presence of 
independent directors is positively related to the higher rating and lower yields.  
Sengupta (1998) explores the link between the overall quality of disclosure and 
the companies’ credit ratings for United States companies and finds a negative 
relationship between the two measures of cost of debt and the quality of 
disclosure. 
The current study theorises that higher levels of corporate governance 
impact on cost of debt.  In the DCM, corporate governance operates through 
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risk assessment thereby influencing cost of debt.  In this sense, the approach 
outlined in the DCM is distinguished from past literature which overlooks 
testing the theoretical links between corporate governance and risk assessment 
and suffices with using risk measures as control variables (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Klock et al. 2005; Pittman and 
Fortin 2004).  In the DCM, the reduction of agency conflicts and information 
asymmetry brought about by higher levels of corporate governance is explicitly 
stated and examined.  
The DCM proposes that companies that implement higher levels of 
corporate governance are inclined to mitigate agency conflicts amongst 
stakeholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003; Beekes and Brown 2006).  As a result, creditors obtain 
decision-relevant information about the company’s expected cash flows which 
contributes to the reduction of default risks thereby lowering the cost of debt 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; 
Beekes and Brown 2006).  Additionally, the effect of higher levels of corporate 
governance on the quality, transparency and disclosure of accounting 
information reduce information risk, thereby lowering the required rate of 
return demanded by debtholders. The following hypothesis states the proposed 
relationships between higher levels of corporate governance and cost of debt. 
 
Hypothesis 4c:  Higher levels of corporate governance impact negatively on 
cost of debt via the reduction of default risk and information risk. 
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2.6 COMPANY SIZE EFFECT 
     
One final consideration is the impact of company size on the DCM.  
Company size is related to a number of firm systems and processes that impact 
on default and information risk that are present in the company.  From the 
perspective of default risk, size is important for two reasons.  The first reason is 
that smaller firms have less bargaining power with creditors to restructure debt 
or internal resources to deter financial threats.  The second reason is that 
resource allocation differs between small and large firms (Carter and Van 
Auken 2006; Headd 2003).  Small firms have fewer resources to draw from 
during periods of financial difficulty.  This impacts adversely on their ability to 
cope under the threat of default.  As a result, smaller companies are more likely 
to encounter debt repayment problems relative to larger companies.  
Additionally, smaller companies have less chance of surviving a state of default 
in comparison to larger companies.  Consequently, smaller firms are perceived 
to have higher default risk relative to their large counterparts.   
Small companies generally operate within a poor information 
environment which diminishes financial transparency and increases information 
asymmetry amongst stakeholders (Elfakhani and Zaher 1998; Binks et al. 1992; 
Lean and Tucker 2001; Brewer 2007).  As a result of the high cost of acquiring 
company information, financial analysts are less apt to follow and report on 
those companies (Easterday et al. 2008; Chang et al. 2006; Brewer 2007).  The 
analysts’ neglect of small firms further perpetuates the information asymmetry 
problem, thereby increasing chances of misevaluation (Chang et al. 2006).  As a 
result, a stringent risk assessment, assisted by the implementation of higher 
levels of corporate governance, is imperative for small companies.  The 
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informational benefits of risk assessment and corporate governance directly 
impact access and cost dimensions of debt contracting, thereby increasing 
access to debt and lowering cost of debt.    
Small companies also support dissimilar corporate governance practices 
to those normally adopted by large companies (Australian Institute of Company 
Directors 2003; Australian Securities Exchange 2004; Da Silva Rosa, Izan, and 
Lin 2004; Laing and Weir 1999).  The Horwath Corporate Governance Report 
(2004) indicates that small companies implement PGCG less frequently than 
large companies.  Similarly, the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2006) 
state that small companies adopted the recommendations at a lower rate 
compared to larger companies.  Furthermore, the variation in corporate 
governance practices amongst different sized companies is evident in the PGCG 
which mandate that an audit committee is required only for the Top 300 
companies (Australian Securities Exchange 2007). 
The dissimilarity in corporate governance implementation by different 
sized companies could be due to the costs associated with putting corporate 
governance into practice.  Small companies claim they incur significant 
administrative costs if they follow the ASX’s corporate governance 
recommendations (Clarke 2006; Murray 2005; Australian Government 1996).  
Furthermore, small companies contend that they are disadvantaged by PGCG 
(Nicholas 2003; Hayes 2003) but that they are compelled to adopt these 
recommendations because non-adoption sends a negative signal to the market 
(Milligan and Brearley 2003; Costa 2003; Chong 2002).  It is an empirical 
question whether the asserted costs of implementing the recommended 
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governance practices are warranted in terms of the contracting cost-benefit 
payoff for firms and, in particular, for small firms. 
The DCM proposes that company size is a key factor that warrants 
assessment and analysis.  Small companies possess greater vulnerability to 
default risk and information asymmetry relative to larger firms, which impacts 
disadvantageously on their access to and cost of debt dimensions.  Additionally, 
due to the disproportionate cost of adopting corporate governance, small 
companies suffer from uneven implementation of governance practices in 
comparison to larger companies.  As a result, the study proposes that small 
companies are positioned to experience greater debt contracting benefits when 
higher levels of corporate governance are applied.  Those benefits stem from 
the managerial control and financial quality dimensions of corporate 
governance which contribute to the reduction of default and information risk.  
Furthermore, a reduction in the level of risk increases access to debt and 
decreases cost of debt.  The following hypotheses formally state the relationship 
between company size and the debt contracting dimensions in the presence of 
higher levels of corporate governance. 
 
Hypothesis 5a:  Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance access more debt. 
Hypothesis 5b:  Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance access more of each type of debt. 
Hypothesis 5c:  Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance pay a lower cost of debt. 
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2.7 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter develops the DCM which focuses on the relationship 
between higher levels of corporate governance and the debt contracting 
outcomes of access and cost of debt via the lowering of default risk and 
information risk.  The model holds that higher levels of corporate governance 
reduce agency conflicts and lower information asymmetry amongst 
stakeholders.  As a result, the company is assessed by investors as having lower 
default and information risks which leads to greater access to debt and lower 
cost of debt.  The model further posits that smaller companies, which suffer 
from high levels of default and information risks, experience greater benefits 
from corporate governance and thus can access greater quantities and types of 
debt and negotiate lower costs of debt.  
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses 
H1a:  Default risk is negatively related to the quantity of debt accessed. 
H1b:  Default risk is negatively related to the access to:   
                                                                                           Asset financed debt. 
                                                                                           Bank debt. 
                                                                                           Non-bank debt. 
                                                                                           Non-intermediated debt. 
H1c:  Default risk is positively related to cost of debt. 
H2a: Information risk is negatively related to the quantity of debt accessed. 
H2b: Information risk is: 
                                       Positively related to the access to asset finance debt. 
                                       Negatively related to the access to bank debt. 
                                       Negatively related to the access to non-bank debt. 
                                       Negatively related to the access to non-intermediated debt. 
H2c:  Information risk is positively related to cost of debt. 
H3a: Higher levels of corporate governance are negatively related to default risk. 
H3b: Higher levels of corporate governance are negatively related to information risk. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Hypotheses (Continued) 
 
Hypotheses 
H4a: Higher levels of corporate governance impact positively on the quantity of debt 
accessed via the reduction of default and information risk. 
H4b: Higher levels of corporate governance impact positively on the access to the 
following debt types via the reduction of default and information risk: 
                                                                                                    Asset financed debt. 
                                                                                                    Bank debt. 
                                                                                                    Non-bank debt. 
                                                                                                    Non-intermediated debt. 
H4c: Higher levels of corporate governance impact negatively on cost of debt via the 
reduction of default and information risk. 
H5a: Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate governance access 
more interest bearing debt. 
H5b: Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate governance access 
more of the following debt types: 
                                                                 Asset financed debt. 
                                                                 Bank debt. 
                                                                 Non-bank debt. 
                                                                 Non-intermediated debt. 
H5c: Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate governance pay a lower 
a cost of debt. 
 
 
 
The chapter concludes by formulating five testable hypotheses as 
summarised in Table 2.1.  The first hypothesis posits a negative association 
between default risk and the access to quantities and types of debt.  
Additionally, the hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between default 
risk and cost of debt.  The second hypothesis states that information risk is 
negatively related to the quantity of debt accessed.  It also states that 
information risk increases access to asset finance debt, reduces access to bank 
debt, non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt.  Furthermore, the second 
hypothesis posits that information risk is positively related to cost of debt.  The 
third hypothesis proposes that higher levels of corporate governance are 
negatively related to default and information risks.  The fourth hypothesis states 
that higher levels of corporate governance are positively related to access to 
quantities and types of debt and negatively related to cost of debt.  The fifth 
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hypothesis focuses on the relationship between company size and the debt 
contracting outcomes in the presence of higher levels of corporate governance.  
The hypothesis states that smaller companies access higher quantities of debt, 
access more types of debt and pay lower cost of debt in the presence of higher 
levels of corporate governance.  The following chapter presents the empirical 
methods used to formally test the hypotheses developed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter describes the research design which includes the sample, 
variables and the empirical methods employed to test the DCM and debt 
contracting hypotheses developed in the previous chapter.  The remainder of the 
chapter is divided into five sections.  Section 3.2 outlines the research design.  
Section 3.3 discusses the sample and data collection procedures.  Section 3.4 
provides operational definitions for the constructs which are developed in 
chapter two.  Section 3.5 describes the analysis procedure.  Finally, section 3.6 
presents the summary for the chapter.    
 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The research empirically tests the theoretical DCM developed in chapter 
two (refer to Figure 2.4).  The sample used in the study consists of 1,239 
Australian, non-financial, listed companies with a 2007 June 30 balance date.  
The study provides the measurements for corporate governance practices, risk 
assessment, access to quantity and type of debt, and cost of debt.  Key variables 
used to proxy for the DCM and test the relationship between corporate 
governance and debt contracting, are shown in Figure 3.1.       
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Figure 3.1: Measures of Debt Contracting Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research empirically estimates the parameters to test the DCM by 
estimating OLS and 2SLS regressions.  The dependent variables are access to 
debt (quantity and type) and cost of debt.  Access to quantity of debt is 
measured as the ratio of interest bearing debt to total liabilities.  Access to each 
type of debt is measured as the proportion of the aggregate amount of asset 
finance debt, bank debt, non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt divided by 
total interest bearing debt.  Cost of debt is measured as the weighted-average 
interest expense.  The independent variables in the regression are corporate 
governance, default risk and information risk.  Corporate governance is 
represented by a composite score which includes 14 individual corporate 
governance variables (Defond et al. 2005).  Default risk is measured by a Z-
score which is estimated by using discriminate analysis of failed and non-failed 
companies (Altman 1968) while information risk is measured as accruals 
quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2005).  The model also 
controls for the company’s industry, reputation, collateral, and size. 
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3.3 SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION 
PROCEDURES 
  
The sample consists of public companies listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange with a 2007 June 30 balance date.  The reason for sufficing with only 
one year’s worth of data is due to the assumption that corporate governance is 
sticky and that it does not change very quickly over time (Black, Jang, and Kim 
2006; Patro 2005). The sample is chosen from the year 2007 because it 
represents the last available year prior to the global financial crisis of 2008 – 
2009.  Companies with a June 30 balance date are included to ensure 
comparability in the information across a consistent reporting period similar to 
prior studies (Bartholomeusz and Tanewski 2006; Whelan 2004; Kent et al. 
2010).   
The original sample frame includes 1,824 listed companies.  However, 
due to the focus on debt contracting, 257 companies from the banking, 
insurance and financial sectors are excluded from the sample.  Furthermore, the 
study restricts the sample to companies with a June 30 balance date, which 
excludes a further 328 companies and results in a balance of 1,239 companies.  
The data is collected from annual reports and database information from 
AspectHuntley’s FinAnalysis and DatAnalysis and Thomson Reuters Tick 
History (TRTH).  A summary of the sample details are listed in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Sample Details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 OPERATIONALISATION OF 
CONSTRUCTS 
 
 This section discusses the measurements that are used to represent the 
concepts developed in chapter two.  The dependent variables include proxies 
for access to debt (quantity and type) and cost of debt.  The independent 
variables represent corporate governance, default risk and information risk.  
Finally, control variables measure the industry, reputation, collateral, and size 
concepts.  The following sections provide a detailed overview of the 
calculations for the different variables used in the study. 
3.4.1 ACCESS TO DEBT 
 
Access to debt has two sub-components which are the quantity and type 
of debt accessed by the company.  The variable, QUANT, is the proxy for the 
access to the quantity of debt which represents the quantity of interest bearing 
debt that the company obtains to finance its operations (Friend and Lang 1988; 
Abor 2007; Wen et al. 2002; Berger et al. 1997; Funchal et al. 2008).  One of 
the measurements used by Funchal et al. (2008) to proxy for access to debt is 
the log of total debt.  However, since larger firms tend to have more debt 
 
Sample Details 
            
Companies 
Original sample frame       1,824 
Companies from the  financial sector         257 
Companies with a balance date other than June 30         328 
Final sample frame      1,239 
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relative to smaller firms (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999), the log of 
total debt is likely to be biased by the size of the company.  Therefore a more 
appropriate measure is to scale quantity of interest bearing debt by total 
liabilities in order to capture the proportion of interest bearing debt accessed 
relative to other financial liabilities thereby defusing the impact of size 
(Bougheas et al. 2006; González et al. 2007).  In accordance with prior 
literature, the current study measures access to quantity of debt, QUANT, as 
total interest bearing debt divided by total liabilities (Bougheas et al. 2006; 
González et al. 2007).  The following is the calculation for QUANT.17 
 
i
i
i
LIAB
IDEBT
QUANT =                               (3.1) 
Where: 
iQUANT   = Total interest bearing debt divided by total liabilities for 
firm i. 
  
iIDEBT     = Total interest bearing debt for firm i. 
iLIAB      = Total liabilities for firm i. 
 
The second sub-component of access to debt focuses on the company’s 
ability to contract four types of debt:  asset finance debt, bank debt, non-bank 
debt and non-intermediated debt.  Similar to past studies, the four debt type 
variables are measured as the proportion of the aggregate amount of each debt 
type to the total interest bearing debt (González et al. 2007; Bougheas et al. 
2006; Denis and Mihov 2003; Cantillo and Wright 2000).  The first debt type 
                                                
17 Refer to Appendix K for calculations of alternate access to debt measures.  The appendix also 
includes regression results using the alternate measures.   
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variable, ASFIN, is asset finance debt divided by total interest bearing debt.  
Asset finance refers to interest bearing debt that is secured by the company’s 
assets such as hire purchases and finance leases.  The second debt type variable, 
BANK, is bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt where bank debt 
comprises bank loans, facilities, and overdrafts.  The third debt type measure, 
NONBANK, is non-bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt where non-
bank debt refers to loans from non-bank financial institutions, the company’s 
directors and loans from other related and unrelated parties.  The final debt type 
variable, NONINT, is the non-intermediated debt divided by total interest 
bearing debt where non-intermediated debt consists of convertible and non-
convertible commercial papers, notes, and bonds.  The following measures are 
used to proxy for the company’s access to the four types of debt.  
 
i
i
i
IDEBT
AFDEBT
ASFIN =                            (3.2a)
 Where: 
iASFIN       = Asset finance debt divided by total interest bearing debt 
for firm i. 
  
iAFDEBT   = Asset finance debt for firm i which includes hire 
purchase and finance lease liabilities. 
 
iIDEBT       = Total interest bearing debt for firm i. 
 
i
i
i
IDEBT
BKDEBT
BANK =                             (3.2b)
 Where: 
iBANK      = Bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt for firm i. 
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iBKDEBT   = Bank debt for firm i which includes bank loans, facilities, 
and overdraft. 
 
iIDEBT        = Total interest bearing debt for firm i. 
 
i
i
i
IDEBT
NBKDEBT
NONBANK =                 (3.2c)
 Where: 
=iNONBANK   = Non-bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt 
for firm i. 
  
iNBKDEBT   =  Non-bank debt for firm i which includes loans made 
by non-bank financial institutions. 
 
iIDEBT             =  Total interest bearing debt for firm i. 
 
i
i
i
IDEBT
NINDEBT
NONINT =                 (3.2d)
 Where: 
iNONBANK   = Non-intermediated debt divided by total interest 
bearing debt for firm i. 
  
iNINDEBT   = Non-intermediated debt for firm i which includes 
commercial papers, notes, and bond. 
 
iIDEBT         = Total interest bearing debt for firm i. 
3.4.2 COST OF DEBT 
 
The second dimension of debt contracting is the cost of debt negotiated 
by the company.  Prior studies, which focus primarily on traded debt issued by 
US companies, use yield spreads to proxy for cost of debt (Nikolaev and Van 
Lent 2005; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Boubakri and Ghouma 2006; Klock et 
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al. 2005; Anderson et al. 2004; Shaw 2007; Sengupta 1998; Schauten and Blom 
2006).  However, unlike the US, Australian companies are less reliant on traded 
debt and often resort to financial intermediaries to access interest bearing debt 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2005a).  As a result, this study utilises the interest 
rate information disclosed in the notes to the financial statements to calculate 
the cost of debt.   The following is the cost of debt measure, COST, which is the 
calculated weighted average interest rate for each debt type.  
 
∑
=






×=
N
i i
ij
ii
IDEBT
TYPE
rCOST
1
,
       
                    (3.3)   
Where N is the number of types of debt and ri is the interest rate for each debt 
type reported in the notes to the annual reports of firm i.18  The definitions for 
the other variables are as follows: 
        
iCOST   = Cost of debt for firm i. 
  
ijTYPE ,  
 = Amount of interest bearing debt in debt type j for firm i. 
 
iIDEBT  = Total interest bearing debt for firm i.   
3.4.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Corporate governance is a multi-faceted concept that is captured by 
fourteen individual variables.
19
  Consistent with previous literature, the study 
calculates a corporate governance composite by summarising the fourteen 
                                                
18 Note that not all companies have access to all debt types.  Some companies have access to a 
single debt type and therefore cost of debt for those companies is the interest expense for that 
particular debt type. 
19 Refer to Appendix E definitions of individual corporate governance variables. 
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individual corporate governance variables into a single variable (Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick 2003; Defond et al. 2005). 20   The individual corporate 
governance variables are listed in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Summary of the Fourteen Individual Corporate Governance 
Variables 
 
Variable 
Name Variable Description 
 INDP Proportion of non-executive independent directors on the board. 
 DUAL One if the CEO is separate from chair of the board, and zero otherwise. 
 BDSIZE Number of directors on the board. 
 BDMEET Number of board meetings. 
 NOM One if the company has a nomination committee, and zero otherwise. 
 REM One if the company has a remuneration committee, and zero otherwise. 
 AUDCHRT One if the company has an audit committee charter, and zero otherwise. 
 AUDIND Proportion of non-executive independent members on the audit committee. 
 AUDEXP Proportion of audit committee members with accounting and finance 
qualifications. 
 AUDSIZE Number of directors on audit committee. 
 AUDMEET Number of audit committee meetings. 
 AUDITOR One if the auditor is a Big Four, and zero otherwise. 
 BLOCK Percentage of shares owned by investors owning five percent or more of the 
company’s shares. 
 INSIDER Percentage of company’s shares owned by insiders. 
 
The calculation of the corporate governance composite requires 
converting non-binary variables to binary scores.  Corporate governance 
variables, such as DUAL, NOM, REM, AUDCHRT, and AUDITOR are 
already binary in nature.  However, the remainder of the fourteen variables are 
non-binary, therefore they are recoded to be dichotomous by allocating a value 
of one if the variable is above the sample median and zero otherwise.  The 
fourteen dichotomous variables are added to produce a governance composite, 
GOV, which has a maximum value of fourteen and a minimum value of zero 
(Defond et al. 2005).  A value of fourteen indicates strong corporate governance 
                                                
20  Previous studies calculate an aggregate of corporate governance because individual 
governance measures represent similar aspects of corporate governance, which imply a high 
correlation between those measures (Gompers et al. 2003; Defond et al. 2005).   
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and a value of zero indicates weak corporate governance.  The following 
variable represents the corporate governance composite.   
 
∑
=
=
14
1
,
j
iji CORPGOVGOV                            (3.4) 
 
Where: 
iGOV               = The level of corporate governance for firm i. 
  
ijCORPGOV ,   
=  The jth individual corporate governance variable for 
firm i. 
                 
3.4.4 RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
 There are two aspects of risk assessment: default risk and information 
risk.  Default risk is represented by Z-score, while the proxy used for 
information risk is the accruals quality.  The variable measurements for the two 
risk concepts are presented in the following sections.  
3.4.4.1 DEFAULT RISK  
  
Consistent with extensive prior literature, the current study estimates a 
default risk score by using multivariate linear discriminate (MLD) analysis to 
estimate an Australian Z-score model (Altman 1968, 1983).  The study uses 
failed and non-failed Australian companies that are similar in size, industry and 
time period to estimate the Z-score.  Following the approach used by Altman 
(1968, 1983), this study employs a five factor model where each factor 
represents an accounting ratio.  By using discriminate analysis, the study 
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calculates the weights of the five accounting ratios which are then used to 
estimate an Australian market-specific Z-score.  The five accounting ratios are 
working capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, earnings before 
interest and tax to total assets, total debt to total liabilities and sales to total 
assets (refer to Tables G.8 and G.9 in Appendix G for details about the 
estimation and decomposition of the Z-score).  The following equation is used 
to estimate the Z-score (Altman 1968, 1983).    
 
55443322110 XXXXXZSCORE i ββββββ +++++=  
                    (3.5a) 
Where: 
 
iZSCORE  =  Default risk score for firm i. 
 β        =  Discriminate coefficient (weight). 
 
1X         = Working capital/Total assets. 
 2X        = Retained earnings/Total assets. 
 
3X        = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets. 
 
4X        = Book value of total debt/Total assets. 
 
5X         =  Sales/Total assets. 
 
A possible issue with the Z-score calculation is the way in which it 
interprets default risk.  A high Z-score infers a lower default risk which could 
complicate the reading of the results.  In order to simplify the interpretation of 
the Z-score result, the study multiplies each company’s Z-score by negative 
one.  As a result, a high Z-score signals a high default risk.    
3.4.4.2 INFORMATION RISK 
 
The study uses accruals quality to proxy for information risk.  The 
measurement of information risk follows the specifications for accruals quality 
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used by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and applied in Francis et al. (2005).  
Accruals quality is calculated by taking the standard deviation of the firm-
specific residual (error term) from years t to t - 5.  The error terms are a result of 
regressing change in working capital accruals on cash flows from period t, t+1, 
and t-1.  Additionally, the equation includes changes in revenue as well as the 
level of property, plant and equipment as shown in the following regression 
estimation.21 The following shows the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
accruals quality model which is used to obtain the error term. 
 
ttitititititi PPEREVCFOCFOCFOWCA εββββββ ++∆++++=∆ +− ,5,41,3,21,10,  
                   (3.5b) 
Where: 
tiWCA ,∆  =  Change in current assets - change in cash - change in current 
liabilities + change in short-term debt. 
tiCFO ,    =  Cash flow from operations for the ith firm in year t. 
tiREV ,∆  =  Change in revenue for the ith firm in year t. 
tiPPE ,    =  Property, plant, and equipment for the ith company for year 
t.  
tε           =  Firm specific residual for the ith company for year t. 
 
The study interprets a low standard deviation of the error terms as a 
signal of high quality of accruals, thus lower information risk.  Furthermore, a 
high variation in the errors indicates that working capital maps poorly into cash 
flows, which translates into inadequate financial transparency and disclosure, 
and high information risk.  The following variable is used to proxy for 
information risk.    
 
                                                
21 All variables in equation (3.5b) are scaled by average of beginning and ending total assets. 
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iACCRL =   Accruals quality for ith company which is measured as the 
standard deviation of the firm-specific residual (error term) 
from years t to t-5 where the error terms are from the 
following estimation of Dechow and Dichev (2002) model: 
 
ttitititititi PPEREVCFOCFOCFOWCA εββββββ ++∆++++=∆ +− ,5,41,3,21,10,
      
                       (3.5c) 
3.4.5 CONTROL VARIABLES  
   
The study controls for a number of potential confounding variables that 
could also impact on the access and cost dimensions of debt contracting.  Prior 
research identifies the firm’s reputation, collateral, size and industry are the key 
variables to control (Pittman and Fortin 2004; Klock et al. 2005).  Additionally, 
profitability is also considered a significant driver of debt contracting variables 
which needs to be controlled (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003; Sengupta 1998).   However, the Z-score, measured as a 
composition of different accounting ratios, includes return on assets which is a 
common profitability measure.  As a result, the study does not include a 
separate variable to control for profitability.  The measurements for reputation, 
collateral, size and industry are detailed in this section. 
 
a) Reputation: 
A company’s reputation can influence its ability to obtain credit and the 
cost it pays on any borrowings (Pittman and Fortin 2004; Diamond 1989).  
The study uses company age as a proxy for reputation, which is the length 
of time a company has been incorporated (Pittman and Fortin 2004; 
Diamond 1989).  The following variable represents the age of the company. 
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iAGE  
=  number of years since incorporation for firm i.             
                (3.6a) 
 
b) Collateral 
Asset collateral provides the borrower with greater access to credit markets 
(Bougheas et al. 2006).  In accordance with prior research, the current study 
measures collateral as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Berger et al. 1997; 
Wen et al. 2002).  The following variable represents the company’s collateral. 
  
i
i
i
ASSET
PPE
COLLT =    
                 (3.6b)         
  Where: 
 iCOLLT  =   Asset collateral for firm i. 
iPPT      =   Property, plant, and equipment for firm i. 
iASSET   =   Total assets for firm i. 
c) Size 
Company size is an important factor which influences the relationship 
between corporate governance practices, access to debt and cost of debt 
(Minton and Schrand 1999; Byun 2007; Brewer 2007; Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2006; Bougheas et al. 2006; 
Cantillo and Wright 2000).  Previous literature by Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), 
Sengupta (1998), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al, (2006), Piot and Missonier (2007), 
Boubakri and Ghouma (2006), James and Cotter (2007), Chen and Jian (2006), 
Klock et al. (2003), Anderson et al. (2004), Black, Jang et al. (2006) and 
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Mendez and Garcia (2007) measure company size based on total assets.  Due to 
the fact that total assets tend to have a highly-skewed distribution (Honohan 
2004; Kent and Ung 2003), the current study uses the log of total assets as a 
proxy for company size.  
 
iSIZE = Log of book value of total assets for firm i.                        
           (3.6c) 
d) Industry  
Prior studies indicate the importance of the company’s industry in 
determining the access to debt and cost of debt (Funchal et al. 2008).  The 
current study uses economic sectors with two-digit Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) codes to represent the industry.  The economic 
sectors used are energy, materials, industrial, consumer discretionary, consumer 
staples, health care, utilities, information technology, and telecommunications.  
However, the financial sector is excluded from the analysis because financial 
ratios cannot be applied on companies from that sector.  An industry fixed 
effect, which is composed of Y - 1 industry dummy variables with Y being the 
number of industries included in the sample, is used to capture the impact of the 
industry on the debt contracting variables.  Each industry variable equals 1 if 
the observation falls within that industry and zero otherwise.  The following is 
the industry dummy used in this research.  
 
iINDUSTRY  
=  
      
                  (3.6d)
 
 
  1 if firm i belongs to Y-1 industry  
  0 otherwise 
 72 
The variables used to proxy for corporate governance, risk assessment and debt 
contracting are summarised in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: Summary of Measures 
 
 
3.5 ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
 
 
 The analysis procedures utilise the variables developed in this chapter to 
test the relationship between corporate governance, risk assessment and debt 
contracting.  An initial descriptive analysis highlights the summary statistics of 
the different variables.  Univariate analysis is conducted to examine the 
variances in means which is followed by multivariate analysis, OLS and 2SLS 
regressions, to test the hypothesis of the study.  Finally, sensitivity analysis is 
Type Variable Definition 
 
iQUANT  Total interest bearing debt divided by total liabilities for firm i.  
 
iASFIN  
Asset financed debt divided by total interest bearing debt for 
firm i.  
Dependent 
Variables i
BANK  Bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt for firm i.  
 
iNONBANK  Non-bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt for firm i.  
 
iNONINT  
Non-intermediated debt divided by total interest bearing debt  
for firm i.  
 
iCOST  Cost of debt for firm i. 
 
iGOV  The level of corporate governance for firm i.  
Independent 
Variables i
ZSCORE  Default risk for firm i. 
 
iACCRL  Accruals quality for firm i. 
 
iAGE  Number of years since incorporation for firm i. 
 
iCOLLT  Total fixed assets by total assets for firm i. 
Control 
Variables i
SIZE  Log of total assets for firm i. 
 
iINDUSTRY  
One if the observation falls within the Y - 1 industry and zero 
otherwise for firm i. 
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carried out to check for the robustness of the results.  The analysis procedures 
are detailed in the following sections. 
3.5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The study calculates the descriptive statistics of the different variables in 
the study with the focus being on a detailed examination of debt contracting 
measures.  Changes to the sample size that are related to the calculations of the 
various variables are reported and discussed in this section.  The descriptive 
statistics include minimum and maximum values along with the means, 
medians and standard deviations for the various measures.  Additionally, an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) is applied to the variables along with Tukey’s 
Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) post hoc test in an attempt to highlight 
the variations amongst the variables.  Finally, the study offers a correlation 
analysis of the independent and control variables in the study thereby showing 
preliminary relationships amongst these variables. 
3.5.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
 
The study uses regression analysis to test the hypotheses developed in 
the previous chapter.  The parameters for hypotheses one to three are estimated 
using OLS.  The following are the OLS models used to test the first three 
hypotheses.22 
H1a: Default risk is negatively related to the quantity of debt accessed. 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
               (3.7a) 
                                                
22 Variable definitions are listed under Table 3.3.  Also ‘R’ refers to the four types of debt: 
ASFIN, BANK, NONBANK, and NONINT. 
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H1b: Default risk is negatively related to the access to the different types of 
debt. 
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCORETYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
               (3.7b) 
 
H1c: Default risk is positively related to cost of debt. 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCORECOST ++++++= ββββββ  
                (3.7c) 
Hypothesis 2a:  Information risk is negatively related to the quantity of 
debt accessed. 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
                (3.7d) 
Hypothesis 2b:  Information risk is positively related to the access to asset 
finance debt and negatively related to the access to bank debt, non-bank 
debt and non-intermediated debt. 
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
                 (3.7e) 
Hypothesis 2c:  Information risk is positively related to cost of debt. 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
                 (3.7f) 
Hypothesis 3a:  Higher levels of corporate governance are negatively 
related to default risk. 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVZSCORE ++++++= ββββββ  
               (3.7g) 
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Hypothesis 3a:  Higher levels of corporate governance are negatively 
related to information risk. 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVACCRL ++++++= ββββββ  
               (3.7h) 
Hypothesis four, which focuses on the relationship between higher 
levels of corporate governance and debt contracting, explicitly expects that risk 
is endogenously determined while corporate governance is exogenous.  The 
DCM theoretically proposes that higher levels of corporate governance impact 
on access and cost dimensions of debt contracting by reducing default risk and 
information risk (see Figure 2.1) therefore the two risk variables are modelled 
to be endogenous.  Moreover, the possibility that less risky firms (firms with 
lower default and information risk) are more likely to choose higher levels of 
corporate governance further supports the concern that endogeneity is an issue.   
Prior accounting literature theorises the relationship between corporate 
governance and other firm relevant variables in the absence of the intervening 
effect of risk assessment. 23  Furthermore, these studies often include risk 
measures alongside corporate governance as covariates in OLS regression 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; 
Beekes and Brown 2006).  The theoretical model proposed in the DCM expects 
corporate governance to impact debt contracting via risk assessment therefore 
treating corporate governance and risk measures as covariates may cause OLS 
to suffer from endogeneity.  This would lead the parameter estimates to be 
inconsistent thus clouding the interpretation of the results.  The econometric 
                                                
23 OLS regression is used by Klock et al. (2005), James and Cotter (2007), Piot and Missonier-
Piera (2007), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Sengupta (1998), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), 
Ashbaugh-Skaife and LaFond (2006), Ashbaugh et al. (2004), Blom and Schauten (2006), 
Boubakri and Ghouma (2006), Chen and Jian (2006) and Kose and Lubomir (2009).  
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problems caused by endogeneity can be addressed by using instrumental 
variable methods such as 2SLS (Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Hail 2002; 
DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002).  The study initially uses a 
2SLS regression where corporate governance is the instrumental variable for 
risk.  The following equations represent the 2SLS regression models estimated 
in this study. 
 
Hypothesis 4a:  Higher levels of corporate governance impact positively on 
the quantity of debt accessed via the reduction of default risk and 
information risk. 
iii
iiiii
eINDUSTRYSIZE
COLLTAGEACCRLZSCOREQUANT
+++
++++=
76
54321
ββ
βββββ  
                   (3.8a) 
Hypothesis 4b:  Higher levels of corporate governance impact positively on 
the access to the different types of debt via the reduction of default risk and 
information risk. 
iii
iiiiiR
eINDUSTRYSIZE
COLLTAGEACCRLZSCORETYPE
+++
++++=
76
54321,
ββ
βββββ    
                                                  (3.8b) 
Hypothesis 4c:  Higher levels of corporate governance impact negatively on 
cost of debt via the reduction of default risk and information risk. 
   
iii
iiiii
eINDUSTRYSIZE
COLLTAGEACCRLZSCORECOST
+++
++++=
76
54321
ββ
βββββ      
                              (3.8c)     
If the 2SLS results support the theorised intervening nature of risk in the 
DCM where corporate governance is an instrument for risk, then it is 
appropriate to use OLS to further test the DCM (Larcker and Rusticus 2010).  
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The objective behind this approach is to assess whether access to debt and cost 
of debt are exogenously affected by corporate governance while controlling for 
several firm-specific factors (refer to Table 3.3 for the definition of the 
variables used in the regression models).  The following equations represent the 
OLS regression models which include corporate governance and exclude 
default and information risk.  
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
                   (3.9a) 
iiiiiiiR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVTYPE ++++++= 654321, ββββββ  
                                         (3.9b) 
   
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVCOST ++++++= 654321 ββββββ      
                               (3.9c)     
 
The expected direction of the relationships between corporate governance, risk 
assessment and debt contracting are listed in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: Expected Signs for the Parameters in the DCM  
 
 
Quantity 
of Debt                        Type of Debt   
Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
GOV +  + + + +  - 
ZSCORE -  - - - -  + 
ACCRL -  + - - -  + 
AGE +  + + + +  - 
COLLT +  + + + +  - 
SIZE +  + + + +  - 
INDUSTRY ?  ? ? ? ?  ? 
 
Notes:   
QUANT  = Total interest bearing debt divided by total liabilities. 
ASFIN  =  Asset finance debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
BANK  =  Bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
NONBANK  =  Non-bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
NONINT  =  Non-intermediated debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
COST  =  Cost of debt. 
GOV  =  The level of corporate governance.  
ZSCORE  =  Default risk. 
ACCRL  =  Accruals quality. 
AGE  =  Number of years since incorporation. 
COLLT  =  Total fixed assets divided by total assets. 
SIZE  =  Log of total assets. 
INDUSTRY  = One if the observation falls within the Y - 1 industry and zero otherwise. 
 
The DCM assumes that small companies exhibit high levels of 
information and default risks which impact unfavourably on their debt 
contracting outcomes.  As a result, the informational advantages of higher 
levels of corporate governance could potentially provide smaller companies 
with greater benefits, in terms of increased financial disclosure and lower 
agency conflicts, relative to larger companies.  Consequently, the impact of 
corporate governance on the debt contracting outcomes is expected to differ for 
smaller companies.  The study introduces governance-size interaction terms to 
assess the influence of governance on debt contracting variables for small and 
large companies.  The first interaction term is GOV_S which is measured by 
multiplying GOV by the small company dummy variable, SML. The variable 
SML equals one if the company belongs to the lower size quintile and zero 
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otherwise. The second interaction term is GOV_L which is measured by 
multiplying GOV by the large company dummy variable.  The variable LRG 
equals one if the company belongs to the upper size quintile and zero otherwise.  
 
=iS_GOV GOV multiplied by SML for firm i.                              
         (3.10a) 
=iL_GOV GOV multiplied by LRG for firm i.                                
        (3.10b) 
Company size is determined by ranking the companies based on total 
assets and then dividing them into quintiles.  Small companies are located in the 
lower quintile while large companies are in the upper quintile.  As a result, the 
variable SML equals one if the company is in the lower quintile and zero 
otherwise.  The variable LRG equals one if the company is in the upper quintile 
and zero otherwise.  
   
 i
SML =   
                 (3.11a)
 
 i
LRG =  
      
 
                (3.11b)
 
The study expects the relationship between corporate governance 
practices, access to debt, and cost of debt to be greater for small companies 
relative to large companies. The following equations represent the OLS 
estimations which include governance-size interaction terms.  
 
  1 if firm i belongs to companies in the lower quintile 
  0 otherwise 
  1 if firm i belongs to companies in the upper quintile 
  0 otherwise 
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Hypothesis 5a:  Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance access more debt. 
ii9i8i7
i6i5i4i3i21i
eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE
LRGSMLLOV_GSV_GOGOVQUANT
++++
+++++=
βββ
ββββββ  
                 (3.12a) 
Hypothesis 5b:  Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance access more of each type of debt. 
ii9i8i7
i6i5i4i3i21iR
eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE
LRGSMLLV_GOOV_SGGOVTYPE
++++
+++++=
βββ
ββββββ,   
                                                 (3.12b) 
Hypothesis 5c:  Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance pay a lower cost of debt. 
 
ii9i8i7
i6i5i4i3i21i
eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE
LRGSMLLOV_GSOV_GGOVCOST
++++
+++++=
βββ
ββββββ    
        (3.12.c)     
 
where ‘R’ refers to the four types of debt: ASFIN, BANK, NONBANK, and 
NONINT.  The variable GOV_L equals GOV multiplied by LRG, where LRG 
equals one if the company is in the upper size quintile and zero otherwise.  The 
variable GOV_S equals GOV multiplied by SML, where SML equals one if the 
company is in the lower size quintile and zero otherwise.  The variable SIZE is 
excluded from the regression estimations to prevent collinearity with SML and 
LRG dummy variables.  Furthermore, the inclusion of SML and LRG reduces 
the need to control for company size.  The definitions for the other variables are 
listed under table 3.3.  
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3.5.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
The study applies further tests to assess the robustness of the original 
findings.  This includes using alternative specifications to test the relationships 
in the DCM.  The primary sensitivity analysis uses alternative measures for 
access to debt, corporate governance, default risk, information risk and size 
dummy variables.   
The method used to calculate access to debt variables scales the amount 
of interest bearing debt by financial liability items such as total liabilities and 
interest bearing debt.  Although the calculation method is in accordance with 
past studies (González et al. 2007; Bougheas et al. 2006; Denis and Mihov 
2003; Cantillo and Wright 2000) an alternate approach is introduced which 
requires the variables to be scaled by total assets.  One of the advantages of the 
alternative method is that it demonstrates the degree of financing from interest 
bearing debt necessary to secure the firm’s assets. 
An alternative corporate governance composite is introduced as a proxy 
for corporate governance practices.  The score ranges from 0 to 140 where 140 
is the highest possible score a company can achieve.  The composition of the 
alternate corporate governance score requires scaling each of the 14 individual 
corporate governance variables.  Each variable is redesigned to yield a score of 
0 to 10 where 10 is the highest score a company can achieve.  The resulting 
score from each variable is added to produce the overall score of 0 to 140.  The 
alternative corporate governance score provides higher variability in the data 
which captures information that could have been overlooked by the original 
corporate governance score. 
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An alternative Z-score is used to proxy for default risk.  The score is 
calculated using a stepwise multivariate discriminate analysis of ten financial 
ratios.  The Z-score is used to test the relationship between default risk and the 
debt contracting dimensions.  Furthermore, the variable is used in testing the 
relationship between corporate governance and default risk.24 
The study further examines information risk by separating it into 
discretionary and innate components (Francis et al. 2005, 2004; Dechow and 
Dichev 2002; Gray et al. 2009).  Furthermore, the two components of 
information risk are then used as alternate measures for the accruals quality to 
test whether they have a differential impact on the debt contracting outcomes.  
The DCM adopts a similar position to prior studies (Francis et al. 2005) by 
proposing that innate information risk is expected to have more influence on 
debt contracting in comparison to discretionary information risk.
25
 
Finally, there are three different approaches used to assess the 
robustness of the relationship between corporate governance and debt 
contracting for different sized companies.  The first approach introduces two 
size dummy variables which are used in place of the governance-size 
interaction terms.  The small size dummy variable equals one if the company 
falls within the lower quintile and zero otherwise (companies are ranked based 
on their total assets).  The large size dummy equals one if the company falls 
within the upper quintile and zero otherwise.   
The second approach focuses on re-categorising firm size.  The study 
uses the ASX Top 300 companies listed on the All Ordinaries index as an 
alternate size classification.  Companies listed in the Top 300 are required to 
                                                
24 The ratio times interest earned is also used as an additional default risk measure. 
25  The study uses the ask-bid spread and abnormal accruals as additional measures for 
information risk.   
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have an audit committee which complies with PGCG (Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2007b).  According to the new 
size categorisation, a Top 300 company is perceived as having a higher level 
corporate governance structure in addition to being a larger company relative to 
other publicly listed firms.  To measure the new size categorisation, the study 
uses a dummy variable which equals one if the company is in the Top 300 and 
zero otherwise. 
The third approach examines exclusively the impact of governance for 
the small companies; these are defined by the companies that are ranked in the 
lower quintile.  An OLS regression is used to test the impact of corporate 
governance on debt contracting for a subset of small companies.  The focus on 
a sub-sample of small companies enables the investigation of how a variation in 
corporate governance amongst smaller firms can influence debt contracting for 
those firms.  This approach specifically tests whether or not the small 
companies with higher levels of corporate governance benefit in terms of access 
to and cost of debt.  
 
3.6 SUMMARY 
 
Chapter three describes the empirical methods used to test the debt 
contracting hypotheses which were constructed in chapter two.  Additionally, 
the chapter presents the sample and describes the data collection process.  The 
study develops the measures used in estimating the regression model which 
tests the relationship between corporate governance, risk assessment, and debt 
contracting.  The following chapter presents the results of the analysis detailed 
in the current chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter tests the hypotheses stated at the end of chapter two and 
presents the results of the data analyses as described in chapter three.  The 
chapter also presents the summary statistics for the dependent, independent and 
control variables followed by the multivariate regression results and hypothesis 
testing. 
The remainder of the chapter is separated into four sections.  Section 4.2 
describes the sample after removing missing and extreme observations and 
outlines the descriptive analysis for the study.  Section 4.3 presents the results 
from the hypothesis tests.  Section 4.4 reports the sensitivity analysis results.  
Finally, section 4.5 summaries the results from the chapter. 
 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS   
 
The descriptive analysis focuses on the summary statistics for the 
dependent, independent and control variables.  This section describes the 
sample frame after the exclusion of missing data and outliers.  Additionally, it 
details results from the analysis of variance (ANOVA) undertaken to compare 
means across size for the dependent and independent variables.  This section 
also presents the correlation analysis results which provide a preliminary 
description of interactions between variables in a bivariate setting.   
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4.2.1 SAMPLE FRAME   
 
The sample frame, as outlined in the previous chapter, consists of 1,239 
non-financial public companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange with a 
2007 June 30 balance date.  Due to the study’s focus on companies that contract 
interest bearing debt, 618 companies that do not have interest bearing debt are 
excluded from the sample frame.  Additionally, the cost of interest bearing debt 
represents an important aspect of this research and consequently a further 16 
companies that do not report cost of debt in their annual reports are also omitted 
from the sample frame.  A summary of the sample details is provided in Table 
4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Sample Frame 
 
Sample Details 
Missing 
Values 
Extreme 
Outliers 
Final 
Sample 
Initial sample frame    1,239 
Companies with interest bearing debt 618 0  
Sample frame including the following 
variables:    
     COST 16 0  
     ZSCORE 0 4  
     COLLT 0 6  
        Main sample   595 
Sample frame including information risk 
variable:    
     ACCRL 382 8  
        Sub-sample     205 
 
Notes: 
COST = Cost of debt. 
ZSCORE = Default risk. 
ACCRL = Accruals quality. 
COLLT = Total fixed assets divided by total assets. 
 
The sample frame is further refined in order to analyse and test the 
relationship between access and cost of debt variables and corporate 
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governance.  Following the treatment of outliers by McDonald (1973) and 
Subramanyam (1996), ten companies are excluded from the sample because 
they are more than three standard deviations from their respective means.
26
  The 
ten companies omitted from the sample are composed of four companies that 
have extreme ZSCORE values (default risk variable) and six companies that 
have extreme COLLT values (collateral variable).  The exclusion of the ten 
companies leaves 595 companies with available data, which make up the main 
sample used in the first stage of multivariate analysis.   
The second stage of the analysis requires the inclusion of ACCRL 
(information risk variable).  Due to the specific nature of the calculation that is 
required to obtain ACCRL, 390 companies are excluded from the sample.27 The 
excluded companies are composed of 382 companies that have missing values 
and eight companies that have extreme values.  The exclusion of the 390 
companies result in 205 companies that have available information which 
comprise the study’s sub-sample.  This sub-sample is used only when testing 
the relationship between ACCRL and other variables. 
                                                
26 The ten observations are considered extreme outliers and therefore they are deleted from the 
data set.  An alternate approach is to winsorize at the top/bottom 1 percentile and 99 percentile 
values.  However, according to Watson (1990)  and Mahir and Al-Khazaleh (2009) deletion of 
outliers is equivalent to winsorizing and therefore the current study adopts the deletion of the 
extreme outliers consistent with prior studies. 
27 The calculation of ACCRL requires 5 years worth of data for each company.  As a result, 
many companies are excluded from the main sample. Refer to section 3.4.4.2 for calculation 
details.   
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4.2.2 DEBT CONTRACTING VARIABLE 
DESCRIPTIONS    
 
This section presents summary statistics for the variables that proxy for 
access to quantity and type of debt as well as cost of debt.28 Furthermore, a 
detailed company size analysis is presented to show the differences in the debt 
contracting variables for small, medium and large companies.   
4.2.2.1 ACCESS TO THE QUANTITY OF DEBT  
 
Access to the quantity of debt is investigated by analysing the variable 
QUANT, which is measured as total interest bearing debt divided by total 
liabilities.  Table 4.2 provides the summary statistics for QUANT for all 
companies, as well as small, medium and large companies in the main sample.29  
The categorisation for company size is based on the ranking of total assets into 
quintiles where small companies are located in the lower quintile, medium 
companies are found in the middle quintile, and large companies are positioned 
in the upper quintile.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                
28  An extended discussion of preliminary debt contracting results which includes industry 
analysis is presented in Appendix F. 
29 Refer to Table G.1 in Appendix G for the complete table that shows all quintiles for QUANT. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for QUANT 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All Companies  
QUANT  595 0.39 0.39 0.26 0.00 0.97 
 Small Companies (Lower Quintile) 
QUANT  119 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.00 0.94 
 Medium Companies (Middle Quintile)  
QUANT  119 0.34 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.97 
 Large Companies (Upper Quintile) 
QUANT  119 0.47 0.50 0.26 0.00 0.94 
 
Notes: 
QUANT  =  Total interest bearing debt divided by total liabilities. 
N  =  Number of companies. 
 
The mean for QUANT is 0.39 which indicates that interest bearing debt 
contracts are a significant component of total liabilities.  The QUANT mean for 
companies in the lower and upper quintiles are 0.36 and 0.47 respectively.  
These results initially suggest that small and large companies have varying 
access to interest bearing debt relative to other companies. 
ANOVA is used in order to formally examine whether the differences in 
means between small, medium and large companies are statistically significant.  
The ANOVA result presented in Table 4.3 show that the mean QUANT are 
statistically different across different sized companies.  Furthermore, the study 
conducts a Tukey’s HSD post hoc test to find which of the means for the three 
size groups are significantly different.  The test results show that the mean for 
large companies is significantly different from other means which indicates that 
larger companies have greater access to interest bearing debt relative to other 
companies.30   
 
                                                
30 Refer to Table G2 in Appendix G for Tukey’s HSD post hoc test results for QUANT. 
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Table 4.3: ANOVA Results for Quantity of Debt Accessed for Different Sized 
Companies 
          
 Mean   
Variable Small Medium Large F Statistic P value  
      
QUANT 0.36 0.34 0.47 8.008 0.000*** 
 
Notes:  
***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively.   
 
 
4.2.2.2 ACCESS TO TYPES OF DEBT  
 
Access to types of debt is examined by studying the relative proportions 
of asset finance, bank debt, non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt to 
interest bearing debt. As shown in Table 4.4, debt types are categorised into 
short-term and long-term debt where the former comprises 21% of total interest 
bearing debt while the latter makes up 79%.31  Additionally, non-intermediated 
debt which includes convertible and non-convertible notes, bonds and 
commercial papers comprises the largest debt type at $54.2 billion or 43.3% of 
total interest bearing debt.  Bank debt which includes bank loans, facilities and 
overdrafts totals $42.4 billion which is 33.9% of the total interest bearing debt 
thereby making it the second largest type of debt.  Non-bank debt which 
includes loans from non-bank financial institutions, directors and related 
entities is the third largest debt type at $24.2 billion or 19.3% of total interest 
bearing debt.  Finally, asset finance which is represented by finance lease and 
hire purchases amounts to $4.3 billion or 3.4% of total interest bearing debt 
making it the smallest debt type relative to the other types of debt. 
 
                                                
31 A future study could investigate the impact of corporate governance on short-term and long-
term interest bearing debt (See section 5.5 in Chapter five).  
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Table 4.4: Interest Bearing Debt across the Four Debt Types 
 
Type Debt Quantities (Billions) % 
Short-Term Debt   
   (i)   Asset finance debt $1.0 0.8 
   (ii)  Bank debt 16.4 13.1 
   (iii) Non-bank debt 3.4 2.7 
   (iv) Non-intermediated debt 5.9 4.7 
       Total  26.7 21.3 
Long-Term Debt   
   (i)   Asset finance debt 3.3 2.6 
   (ii)  Bank debt 26.0 20.8 
   (iii) Non-bank debt 20.8 16.6 
   (iv) Non-intermediated debt 48.3 38.6 
       Total  98.4 78.7 
       Total Interest Bearing Debt $125.1 100.0 
 
Access to debt types are further examined by the use of four other 
variables which represent the proportion of each debt type relative to the total 
interest bearing debt.  Table 4.5 presents the summary statistics for the four 
debt type variables.  The table shows information for all companies, as well as 
small, medium and large companies.32   
The variable ASFIN is measured as finance lease and hire purchase debt 
divided by total interest bearing debt.  ASFIN has a mean of 0.27 and a 
standard deviation of 0.40.  Furthermore, the mean values for ASFIN in the 
lower and upper quintiles are 0.47 and 0.09 respectively.  This is a crude 
indication that small and large companies could have varying access to ASFIN. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Refer to Table G.3 in Appendix G for the complete table that shows all quintiles for the four 
debt types. 
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics for Access to the Four Debt Types 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All Companies  
ASFIN   595 0.27 0.03 0.40 0.00 1.00 
BANK   595 0.33 0.01 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  595 0.19 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
NONINT   595 0.20 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
 Small Companies (Lower Quintile) 
ASFIN  119 0.42 0.09 0.47 0.00 1.00 
BANK 119 0.11 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  119 0.27 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONINT  119 0.20 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
 Medium Companies (Middle Quintile)  
ASFIN   119 0.33 0.07 0.41 0.00 1.00 
BANK   119 0.31 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  119 0.18 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 119 0.18 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
 Large Companies (Upper Quintile) 
ASFIN  119 0.09 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 
BANK  119 0.48 0.49 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  119 0.18 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 119 0.25 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
 
Notes: 
ASFIN  =  Asset finance debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
BANK  =  Bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
NONBANK  =  Non-bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
NONINT  = Non-intermediated debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
 
The variable BANK which is measured by dividing bank loans, 
facilities and overdrafts by total interest bearing debt has a mean of 0.33 and a 
standard deviation of 0.41.  It is clear from Table 4.5 that BANK has the 
highest mean relative to the other debt type variables which suggests that it is 
the most accessed type of debt.  An ANOVA is conducted to formally assess 
the variation in the means for the four debt types.  The results presented in 
Table 4.6 indicate the means for the four debt types are statistically different 
from each other, and provide support to the claim that bank debt is accessed 
more than other debt types. 
 92 
Table 4.6: ANOVA Results for Access to the Four Debt Types  
          
                   Mean   
ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT F Statistic P value  
      
0.27 0.33 0.19 0.20 18.168 0.000*** 
 
Notes:   
***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively. 
 
  Summary statistics for the last two debt types, NONBANK and 
NONINT, are presented in Table 4.5.  NONBANK is measured as loans from 
non-bank financial intermediaries divided by total interest bearing debt.  
NONBANK has a mean of 0.19 and a standard deviation of 0.35.  Additionally, 
NONINT which is calculated as non-intermediated debt divided by total interest 
bearing debt has a mean of 0.20 and a standard deviation of 0.35. 
Table 4.5 also presents summary statistics for the four debt type 
variables based on size.  It is clear that large companies access ASFIN less than 
other companies whilst they are more partial to accessing BANK.  The 
ANOVA analysis presented in Table 4.7 shows that the means for ASFIN and 
BANK across small, medium and large companies are statistically different.  
Tukey’s HSD post hoc test shows that the ASFIN’s mean for large companies 
is significantly different from other means which indicates that large companies 
access ASFIN less often than other companies.  Additionally, Tukey’s test 
results show that the means for BANK are significantly different from each 
other across all sizes.33 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Refer to Table G4 in Appendix G for the results of Tukey’s HSD post hoc test for ASFIN and 
BANK. 
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Table 4.7: ANOVA Results for Access to Debt Types for Different Sized 
Companies 
          
 Mean   
Variable Small Medium Large F Statistic P value  
      
ASFIN  0.42 0.33 0.09 23.459 0.000*** 
BANK  0.11 0.31 0.48 28.206 0.000*** 
NONBANK  0.27 0.18 0.18 2.557    0.079 
NONINT 0.20 0.18 0.25 1.443  0.238 
 
Notes: 
 ***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively. 
 
 
4.2.2.3 COST OF DEBT  
 
Cost of debt is measured as the calculated weighted average interest rate 
as disclosed in the notes to the financial statements.  Table 4.8 shows the 
average cost of debt for the different sized companies.
34
  It is evident from the 
table that the smallest companies are contracting the highest cost of debt at 
9.16%.  Medium sized companies have an average cost of debt of 8.42%. 
Finally, large companies incur the lowest cost of debt at 7.10%. 
 
Table 4.8: Summary Statistics for Cost of Debt (%) 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All Companies  
COST   595 8.17 7.85 2.20 0.90 24.03 
 Small Companies (Lower Quintile) 
COST 119 9.08 8.55 2.45 4.00 24.03 
 Medium Companies (Middle Quintile)  
COST 119 8.33 8.02 2.14 2.30 20.46 
 Large Companies (Upper Quintile) 
COST 119 7.12 7.04 1.70 1.05 17.80 
 
 
                                                
34 Refer to Table G.5 in Appendix G for the complete table that shows all quintiles for COST. 
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The results of the ANOVA tests presented in Table 4.9 show that the 
means for COST across the different size groups are statistically different.  
Tukey’s HSD test suggests that the means for all sizes are significantly different 
from each other.35  The variations in cost of debt across size are an indicator of 
the importance of company size in the multivariate analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.9: ANOVA Results for Cost of Debt for Different Sized Companies 
          
 Mean (%)   
Variable Small Medium Large F Statistic P value  
      
COST 9.08 8.33 7.12 26.012 0.000*** 
 
Notes:   
***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively.   
 
 The study presents the summary statistics for the three debt contracting 
variables in the main sample.  The results show that access to quantity of 
interest bearing debt represents 39% of total liabilities.  Additionally, larger 
companies access greater quantities of interest bearing debt relative to smaller 
companies.  As for the types of debt accessed, the results indicate that bank debt 
is the most accessed debt type with larger companies accessing bank debt more 
than smaller companies.  Asset finance debt is the only debt type that is 
accessed more by smaller companies relative to other companies.  Finally, cost 
of debt for companies in the main sample is approximately 8.17%.  
Furthermore, the results suggest that smaller companies pay a higher cost of 
debt relative to other companies.  The next section addresses the description of 
independent variables.     
                                                
35 Refer to Table G6 in Appendix G for the results of Tukey’s HSD post hoc test for COST. 
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4.2.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  
 
The summary statistics for the corporate governance and default risk 
variables are shown in Table 4.10.
36
  Corporate governance, GOV, has a mean 
of 8.19 and a standard deviation of 3.59.37  GOV is measured on a scale of zero 
to 14, where a score of 14 represents the highest level of corporate governance 
a company can achieve.  Default risk, ZSCORE, which is estimated by applying 
parameters from multivariate linear discriminate (MLD) analysis has a mean of 
0.49 and a standard deviation of 1.46.  The higher the ZSCORE the more likely 
a firm will default on its financial obligations.  A decomposition of the Z-score 
shows that it is mainly driven by the leverage ratio as well as asset turnover 
ratio.  Companies with greater debt to assets will have a higher Z-score while 
companies with high levels of sales to assets will receive a lower Z-score.38 
The independent variables’ summary statistics for small, medium and 
large companies are presented in Table 4.10.  The summary statistics for the 
lower quintile show that GOV has a mean of 5.41 which is lower than the mean 
for all companies in the main sample.  However, the summary statistics for 
companies at the upper quintile show the mean for GOV to be 10.82 which is 
above the sample mean.  The results of the ANOVA test, as shown in Table 
4.11, suggest that means for GOV for the three size categories are statistically 
                                                
36 The information risk variable, ACCRL is discussed in section 4.2.5 as part of the variables 
that are represented in the sub-sample. 
37 Refer to Table G.7 in Appendix G for the complete table that shows all quintiles for GOV 
and ZSCORE. 
38 Refer to Tables G.8 and G.9 in Appendix G for a detailed overview of the estimation and 
decomposition of ZSCORE. 
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different.  This result is supported by Tukey’s HSD which shows that the means 
for the three sizes are different from each other.39  
 
Table 4.10: Summary Statistics for the Independent Variables 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All Companies  
GOV  595 8.19 9.00 3.59 0.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  595 0.49 0.75 1.46 -3.73 4.58 
 Small Companies (Lower Quintile) 
GOV  119 5.41 6.00 2.97 0.00 11.00 
ZSCORE  119 1.64 1.46 0.95 -2.89 4.58 
 Medium Companies (Middle Quintile)  
GOV  119 8.09 9.00 2.96 0.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  119  0.30 0.46 1.49 -3.73 2.52 
 Large Companies (Upper Quintile) 
GOV  119 10.82 12.00 2.71 2.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  119 -0.28 -0.43 1.182 -2.87 3.35 
 
Notes:   
GOV = Corporate governance score. 
 
The different size categories show varying values for ZSCORE.  The 
summary statistics at the lower quintile present the mean for ZSCORE to be    
1.64 which is higher than the mean for the main sample.  The information at the 
upper quintile shows the mean for ZSCORE to be -0.28 which is lower than the 
sample mean.  The ANOVA results suggest that the ZSCORE means for the 
three size groups are statistically different.  Tukey’s HSD test shows that the 
means for the three size groups are significantly different from each other.    
 
 
 
                                                
39 Refer to Table G10 in Appendix G for the complete results of Tukey’s HSD post hoc test for 
GOV, ACCRL and ZSCORE. 
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Table 4.11: ANOVA Results for the Independent Variables for Different 
Sized Companies  
          
 Mean   
Variable Small Medium Large F Statistic P value  
      
GOV  5.41 8.09 10.82 104.910 0.000*** 
ZSCORE  1.64 0.30 -0.28 76.050 0.000*** 
 
Notes:  
 ***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively.   
 
 The two independent variables discussed in this section are corporate 
governance and default risk (information risk which is the third independent 
variable is presented in section 4.2.5).  The summary statistics show that 
smaller companies have a higher default risk and implement lower levels of 
corporate governance in comparison to other companies.  The next section 
provides a descriptive analysis for the study’s control variables.  
4.2.4 CONTROL VARIABLE DESCRIPTION   
 
This section investigates the descriptive analysis for the control 
variables used in the analysis.  The summary statistics for the control variables 
across all companies, as well as the lower, middle and upper quintiles for the 
main sample are presented in Table 4.12.40  Reputation, AGE, is measured as 
the number of years since the company’s incorporation.  AGE has a mean of 
19.98 years and a standard deviation of 18.33.  Collateral, COLLT, is measured 
as fixed assets divided by total assets.  COLLT has a mean of 0.33 and a 
                                                
40 Refer to Table G.11 in Appendix G for the complete table that shows all quintiles for AGE, 
COLLT and SIZE. 
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standard deviation is 0.29.  Finally, company size, SIZE, is calculated as the log 
of total assets.  SIZE has a mean of 7.78 and a standard deviation of 0.93.41      
Table 4.12 shows that AGE varies across company size.  The mean for 
AGE in the upper quintile is 28.04 which is greater than the means reported for 
AGE under other quintiles.  The ANOVA test results presented in Table 4.16 
suggest that AGE means for small, medium and large companies are 
statistically different.  Tukey’s HSD test shows that the mean for large sized 
companies is significantly different from other means which indicates that 
larger companies are older than other companies.42  
 
Table 4.12: Summary Statistics for the Control Variables 
  
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All Companies  
AGE   595 19.98 15.00 18.33 1.00 124.00 
COLLT  595 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.00 1.18 
SIZE  595 7.78 7.67 0.93 5.71 10.87 
 Small Companies (Lower Quintile) 
AGE  119 13.92 10.00 10.91 1.00 54.00 
COLLT  119 0.25 0.16 0.26 0.00 1.07 
SIZE  119 6.62 6.75 0.32 5.71 7.01 
 Medium Companies (Middle Quintile)  
AGE  119 18.36 16.00 13.63 1.00 94.00 
COLLT  119 0.36 0.24 0.32 0.00 1.18 
SIZE  119 7.67 7.67 0.13 7.45 7.90 
 Large Companies (Upper Quintile) 
AGE 119 28.04 20.00 24.92 1.00 124.00 
COLLT  119 0.44 0.41 0.30 0.00 1.08 
SIZE  119 9.20 9.10 0.53 8.49 10.87 
 
Notes: 
AGE  =  Number of years since incorporation. 
COLLT =  Total fixed assets divided by total assets. 
SIZE  =  Log of total assets. 
                                                
41 SIZE varies across small, medium and large companies.  This is as expected due to the nature 
of the size categorisation. 
42 Refer to Table G12 in Appendix G for the results of Tukey’s HSD post hoc test for AGE and 
COLLT.  No test is conducted on SIZE because by definition SIZE is expected to differ across 
size. 
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Summary statistics for COLLT are presented in Table 4.12.  As shown 
in the table, large companies have a higher mean for COLLT when compared to 
the mean for all companies in the main sample.  The ANOVA test results in 
Table 4.13 show that the mean for COLLT across small medium and large 
companies are statistically different from each other.  Tukey’s HSD test shows 
that the mean for small sized companies is significantly different from other 
means which implies that smaller companies have less collateral relative to 
other companies. 
     
Table 4.13: ANOVA for Control Variables for Different Sized Companies  
          
 Mean   
Variable Small Medium Large F Statistic P value  
      
AGE  13.94 18.36 28.04 20.102 0.000*** 
COLLT   0.25 0.35 0.44 12.313 0.000*** 
 
Notes:   
***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively.   
 
 The control variables used in this study are company age, level of 
collateral, and size.  The summary statistics for the three variables indicate that 
smaller companies are younger and have less collateral relative to other 
companies. The next section discusses the debt contracting variables, 
independent variables and control variables for the study’s sub-sample. 
4.2.5 SUB-SAMPLE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  
 
The inclusion of the information risk variable, ACCRL, into the analysis 
results in excluding 390 companies from the main sample which leaves 205 
companies that compose the study’s sub-sample.   This section reports the 
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summary statistics for all the variables in the sub-sample as well as the 
variations in the variables across size. 
The summary statistics for the debt contracting variables used in the 
sub-sample are presented in Table 4.14.43  QUANT has a mean of 0.43 which is 
higher than the 0.39 mean reported for the main sample.  Additionally, the 
mean for QUANT varies across small, medium and large companies.  The 
ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests indicate that the means for QUANT 
are significantly different for the three size groups whilst small and large 
companies are significantly different from medium companies.44    
The summary statistics for access to type of debt variables are presented 
in Table 4.14.  ASFIN has a mean of 0.21 which is lower than the 0.27 mean 
recorded for the main sample.  Across size groups in the sub-sample, large 
companies have lower access to ASFIN relative to other companies.  The 
ANOVA test for ASFIN indicates that the means across the three size groups 
are significantly different.  Tukey’s HSD post hoc test suggests that the mean 
for large companies are significantly different to the means for other 
companies.  The means for BANK and NONBANK are 0.38 and 0.19 
respectively.  However, across the three size groups, the ANOVA results show 
no significant differences in means for BANK and NONBANK.  Finally, the 
mean for NONINT is 0.22 in the sub-sample which is slightly higher than the 
mean of 0.20 reported in the main sample.  The ANOVA test shows that the 
means for small, medium and large companies are different.  However, Tukey’s 
                                                
43 Tables H1 to H5 in Appendix H provide information on all quintiles for all variables in the 
sub-sample. 
44 Tables H6 and H7 in Appendix H provide information on ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD post 
hoc test for the sub-sample. 
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HSD post hoc test reveals that the differences for the means are most significant 
for medium and large companies.   
Table 4.14: Sub-sample Summary Statistics for Debt Contracting Variables 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All Companies  
QUANT 205 0.43 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.97 
ASFIN   205 0.21 0.03 0.35 0.00 1.00 
BANK   205 0.38 0.23 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  205 0.19 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
NONINT   205 0.22 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
COST 205 8.04% 7.51% 2.43% 1.05% 20.46% 
 Small Companies (Lower Quintile) 
QUANT 41 0.38 0.30 0.27 0.01 0.97 
ASFIN  41 0.32 0.05 0.43 0.00 1.00 
BANK 41 0.28 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  41 0.20 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
NONINT  41 0.21 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
COST 41 9.38% 8.78% 2.72% 5.60% 19.52% 
 Medium Companies (Middle Quintile)  
QUANT 41 0.44 0.52 0.25 0.03 0.86 
ASFIN   41 0.23 0.07 0.32 0.00 1.00 
BANK   41 0.47 0.40 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  41 0.16 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 41 0.14 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
COST 41 7.78% 7.47% 1.63% 6.03% 15.92% 
 Large Companies (Upper Quintile) 
QUANT 41 0.51 0.52 0.21 0.00 0.86 
ASFIN  41 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 
BANK  41 0.42 0.46 0.37 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  41 0.16 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 41 0.38 0.31 0.36 0.00 1.00 
COST 41 6.77% 6.67% 1.09% 4.49% 10.84% 
 
 
The summary statistics for COST are presented in Table 4.14.  The 
mean for COST is 8.04% which is lower than the 8.17% mean reported for 
COST in the main sample.  Across, the three size groups, the means for COST 
are significantly different as indicated by the ANOVA test.  Furthermore, 
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Tukey’s HSD post hoc test shows that the COST means for small, medium and 
large companies are significantly different from each other.   
Table 4.15: Sub-sample Summary Statistics for Independent and Control 
Variables 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All Companies  
GOV  205 9.51 11.00 3.16 1.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  205 -0.01 -0.16 1.36 -2.81 3.32 
ACCRL   205 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.04 2.50 
AGE   205 28.67 23.00 21.18 2.00 124.00 
COLLT  205 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.00 1.18 
SIZE  205 8.22 8.08 0.97 6.07 10.87 
 Small Companies (Lower Quintile) 
GOV  41 6.90 7.00 3.10 1.00 12.00 
ZSCORE  41 1.22 1.38 1.105 -2.35 3.32 
ACCRL   41 0.75 0.61 0.53 0.14 2.20 
AGE  41 21.56 17.00 17.23 2.00 101.00 
COLLT  41 0.37 0.29 0.28 0.00 1.07 
SIZE  41 6.99 7.08 0.386 6.07 7.41 
 Medium Companies (Middle Quintile)  
GOV  41 10.34 11.00 2.39 5.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  41 -0.13 -0.16 1.40 -2.80 2.77 
ACCRL   41 0.36 0.27 0.36 0.07 1.81 
AGE  41 24.80 22.00 16.13 10.00 99.00 
COLLT  41 0.41 0.37 0.26 0.04 0.94 
SIZE  41 8.08 8.08 0.18 7.80 8.43 
 Large Companies (Upper Quintile) 
GOV  41 11.10 12.00 2.90 2.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  41 -0.45 -0.45 0.90 -2.04 2.08 
ACCRL  41 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.04 1.41 
AGE 41 37.02 29.00 26.29 4.00 124.00 
COLLT  41 0.45 0.41 0.32 0.00 1.06 
SIZE  41 9.69 9.62 0.41 9.14 10.87 
 
The summary statistics for the independent and control variables in the 
sub-sample are presented in Table 4.15.  The mean for GOV in the sub-sample 
is 9.51 which is higher than the 8.19 mean reported for GOV in the main 
sample.  Additionally, the ANOVA and Tukey’s post hoc tests show that the 
means for GOV across the three size groups are significantly different.  Tukey’s 
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post hoc test shows that the mean for small companies is significantly different 
from the others. 
The results show that the mean for ZSCORE is -0.01 which is lower 
than the 0.49 mean reported for ZSCORE in the main sample.  According to the 
ANOVA test results, the ZSCORE means in the sub-sample across small, 
medium and large companies are significantly different from each other.  
Tukey’s post hoc test indicates that the ZSCORE mean for small companies is 
significantly different to the means for other companies.    
Information risk is represented by an accruals quality variable, ACCRL, 
which is calculated by using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model45.  ACCRL 
has a mean of 0.50 and a standard deviation of 0.58. The summary statistic for 
the lower quintile shows that ACCRL has a mean of 0.87 which is higher than 
the mean for all companies in the sub-sample.  Additionally, the mean for 
ACCRL in the upper quintile is 0.24 which is lower than the mean for all 
companies in the sub-sample.  The ANOVA test results show that the means for 
ACCRL are statistically different.  Moreover, Tukey’s HSD test suggests that 
the mean for small sized companies is significantly different from other means.   
This indicates that small companies have a low quality of accruals (high 
information risk) and that large companies have a high quality of accruals (low 
information risk). 
The summary statistics for the control variables AGE, COLLT and 
SIZE are shown in Table 4.15.  The mean for AGE in the sub-sample is 28.67 
while the standard deviation is 21.18.  The ANOVA test results suggest that the 
AGE means for the three size groups are significantly different from each other.  
                                                
45 Refer to Table H.8 in Appendix H for a detailed overview of the regression analysis results 
used in the calculation of ACCRL. 
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The Tukey’s post hoc test shows that the mean for AGE for large companies is 
significantly different from the other means.  Table 4.15 also reports a mean of 
0.43 for COLLT which is greater than the mean in the main sample.  
Additionally, the ANOVA test results indicate that the means for COLLT are 
not significantly different across the three groups.  Finally, the mean for SIZE is 
8.22 in the sub-sample and the standard deviation is 0.97.   
 This section shows summary statistics for the debt contracting, 
independent and control variables in the sub-sample.  The quantity of debt 
accessed is 43% of total liabilities with smaller companies accessing less 
interest bearing debt relative to larger companies.  Similar to the results 
presented for the main sample, bank debt is the most accessed debt type.  
However, the results indicate that access to bank debt does not differ across 
company size.  Additionally, small companies in the sub-sample access more 
asset finance debt relative to other companies.  The summary statistics for the 
independent and control variables show that smaller companies have lower 
levels of corporate governance and higher default risk and information risk.  
Furthermore, smaller companies are younger with less collateral relative to 
other companies.  The next section presents the correlation analysis for the 
independent and control variables used in the main sample and sub-sample.      
4.2.6 CORRELATION ANALYSIS  
 
Correlation analysis results for the independent and control variables are 
reported for the main sample in Tables 4.16 and for the sub-sample in Table 
4.17.  For the main sample of 595 companies, several of the variables are 
correlated with each other, but it is clear that the magnitude of the correlations 
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is low.  Nonetheless, the correlation between SIZE and GOV, which is 0.54, 
could pose a collinearity problem when the two variables are tested in a 
multivariate setting.  Additionally, the degree of correlation between the 
variables in the sub-sample is also low as reported in Table 4.17.  Overall, the 
low magnitude of the correlations amongst the exogenous variables indicates 
that multicollinearity should not be a problem for the two sample sets.  To 
formally substantiate the lack of multicollinearity between the independent and 
control variables, the study conducts collinearity diagnostics and finds that the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) indicate no significant multicollinearity in the 
data.46 The next section focuses on testing the hypotheses developed in previous 
chapters in order to investigate the relationship between debt contracting, 
independent and control variables.       
 
Table 4.16: Correlation Analysis for the Main Sample 
 
  GOV ZSCORE AGE COLLT SIZE 
GOV 1.000         
ZSCORE -0.403*** 1.000       
AGE 0.147*** -0.198*** 1.000     
COLLT 0.137*** -0.171*** 0.258*** 1.000   
SIZE 0.537*** -0.441*** 0.281*** 0.260*** 1.000 
 
Notes:  ***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively.  
 
Table 4.17: Correlation Analysis for the Sub-Sample   
 
  GOV ACCRL ZSCORE AGE COLLT SIZE 
GOV 1.000           
ACCRL -0.333*** 1.000         
ZSCORE -0.341*** 0.281*** 1.000       
AGE 0.161** -0.068 -0.217*** 1.000     
COLLT -0.039 -0.085 -0.103 0.236*** 1.000   
SIZE 0.481*** -0.361*** -0.389*** 0.326*** 0.116 1.000 
 
Notes: ***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively.
                                                
46 Refer to Appendix I for the VIF results. 
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4.3 HYPOTHESIS TESTING    
 
This section presents the multivariate analysis undertaken in order to 
test the various hypotheses stated in chapter two.  Additionally, sensitivity 
checks are applied to examine the results under differing circumstances.  The 
sensitivity outcomes relative to the original results provide greater credibility to 
the overall findings of the study.  The results for each hypothesis are presented 
in the following sections. 
4.3.1 DEFAULT RISK AND DEBT CONTRACTING  
 
Hypothesis one focuses on the relationship between default risk and 
debt contracting.  The hypothesis is partitioned into three sub-hypotheses.  H1a 
and H1b state that default risk is negatively related to access to quantity and 
type of debt respectively, while H1c states that default risk is positively related 
to cost of debt. 
 The OLS regression results for H1a are presented in Table 4.18.47 It is 
clear from the results that QUANT is positively related to ZSCORE.  However, 
a high ZSCORE signals a high possibility of default risk.  Therefore, the initial 
interpretation of the results show that companies with a high default risk access 
higher quantities of debt which deviates from the theorised relationship between 
the access to quantities of debt and default risk.  A possible explanation for the 
results is that an increase in quantities of interest bearing debt accessed will 
ultimately increase the risk of the company, specifically default risk.  Another 
explanation is found in the decomposition of ZSCORE which reveals that the 
                                                
47 Refer to Table J.1 in Appendix J for the complete table with industry dummy variables. 
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default risk variable is predominantly driven by the debt to asset ratio (refer to 
Table G.9 in Appendix G for more details on the decomposition of ZSCORE).   
It is therefore expected that an increase in debt levels causes the default risk to 
increase, thus resulting in the positive relationship between ZSCORE and 
QUANT.48 
 
Table 4.18: Relationship between Default Risk and the Debt Contracting 
Variables 
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCORETYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCORECOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  -0.283** 1.312*** -0.302 0.545** -0.555*** 11.753*** 
(-2.007) 
 
(7.781) (-1.337) (2.357) (-3.018) 
 
(9.960) 
ZSCORE 0.065*** -0.056*** -0.040*** 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.317*** 
 
(-7.911) (4.695) (3.067) (-3.970) (-4.814) (-4.655) 
AGE 0.0004 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
(0.751) (-4.335) (1.111) (1.135) (1.066) (0.320) 
COLLT 0.150*** 0.068 -0.071 0.011 -0.007 0.009 
(4.058) (1.206) (-1.189) (0.229) (-0.136) (0.030) 
SIZE 0.072*** -0.134*** 0.083*** -0.013 0.064*** -0.501*** 
(5.426) (-7.956) (3.925) (-0.657) (3.414) (-4.542) 
Adjusted R2 0.153 0.148 0.104 0.037 0.042 0.133 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between the debt contracting variables 
and default risk, where ZSCORE is the proxy for default risk.  The regressions include 
unreported industry dummy variables. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  TYPE is defined as follows: 
TYPER   = Access to type of debt where R refers to the following debt types: 
    ASFIN  =  Asset finance debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
    BANK  =  Bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
    NONBANK  =  Non-bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
    NONINT  =  Non-intermediated debt divided by total interest bearing 
debt. 
 
 
                                                
48 This is a major limitation which is discussed in more details in chapter five. 
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There are several control variables that are significantly related to 
QUANT.  COLLT and SIZE are positively related to QUANT at the 1% 
significance level which shows that higher quantities of interest bearing debt 
are positively linked with high levels of collateral in the form of property, plant 
and equipment and company size.   
 The regression results for H1b, which states that access to the different 
debt types is negatively related to default risk, are presented in Table 4.18.  The 
first debt type, ASFIN, is negatively related to ZSCORE at the 1% significance 
level.  A decrease in ZSCORE results in a rise in ASFIN.  Additionally, AGE 
and SIZE are negatively related to ASFIN at the 1% significance level which 
indicates that the use of asset secured finance such as lease liabilities and hire 
purchase decreases with an increase in company age and size.   
The regression results relating ZSCORE to BANK are shown in Table 
4.18.  The coefficient sign for ZSCORE is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, which implies that a decrease in ZSCORE results in an increase in access 
to bank debt.  Additionally, SIZE is positively related to BANK at the 1% 
significance level which indicates that access to bank debt is greater for larger 
companies relative to other companies.   
As shown in Table 4.18, a significant positive relationship exists 
between ZSCORE and both NONBANK and NONINT.  However, the results 
are contrary to the expected negative relationship between ZSCORE and access 
to the two debt types.  A likely explanation could be the association between 
increased debt levels and default risk.  It is a possibility that an increase in the 
proportion of aggregate amounts of non-bank and non-intermediated debt to 
interest bearing debt also increases the default risk.  Similar results are reported 
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by Anderson et al. (2004) who state that higher leverage levels increase the 
possibility of bankruptcy, thereby increasing cost of debt.  Additionally, Klock 
et al (2005) show that higher debt usage increase the probability of the firm not 
being able to service its debt, which results in an increase in the required rate of 
return demanded by lenders. 
The results for H1c, which states that default risk is positively related to 
cost of debt, are shown in Table 4.18.  The significantly positive relationship 
between ZSCORE and COST at the 1% significance level leads to the support 
of H1c.  This is an indication that high levels of default risk increase the lenders 
required rate of return as previously found by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) 
and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003).  Additionally, SIZE is negatively related to 
COST at the 1% significance level which suggests that an increase in company 
size results in a lower cost of debt. 
 
Table 4.19: Results for Hypothesis One    
 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1a: Default risk is negatively related to the quantity of debt 
accessed. Not Supported 
H1b:  Default risk is negatively related to the access to:    
                                                                         Asset finance debt. Supported 
                                                                         Bank debt. Supported 
                                                                         Non-bank debt. Not Supported 
                                                                         Non-intermediated debt. Not Supported 
H1c:  Default risk is positively related to cost of debt. Supported 
   
A summary of the outcomes for hypothesis one are reported in Table 
4.19.  The study does not support H1a which states that default risk is 
negatively related to access to the quantity of debt.  The second sub-hypothesis, 
H1b, states that default risk is negatively related to the access to the four debt 
types.  The study supports the statements that negatively relate default risk to 
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access to asset finance and bank debt.  However, the study does not support the 
statements that negatively relate default risk to access to non-bank and non-
intermediate debt.  Finally, the positive relationship between default risk and 
cost of debt stated in H1c is supported.  This implies that higher levels of 
default risk increase the cost of debt which is consistent with results from prior 
studies which find a positive relationship between default risk and cost of debt 
(Bougheas et al. 2006; Denis and Mihov 2003; Byun 2007; Klock et al. 2005; 
Anderson et al. 2004).  
4.3.2 INFORMATION RISK AND DEBT 
CONTRACTING  
 
The study investigates the relationship between information risk and 
debt contracting variables by testing the second hypothesis, which is separated 
into three sub-hypotheses.  H2a states that a negative relationship exists 
between information risk and access to quantity of debt.  H2b states that 
information risk is positively related to access to asset finance debt and 
negatively related to access to non-intermediated debt, bank debt and non-bank 
debt.  Finally, H2c states that information risk is positively related to cost of 
debt. 
The regression results for H2a are presented in Table 4.20.  The results 
show that a negative relationship exists between ACCRL and QUANT, but this 
relationship is not statistically significant.49 The results for H2b suggest partial 
support of the theorised relationship between information risk and the access to 
the different debt types.  ACCRL is positively related to ASFIN but the 
relationship is not statistically significant.  However, this is an initial indication 
                                                
49 Refer to Table J.2 in Appendix J for the complete table with industry dummy variables. 
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that high information risk leads to an increase in access to asset finance debt.  
Furthermore, Table 4.20 shows that ACCRL is negatively related to BANK, 
and positively related to NONBANK and NONINT.  However, the 
relationships are also not statistically significant therefore the results do not 
support the expected negative relationship between information risk and access 
to bank debt, non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt.  
  
Table 4.20: Relationship between Information Risk and Debt Contracting 
Variables  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.261 0.594* -0.096 0.919*** -0.417 14.589*** 
(1.095) (1.936) (-0.257) (2.709) (-1.263) (8.752) 
ACCRL -0.026 0.072 -0.077 0.002 0.004 0.824** 
(-0.627) (1.331) (-1.174) (0.031) (0.066) (2.035) 
AGE -0.001 -0.002 0.003* -0.0001 -0.001 -0.002 
(-0.794) (-1.294) (1.768) (-0.052) (-0.760) (-0.380) 
COLLT 0.086 0.257*** -0.214** -0.068 0.025 -0.724 
(1.394) (3.227) (-2.200) (-1.131) (0.286) (-1.364) 
SIZE 0.026 
 
-0.089*** 0.028 -0.014 0.074** 
 
-0.724*** 
(1.247) (-3.254) (0.852) (-0.488) (2.538) (-4.250) 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.156 0.095 0.093 0.014 0.152 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between both debt contracting 
variables and information risk, where ACCRL is the proxy for information risk.  The 
regressions include unreported industry dummy variables. The t-values, given in parenthesis 
below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
 
The results presented in Table 4.20 show that ACCRL and COST are 
positively related at the 5% significance level.  This indicates that a high 
information risk leads to a high cost of debt.  Additionally, SIZE is negatively 
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related to COST at the 1% significance level which suggests that cost of debt 
decreases as size increase.     
 
Table 4.21: Results for Hypothesis Two    
 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H2a:  Information risk is negatively related to the quantity of debt 
accessed. Not Supported 
H2b:  Information risk is:   
                  Positively related to the access to asset finance debt. Not Supported 
                  Negatively related to the access to bank debt.                                 Not Supported 
                  Negatively related to the access to non-bank debt.                                 Not Supported 
                  Negatively related to the access to non-intermediated debt. Not Supported 
H2c:  Information risk is positively related to cost of debt. Supported 
 
 
The summary results for hypothesis two are shown in Table 4.21.  It is 
evident from the results that H2a and H2b are not supported.  However, the 
positive relationship between information risk and asset finance suggest that 
access to asset finance debt increases in the presence of high information risk.  
Additionally, the study supports H2c which states that information risk is 
positively related to cost of debt.  The results are in accordance with findings 
reported by Francis et al. (2005), Lambert et al. (2004), and Gray et al. (2009) 
which state that information risk increases cost of debt. 
 
4.3.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RISK 
ASSESSMENT  
 
 The study tests hypothesis three which posits that corporate governance 
is related to risk assessment.  Hypothesis three is partitioned into two sub-
hypotheses.  H3a and H3b respectively state that default risk and information 
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risk are negatively related to higher levels of corporate governance respectively.  
Table 4.22 presents the regression results for H3a and H3b. 
 
Table 4.22: Relationship between Corporate Governance and both Default 
Risk and Information Risk  
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVZSCORE ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVACCRL ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
  ZSCORE ACCRL    
Intercept 6.610*** 2.317***     
 (9.948) (4.214)     
GOV -0.071*** -0.031**     
 (-4.134) (-2.320)     
AGE -0.003 0.002     
 (-1.132) (1.161)     
 COLLT -0.297 -0.173     
 (-1.580) (-1.385)     
SIZE -0.504*** -0.137***     
 (-7.106) (-4.269)     
Adjusted R2 0.291 0.156     
N 595 205     
 
Notes:   
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.    
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
both default risk and information risk.  The regressions include unreported industry dummy 
variables.  The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.   
 
Two regression models are estimated to test the relationships between 
corporate governance and both default risk and information risk.  The first 
model relates ZSCORE to GOV.  Table 4.22 shows that GOV is negatively 
related to ZSCORE at the 5% significance level.50 This implies that an increase 
in corporate governance results in a decrease in default risk.  Additionally, 
SIZE is negatively related to ZSCORE at the 1% significance level which 
indicates that default risk is reduced when the size of the company is increased.      
                                                
50 Refer to Table J.3 in Appendix J for the complete table with industry dummy variables. 
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The second model tests the relationship between ACCRL and GOV.  
The results in Table 4.22 show that ACCRL is negatively related to GOV at the 
5% significance level which indicates that an increase in corporate governance 
results in a reduction in information risk.  Furthermore, ACCRL is negatively 
related to SIZE at the 1% significance level which suggests that information 
risk increases when company size decreases.   
 
Table 4.23: Results for Hypothesis Three    
 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H3a: Higher levels of corporate governance are negatively related to 
default risk. Supported 
H3b: Higher levels of corporate governance are negatively related to 
information risk. Supported 
 
 
A summary of the outcomes for hypothesis three is reported in Table 
4.23.  The study supports H3a and H3b which state that higher levels of 
corporate governance are negatively related to default risk and information risk 
respectively.  Similar results are reported by Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) which find that corporate governance decreases 
default risk.  Furthermore,  Strydom et al. (2009) and Kent et al. (2010) find 
that corporate governance is negatively related to accruals quality. 
4.3.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DEBT 
CONTRACTING  
 
 The fourth hypothesis focuses on the association between higher levels 
of corporate governance and the debt contracting variables.  Hypothesis four is 
separated into H4a and H4b which state that higher levels of corporate 
governance are positively related to access to the quantity and type of debt 
respectively, via risk reduction.  Furthermore, H4c states that higher levels of 
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corporate governance impact negatively on cost of debt by reducing default and 
information risk. 
 The DCM theorises that corporate governance impacts debt contracting 
via the reduction of default and information risk. Accordingly, 2SLS is used to 
estimate the relationship between corporate governance and debt contracting 
via risk assessment by using GOV as an instrumental variable.  Furthermore, 
the results presented in Table 4.22 indicate a significant relationship between 
corporate governance and risk assessment thereby supporting that GOV is a 
strong instrument for ZSCORE and ACCRL.   
The 2SLS results shown in Table 4.24 are similar to those presented in 
Tables 4.18 and 4.20 which test the impact of risk assessment on debt 
contracting.51  The results show that ZSCORE is positively related to QUANT 
at the 1% significance level.  Additionally, ZSCORE is negatively related to 
ASFIN at the 5% significance level while it is positively related to NONBANK 
and NONINT at the 1% and 5% significance levels respectively.  ZSCORE is 
also found to be positively related to COST at the 1% significance level.  The 
results for the relationship between information risk and debt contracting, 
which are presented in Table 4.24, indicate that ACCRL is positively related to 
ASFIN and COST at the 10% significance level.  However, ACCRL is 
negatively related to QUANT, BANK, NONBANK and NONINT but the 
relationships are not significant.  These results show that corporate governance, 
as an exogenous variable, could have an impact on debt contracting. 
 
 
                                                
51 Refer to Table J.4 in Appendix J for the complete table with industry dummy variables. 
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Table 4.24: Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Debt 
Contracting Variables Using 2SLS   
 
iiiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLZSCOREQUANT +++++++= 7654321 βββββββ  
ii7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLZSCORETYPE +++++++= βββββββ,  
 
ii7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLZSCORECOST +++++++= βββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  -0.102 0.896*** 0.067 0.679** -0.641* 12.495*** 
(-0.431) (3.516) (0.171) (1.977) (-1.870) (7.446) 
ZSCORE 0.068*** -0.055** -0.030 0.040*** 0.045** 0.408*** 
(5.007) (-2.517) (-1.330) (2.674) (2.282) (3.373) 
ACCRL -0.058 0.101* -0.062 -0.026 -0.012 0.653* 
(-1.456) (1.841) (-0.932) (-0.523) (-0.214) (1.686) 
AGE -0.0004 -0.002* 0.002* 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001 
(-0.458) (-1.904) (1.716) (0.013) (-0.650) (0.007) 
COLLT 0.105* 
 
0.242*** -0.222 -0.057 0.037 
 
-0.614 
(1.787) (2.845) (-2.281) (-0.943) (0.440) (-1.187) 
SIZE 0.058*** -0.116*** 0.014 0.009 0.093*** -0.543*** 
(2.785) (-4.846) (0.391) (0.305) (3.072) (-3.267) 
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.197 0.098 0.124 0.036 0.190 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.     
This table presents 2SLS regression results for the relationship between corporate governance 
and debt contracting variables where corporate governance is an instrumental variable.  The 
regressions include unreported industry dummy variables.  The t-values, given in parenthesis 
below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
 
The study extends the examination of the DCM by testing whether 
corporate governance is directly related to debt contracting.  The OLS results 
from estimating the relationship between corporate governance and the debt 
contracting variables are presented in Table 4.25.52  The results indicate that 
GOV is related to QUANT at the 1% significance level.  The negative sign for 
the GOV coefficient indicates that an increase in GOV reduces QUANT, which 
is opposite to the expected positive relationship between the two variables.  A 
possible explanation is that companies with low levels of corporate governance 
                                                
52 Refer to Table J.5 in Appendix J for the complete table with industry dummy variables. 
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seek higher quantities of debt which influence their risk position.  This is 
consistent with the results of H1a which show that default risk is positively 
related to access to quantity of debt. 
 
Table 4.25: Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Debt 
Contracting Variables Using OLS     
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost 
of Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.082 
 
0.965*** -0.466** 0.765*** -0.263 
 
13.643*** 
(0.597) (6.354) (-2.192) (3.485) (-1.443) (13.133) 
GOV -0.011*** 0.006 0.013** -0.009* -0.010* -0.043* 
 
(-3.165) (1.216) (2.348) (-1.837) (-1.888) (-1.696) 
AGE 0.0001 -0.003*** 0.001 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 
(0.241) (-4.043) (1.294) (0.911) (0.833) (0.115) 
COLLT 0.131*** 0.084 -0.061 -0.001 -0.023 -0.082 
(3.370) (1.493) (-1.012) (-0.013) (-0.410) (-0.285) 
SIZE 0.054*** -0.110*** 0.081*** -0.022 0.051** -0.616*** 
(3.658) (-6.105) (3.585) (-0.989) (2.349) (-5.454) 
Adjusted R2 0.074 
 
0.119 0.098 0.020 0.014 
 
0.104 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.     
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables.  The regressions include unreported industry dummy variables. The 
t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
 
 
The regression results for the relationship between access to the four 
debt types and corporate governance are presented in Table 4.25.  The results 
indicate that a positive relationship exists between GOV and BANK at the 5% 
significance level.  This suggests that an increase in corporate governance leads 
to higher access to bank debt.  However, GOV is not significantly related to 
ASFIN but it is negatively related to NONBANK or NONINT at the 10% 
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significance level.  A possible explanation for the negative relationship between 
GOV and both NONBANK and NONINT could be deduced from the results of 
hypothesis one which show a positive relationship shown between ZSCORE 
and NONBANK and NONINT at the 1% significance level (see Table 4.18).  
As corporate governance is negatively related to ZSCORE (see Table 4.22) it 
could therefore be expected that GOV would have an inverse effect on 
NONBANK and NONINT. 
The regression results for the relationship between GOV and COST are 
presented in Table 4.25.  The results indicate that a negative relationship exists 
between GOV and COST at the 10% significance level which suggests that 
higher levels of corporate governance reduce cost of debt.  Furthermore, SIZE 
is also negatively related to COST at the 1% significance level which shows 
that cost of debt increases when company size is decreased. 
  The summary of the findings for hypothesis four are reported in Table 
4.26.  H4a is not supported because GOV is negatively related to QUANT 
while the DCM expects the relationship to be positive.  Additionally, H4b 
which relates GOV to BANK is supported suggesting that an increase in 
corporate governance results in an increase in the access to bank debt.  
However, other statements in H4b that relate GOV to ASFIN, NONBANK and 
NONINT are not supported.  Finally, H4c is supported, which implies that an 
increase in corporate governance reduces cost of debt.  This result is similar to 
findings reported by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Beekes and Brown (2006), 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and Sengupta (1998) which state that an increase 
in corporate governance reduces cost of debt. 
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Table 4.26: Results for Hypothesis Four 
 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H4a: Higher levels of corporate governance impact positively on the 
quantity of debt accessed via the reduction of default and 
information risk. Not Supported  
H4b: Higher levels of corporate governance impact positively on the 
following debt types via the reduction of default and 
information risk:  
                                              Asset finance debt. Not Supported 
                                              Bank debt. Supported 
                                              Non-bank debt. Not Supported  
                                              Non-intermediated debt. Not Supported 
H4c: Higher levels of corporate governance impact negatively on 
cost of debt via the reduction of default and information risk. Supported 
 
4.3.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, DEBT 
CONTRACTING AND COMPANY SIZE  
 
 Hypothesis five focuses on the relationship between corporate 
governance and the debt contracting variables for different sized companies.  
The hypothesis is partitioned into three sub-hypotheses.  H5a and H5b state that 
smaller companies that implement higher levels of corporate governance have 
greater access to the quantity and the type of debt relative to other companies.  
H5c states that smaller companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance pay a lower cost of debt in comparison to other companies. 
The results of the regression models that estimate the relationship 
between corporate governance and debt contracting for different size companies 
are reported in Table 4.27. It is evident from the results that the relationships 
between GOV and the debt contracting variables have not changed due to the 
inclusion of the interaction terms.53 For the purpose of examining hypothesis 
                                                
53 Refer to Table J.6 in Appendix J for the complete table with industry dummy variables. 
120 
 
five, the study focuses on the debt contracting variables that are significantly 
related to GOV.   
Table 4.27: Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Debt 
Contracting Variables for the Different Sized Companies   
 
iiiiiiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGELGOVSGOVLRGSMLGOVQUANT ++++++++++= 10987654321 __ ββββββββββ  
ii10i9i8i7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGELGOVSGOVLRGSMLGOVTYPE ++++++++++= ββββββββββ __,  
 
ii10i9i8i7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGELGOVSGOVLRGSMLGOVCOST ++++++++++= ββββββββββ __  
Quantity 
of Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.471*** 0.183 0.206 0.525*** 0.086 9.437*** 
(5.316) (1.429) (1.520) (3.476) (0.705) (17.342) 
GOV -0.007* -0.003 0.016** -0.004 -0.009* -0.111*** 
(-1.760) (-0.465) (2.451) (-0.718) (-1.608) (-4.019) 
SML 0.032 
 
-0.070 -0.073 0.192** -0.049 
 
-0.349 
(0.527) (-0.792) (-0.780) (2.007) (-0.576) (-0.739) 
LRG 0.006 -0.204 0.005 0.080 0.120 -2.176*** 
(0.052) (-1.328) (0.029) (0.500) (0.818) (-3.097) 
GOV_S -0.013 0.035*** -0.022* -0.020 0.007 0.174** 
(-1.405) (2.722) (-1.635) (-1.502) (0.545) (2.175) 
GOV_L 0.006 0.005 0.005 -0.009 -0.001 0.134** 
(0.588) (0.370) (0.307) (-0.627) (-0.059) (2.076) 
AGE 0.0003 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(0.420) (-3.048) (1.326) (0.885) (0.911) (-0.195) 
COLLT 0.143 
 
0.074 -0.049 -0.008 -0.017 
 
-0.089 
 
(3.642) (1.302) (-0.814) (-0.161) (-0.317) (-0.309) 
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.127 0.114 0.023 0.010 0.107 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:  
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.     
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
both the access to debt and cost of debt for different sized companies.  The regressions include 
unreported industry dummy variables.  The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  GOV_S is an interaction term which is measured by 
multiplying GOV by SML.  SML equals one if the company is in the lower quintile and zero 
otherwise.  GOV_L is an interaction term which is measured by multiplying GOV by LRG.  
LRG equals one if the company is in the upper quintile and zero otherwise. 
 
The results in Table 4.27 show that QUANT is negatively related to 
GOV but it is not related to GOV_S.  Additionally, although ASFIN is 
positively related to GOV_S at the 1% significance level, it is however not 
121 
 
related to GOV which suggests that small firms do not access more asset 
finance in the presence of higher levels of corporate governance.  The 
association between corporate governance and non-intermediated debt results 
show that GOV and NONINT are negatively related at the 10% significance 
level but NONINT is not related to GOV_S.  Finally, GOV and COST continue 
to maintain a significantly negative relationship in the presence of the 
governance-size interaction terms.  The impact of both GOV_S and GOV_L on 
COST is positive and significant at the 5% significance level.  This result is 
opposite to the expected negative relationship between COST and GOV_S 
which indicates that small companies do not benefit from implementing higher 
levels of corporate governance relative to larger companies.  Nonetheless, LRG 
is negatively related to COST at the 1% significance level which suggests that 
larger companies pay a lower cost of debt. 
The summary of the outcomes relating to hypothesis five are presented 
in Table 4.28.  H5a is not supported because the relationship between GOV_S 
to QUANT is not statistically significant.  H5b is not supported because GOV is 
not related to ASFIN and NONBANK.  Although a significantly positive 
relationship exists between GOV and BANK, the impact of GOV_S on BANK 
is negative which is contrary to the expected relationship between the two 
variables.  Finally, the statement in H5c is not supported due to the significantly 
positive relationship between GOV_S and COST which is opposite to the 
expected negative relationship between the variables. 
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Table 4.28: Results for Hypothesis Five 
 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H5a:  Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance access more interest bearing debt. Not Supported 
H5b:  Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance access more of the following debt types:  
                                                      Asset finance debt. Not Supported 
                                                      Bank debt. Not Supported 
                                                      Non-bank debt. Not Supported 
                                                      Non-intermediated debt. Not Supported 
H5c:  Small companies that implement higher levels of corporate 
governance pay a lower cost of debt. Not Supported  
 
 In summary, the results indicate that default risk reduces access to bank 
debt and asset finance debt, and increases cost of debt.  However, information 
risk is shown to only increase cost of debt.  Furthermore, risk assessment and 
corporate governance are negatively related, which suggest that an increase in 
the level of corporate governance results in a reduction in default risk and 
information risk.  The results also indicate that an increase in corporate 
governance results in an increase in bank debt and a decrease in cost of debt.  
Finally, the results show that small companies do not access more quantities of 
debt or types of debt when they implement higher levels of corporate 
governance.  Moreover, cost of debt for small companies is not reduced due to 
implementing higher levels of corporate governance.  The next section focuses 
on applying sensitivity analysis to the results in order to assess whether the 
findings in the current section are robust under varying conditions.      
4.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS   
 
This section assesses the robustness of the hypothesis tests.  Alternate 
variables for debt access, default risk, information risk, corporate governance 
and company size are used in order to test the sensitivity of the original results.  
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Moreover, the alternate variables are used in the regression estimation to test 
the five hypotheses. 
4.4.1 ALTERNATE DEBT ACCESS MEASURES 
 
 The study uses alternate measures to represent access to quantity and 
types of debt.  The original quantity of debt accessed variable is measured as 
total interest bearing debt divided by total liabilities.  The four variables that 
represent access to debt types are measured as the quantity of debt in each debt 
type divided by total interest bearing debt.  The original measurements of 
access to quantity and type of debt are consistent with proxies used by past 
research (González et al. 2007; Bougheas et al. 2006; Denis and Mihov 2003; 
Cantillo and Wright 2000).  An alternative approach is to divide total interest 
bearing debt and the quantities of debt in each debt type by total assets.  This 
approach indicates the degree of financing of assets that is sourced from the 
different types of interest bearing debt.  Section K.1 in Appendix K provides 
the calculation for the access to debt variables. 
 The results for the regression estimations which use alternate access to 
quantity and type measures are reported in Table K.1 to K.5 in Section K.1 of 
Appendix K.  The results, in light of the new measurements, show similarities 
with the original results for the access to quantity of debt and cost of debt whilst 
some difference are noted for access to the different types of debt.  Most 
importantly, the results support the original findings that default risk and 
information risk increase cost of debt while higher levels of corporate 
governance reduces cost of debt.  
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4.4.2 ALTERNATE DEFAULT RISK VARIABLE 
  
Hypothesis one states that default risk, represented by ZSCORE, is 
related to the debt contracting variables.  The results reported in Table 4.18 
suggest that ZSCORE is negatively related to ASFIN and BANK whilst it is 
positively related to COST.  The results are further assessed by introducing an 
alternate measure to proxy for default risk.  The alternate measure is optimised 
to discriminate between failed and non-failed Australian companies thereby it 
overcomes any potential problems associated with using the financial ratios 
suggested by Altman (1968, 1983). 
The study uses ZSCORE2 as an alternate default risk variable to test the 
relationship between default risk and debt contracting.
54
Unlike the original 
ZSCORE, the alternate variable is estimated by applying parameters from 
stepwise MLD analysis of ten financial ratios.  The inclusion of ten ratios rather 
than the original five ratios improves the selection of the underlying drivers of 
Z-score.  The ratios are return on asset, debt to equity, long-term debt to equity, 
net profit margin, debt to asset, fixed asset turnover, total asset turnover, return 
on equity, operating profit margin and current ratio.  The stepwise MLD 
analysis selected debt to equity, net profit margin, return on asset and total asset 
turnover as the four ratios that are included in the ZSCORE2 estimation.  
Similar to the original default risk variable, ZSCORE2 is multiplied by negative 
one so that a high Z-score indicates a high default risk.  A decomposition of 
ZSCORE2 shows that it is mainly driven by debt to equity and total asset 
turnover.  Companies with a greater debt to equity will have a higher Z-score 
                                                
54 Refer to Tables K.6 and K.7 in Section K.2 of Appendix K for a detailed overview of the 
estimation and decomposition of ZSCORE2. 
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while companies with high levels of total asset turnover will receive a lower Z-
score. 
The results presented in Table 4.29 show a similar pattern to the results 
obtained by using ZSCORE. 55  The relationship between ZSCORE2 and 
QUANT, NONBANK and NONINT is positive and significant at the 1% 
significance level.  The results indicate that access to aggregate interest bearing 
debt and access to non-bank and non-intermediated debt are positively 
influenced by default risk, which reflects the underlying premise that increased 
debt increases the riskiness of the company.  However, BANK is negatively 
related to ZSCORE2 at the 1% significance level, which suggests that high 
levels of default risk reduce the access to bank debt.  Additionally, ZSCORE2 
is positively related to COST at the 1% significance level which indicates that 
high default risk increases the cost of debt.  The sensitivity analysis results that 
are obtained by using ZSCORE2 confirm the original results reported in Table 
4.18.  These results suggest that default risk is negatively related to the access 
to bank debt whilst it is positively related to cost of debt.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
55 Refer to Table K.8 Section K.2 of in Appendix K for the complete table with industry dummy 
variables. 
56 Section K.2 of Appendix K introduces times interest earned as an additional measure for 
default risk.  Refer to Tables K.9 for regression results that include times interest earned as an 
alternate variable for default risk.   
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Table 4.29: Relationship between Default risk (ZSCORE2) and the Debt 
Contracting Variables 
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2ZSCOREQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2ZSCORETYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2ZSCORECOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  -0.013 0.957 -0.273 0.629*** -0.313* 12.842*** 
(-0.0940 (6.124) (-1.318) (2.794) (-1.673) (12.186) 
ZSCORE2 0.017*** 
 
-0.006 -0.027*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 
 
0.103*** 
 
(4.524) (-0.953) (-4.151) (4.015) (2.680) (3.280) 
AGE 0.0003 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
(0.634) (-4.095) (0.899) (1.185) (1.025) (0.412) 
COLLT 0.149*** 0.080 -0.089 0.019 -0.010 0.026 
(3.911) (1.419) (-1.473) (0.389) (-0.178) (0.093) 
SIZE 0.057*** -0.104*** 0.067*** -0.011 0.049** -0.546*** 
(4.053) (-6.084) (3.184) (-0.537) (2.447) (-5.119) 
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.117 0.118 0.035 0.016 0.117 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between the debt contracting variables 
and the default risk, where ZSCORE2 is the proxy for default risk. ZSCORE2 refers to the 
default risk estimated by using stepwise MLD.  The regressions include unreported industry 
dummy variables. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.   
 
4.4.3 ALTERNATE INFORMATION RISK 
VARIABLE 
  
Hypothesis two states that information risk is related to the debt 
contracting variables.  The results presented in Table 4.20 indicate that ACCRL 
is positively related to COST.  The study further examines the relationship 
between debt contracting and information risk by partitioning the latter into 
innate and discretionary components (Francis et al. 2005, 2004; Dechow and 
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Dichev 2002; Gray et al. 2009). 57  The discretionary portion of information risk 
results from the accounting choices carried out by management which are 
independent of the business structure or the operating environment of the firm 
(Gray et al. 2009; Francis et al. 2005).  Managers can exercise judgment with 
respect to current recognition of future expenses and revenues thereby 
distorting the quality of reported accounting information (DeFond and Park 
1997; Subramanyam 1996).  Furthermore, managers’ ability to select and 
disclose accounting information could lead to variability in the level and 
precision of that information.   
The innate component of information risk consists of the intrinsic 
features of the company’s operating and economic environment (Francis et al. 
2004).  Firm-specific factors such as the variability in sales and cash flows, 
company size, the length of the operating cycle and the incidence of losses can 
influence the quality of accruals.  Dechow and Dechiv (2002) and Francis et al. 
(2005) argue that smaller companies and companies with greater variability of 
cash flows, a longer operating cycle, and greater incidences of losses, possess 
poorer accruals quality.  As a result, innate firm factors, especially for small 
companies, could negatively influence the level of and precision of the 
accounting information disclosed to stakeholders, which increases the 
underlying information risk.         
  The innate and discretionary components of information risk are 
expected to have a differential impact on debt contracting.  Discretionary 
information risk can lead to an increase in agency costs (Demirkan and Platt 
2009) which could have an adverse effect on the quantity, type and cost of debt.  
                                                
57 Refer to Tables K.10 to K.13 in Section K.3 of Appendix K for detailed overview of the 
innate and discretionary components of accruals quality.   
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However, prior studies show that an innate information risk has a greater 
impact on the pricing of debt contracts relative to discretionary information 
risk.  The DCM adopts a similar position to prior studies by proposing that the 
firm’s intrinsic factors and operating environment are expected to have more 
influence on debt contracting in comparison to discretionary information risk. 
The study decomposes information risk into innate and discretionary 
components in accordance with prior studies (Dechow and Dichev 2002; 
Francis et al. 2004, 2005).  The innate dimension of information risk comprises 
a number of factors that influence the operational and economical environment 
of the business (Gray et al. 2009) which in turn impact on the quality of 
accruals.  The five factors used by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. 
(2005) are company size, standard deviation of cash flow from operations, 
standard deviation of sales revenue, length of operating cycle and loss in 
earnings.  The current study follows the approach used by Francis et al. (2005) 
to regresses ACCRL on the five innate company factors.  The predicted value 
for the regression provides an estimate of the innate component of accruals 
quality.  However, the residual of the regression represents an estimate of the 
discretionary component of accruals quality. The following is a model of the 
regression estimate that includes ACCRL and the five innate accruals quality 
factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
( ) ( ) ii5i4i3i2i10i LOSSOPCYCLESALESCFOSIZEACCRL εββσβσβββ ++++++=
 
                               (4.1) 
Where: 
iSIZE  =  Log of total assets. 
 
iCFO)(σ  = The standard deviation of cash flow from operations for 
firm i.  Cash flow from operations is calculated over a 
period of 5 years. 
  
iSALE )(σ  = The standard deviation of sales revenue for firm i.  Sales 
revenue is calculated over a period of 5 years. 
  
iOPCYCLE  
= Log of the sum of days accounts receivable and days 
inventory for firm i. 
 
iLOSS    =  One if firm i reports negative earnings after tax and zero 
otherwise. 
 
The predicted values from (4.1) produce an estimate of the innate component of 
the ith firm’s accruals quality, INACCRL, as represented in the following 
model: 
( ) ( ) i5i4i3i2i10i LOSSOPCYCLESALESCFOSIZEINACCRL
∧∧∧∧∧∧
+++++= ββσβσβββ
 
          (4.2) 
The residual from (4.2) is an estimate of the discretionary component of the ith 
firm’s accruals quality DSACCRL as follows: 
itiDSACCRL
∧
= ε,  
The summary statistics for INACCRL and DSACCRL are presented in 
Tables K.10 - K.13 of Section K.3 in Appendix K.  The tables show that the 
mean for INACCRL is 0.45 while the mean for DSACCRL is -0.0000001.  The 
ANOVA results indicate that the INACCRL means for the three size groups are 
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significantly different from each other.  This result is substantiated by Tukey’s 
post hoc test which shows that the means for INACRRL across small, medium 
and large companies are statistically different from each other.  However, 
ANOVA results show that the means for DSACCRL across the three size 
groups are not statistically different from each other. 
To further investigate the impact of information risk on debt 
contracting, the study replaces ACCRL with the two components of 
information:  INACCRL and DSACCRL.  As shown in Table 4.30, INACCRL 
is negatively related to QUANT at the 5% significance level which indicates 
that an increase in the innate factors of information risk leads to a decrease in 
the access to quantity of debt.58  Furthermore, INACCRL is positively related to 
ASFIN and negatively related to NONINT at the 1% and 10% significance 
level respectively which suggests companies with a higher innate information 
risk will access more asset finance debt and less non-intermediated debt.  
Additionally, INACCRL is positively related to COST at the 5% significance 
level which indicates that an increase in the innate component of the 
information risk increases cost of debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
58 Refer to Table K.14 and K.15 in Section K.3 of Appendix K for the complete table with 
industry dummy variables. 
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Table 4.30: Relationship between the Innate Component of Information Risk 
and the Debt Contracting Variables  
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEZSCOREINACCRLQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEZSCOREINACCRLTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEZSCOREINACCRLCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.539*** -0.256*** 0.170 0.797*** 0.289 7.878*** 
(4.086) (-3.576) (0.808) (3.528) (1.575) (9.001) 
INACCRL -0.192** 0.346*** -0.177 0.013 -0.181* 2.399** 
(-2.428) (3.227) (-1.408) (0.111) (-1.646) (2.474) 
AGE -0.001 -0.002** 0.002* -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.007 
(-0.884) (-2.258) (1.767) (-0.301) (-0.172) (-1.192) 
COLLT 0.091 0.260*** -0.225** -0.073 0.039 -0.581 
(1.488) (3.205) (-2.304) (-1.184) (0.453) (-1.036) 
Adjusted R2 0.057 
 
0.132 0.091 0.100 -0.004 
 
0.087 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between the innate component of 
information risk, INACCRL, and the debt contracting variables and information risk. 
INACCRL and SIZE are highly correlated (ρ = -0.715) at the 1% significance level and hence 
the presence of SIZE in the regression estimation caused INACCRL to be insignificant.  The 
study removes SIZE whenever INACCRL is present in the regression model. The regressions 
include unreported industry dummy variables. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each 
estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
 
The study also focuses on the relationship between DSACCRL and the 
debt contracting variables.  The results presented in Table 4.31 show that 
DSACCRL is positively related to COST at the 5% significance level.  These 
results indicate that the innate and discretionary components of information risk 
are priced by the market in terms of the cost of debt charged.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
59 Section K.3 of Appendix K introduces the bid-ask spread and abnormal accruals as alternate 
variables for information risk.  Refer to Table K.16 to K.18 for regression results that include 
two alternate variables for information risk.   
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Table 4.31: Relationship between the Discretionary Component of 
Information Risk and the Debt Contracting Variables   
 
iiiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREDSACCRLQUANT +++++++= 7654321 βββββββ
ii7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREDSACCRLTYPE +++++++= βββββββ,  
 
ii7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREDSACCRLCOST +++++++= βββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.150 0.771*** -0.206 0.920*** -0.485* 15.511*** 
(0.685) (2.727) (-0.598) (2.945) (-1.633) (10.884) 
DSACCRL 0.010 0.058 -0.077 0.008 0.011 1.027** 
(0.208) (0.975) (-1.067) (0.145) (0.178) (2.491) 
AGE -0.001 -0.002 0.003* -0.0001 -0.001 -0.003 
(-0.848) (-1.298) (1.758) (-0.114) (-0.715) (-0.573) 
COLLT 0.104* 0.239*** -0.222** -0.075 0.057 -0.667 
(1.670) (2.978) (-2.262) (-1.225) (0.673) (-1.283) 
SIZE 0.035* 
 
-0.104*** 0.038 -0.014 0.079*** 
 
-0.807*** 
(1.772) (-4.054) (1.226) (-0.496) (2.946) (-5.123) 
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.158 0.094 0.097 0.021 0.158 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relation between the discretionary component of 
information risk, DSACCRL, and the debt contracting variables. The regressions include 
unreported industry dummy variables. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
 
4.4.4 ALTERNATE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
VARIABLE 
  
Hypothesis three states that higher levels of corporate governance are 
associated with both default risk and information risk.  The earlier regression 
results presented in Table 4.22 indicate that default and information risks are 
negatively related to higher levels of corporate governance.  The study checks 
the robustness of the results presented in Table 4.22 by substituting GOV2 and 
ZSCORE2 for GOV and ZSCORE respectively.  
133 
 
The alternate corporate governance variable, GOV2, is calculated by 
combining the fourteen individual corporate governance variables into a single 
score.  Each corporate governance variable is scaled between zero and ten 
where ten represents the highest score a company can achieve.  To compute the 
score of zero to ten, the value of each individual corporate governance variable 
is divided by the highest value for that variable and then the result is multiplied 
by ten.  The scores from each of the fourteen variables are then added together 
to produce GOV2 which ranges from zero to 140, where 140 is the highest total 
score a company can achieve.   
The variable GOV2 is selected as an alternative measure for corporate 
governance because it differs from GOV in two respects.  Firstly, the scale used 
to calculate GOV2 allows for a greater variability in the data.  GOV limits the 
maximum score to 14 whereas GOV2 represents a score which can reach 140, 
thereby reflecting the heterogeneity in the sampled companies.  Secondly, 
GOV2 incorporates all governance information in the score whereas GOV 
discards corporate governance information that is below the median.  GOV2 is 
used in place of GOV to assess the impact of corporate governance on default 
and information risk. 
The results for the regression estimations that are used in testing 
hypothesis three are presented in Table 4.32.  The relationship between the 
original ZSCORE variable and GOV2 is negative and significant at the 5% 
significance level.  The results confirm the original results which suggest that 
higher levels of corporate governance reduce default risk.  Similar results are 
obtained when using ZSCORE2 as an alternate default risk variable.  GOV is 
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negatively related to ZSCORE2 at the 5% significance level. 60 GOV2 is also 
negatively related to ZSCORE2, however the relationship is not statistically 
significant.  
 
Table 4.32: Relationship between Default Risk and Corporate Governance   
 
 
iiiiiiRiR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVZSCORE ++++++= 6543,21, ββββββ
 
 Default Risk    
Variable ZSCORE ZSCORE2 ZSCORE2     
Intercept 
6.833*** 11.636*** 11.106***     
 (10.098) (9.511) (9.304)     
GOV   -0.092**     
   (-2.447)     
GOV2 -0.008** -0.006     
 (-2.480) (-0.876)     
AGE -0.003 -0.009 -0.009*     
 (-0.965) (-1.520) (-1.626)     
COLLT -0.304* -1.113** -1.102**     
 (-1.604) (-2.546) (-2.521)     
SIZE -0.555*** -1.503*** -1.386***     
 (-7.569) (-9.970) (-9.743)     
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.355 0.360     
N 595 595 595     
 
Notes:   
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.     
This table presents regression results for the relation between both default risk and information 
risk and corporate governance.  GOVR  refers to GOV and GOV2.  ZSCORER refers to 
ZSCORE and ZSCORE2.  The regressions include unreported industry dummy variables.  The 
t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
  
As a further examination, the study investigates whether higher levels of 
corporate governance impact on the innate and discretionary components of 
information risk.  The results presented in Table 4.33 indicate that GOV is 
negatively related to INACCRL and DSACCRL at the 1% significance level 
                                                
60 Refer to Table K.19 in section K.4 of Appendix K for the complete table with industry 
dummy variables. 
135 
 
respectively.61  While the two components of information risk are significantly 
related to corporate governance, the innate component is noted to have a 
stronger relationship with corporate governance relative to the discretionary 
component.  Similar results are shown when GOV2 is used as an alternate for 
GOV.  The two components of information risks are negatively related to 
GOV2. Additionally, ACCRL is also negatively related to GOV2 which 
supports the findings in Table 4.22.  This suggests that higher levels of 
corporate governance reduce information risk. 
Table 4.33: Relationship between the Innate and Discretionary Components 
of Information Risk and Corporate Governance   
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE2GOVACCRL +++++= βββββ  
iiiiiRi eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVINACCRL +++++= 543,21 βββββ  
ii5i4i3iR21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVDSACCRL +++++= βββββ ,  
  ACCRL INACCRL INACCRL DSACCRL DSACCRL 
Intercept 1.237*** 0.601*** 0.607*** 0.540 0.677*** 
 
(4.859) (4.817) (4.818) (1.071) (3.020) 
GOV 
 
-0.019*** 
 
-0.037*** 
  
(-3.814) (-2.778) 
GOV2 -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
(-4.007) (-3.757) (-2.718) 
AGE 0.0005 -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.002 0.003*** 
(0.287) (-2.935) (-2.638) (1.496) (1.815) 
 COLLT -0.150 -0.059 -0.049 -0.147 -0.123 
(-1.368) (-1.087) (-0.908) (-1.257) (-1.275) 
SIZE 
   
0.029 
  
(0.857) 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.157 0.155 0.074 0.046 
 N 205 205 205 205 205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.     
This table presents regression results for the relationship between the innate and discretionary 
components of information risk and corporate governance.    SIZE is only included in the 
regressions that exclude GOV2 and INACCRL due to the high correlation between SIZE and 
GOV2 and INACCRL. The regressions include unreported industry dummy variables. The t-
values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
                                                
61 Refer to Table K.20 in Section K.4 of Appendix K for the complete table with industry 
dummy variables. 
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Hypothesis four focuses on the impact of higher levels of corporate 
governance on the debt contracting variables.  The results presented in Table 
4.25 suggest that higher levels of corporate governance are positively related to 
bank debt and negatively related to cost of debt.  As a robustness test, the 
relationship between corporate governance and debt contracting is further 
analysed by introducing GOV2 as an alternate proxy for corporate governance.  
The results in Table 4.35 suggest that GOV2 is negatively related to QUANT 
and NONBANK at the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
 62
A 
possible explanation for the negative relationship between corporate 
governance and the total quantity of debt accessed and non-bank debt could be 
that companies with high debt levels have a greater possibility of default and 
therefore will have a lower governance score (the association between higher 
levels of corporate governance and default risk was established in earlier 
results).  Additionally, the results show that GOV2 is positively related to 
BANK and negatively related to COST.  However, the relationships are not 
statistically significant. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
62 Refer to Table K.21 in Section K.4 of Appendix K for the complete table with industry 
dummy variables. 
137 
 
 
Table 4.35: Relationship between Corporate Governance (GOV2) and the 
Debt Contracting Variables    
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2GOVQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2GOVTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2GOVCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity of 
Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.105 0.983*** -0.534** 0.765*** -0.214 13.783*** 
(0.753) (6.349) (-2.479) (3.426) (-1.128) (12.891) 
GOV2 -0.001** 0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.005 
(-2.218) (1.412) (0.977) (-1.605) (-0.873) (-0.959) 
AGE 0.000 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.367) (-4.112) (1.210) (1.003) (0.904) (0.189) 
COLLT 0.130*** 0.085 -0.059 -0.001 -0.024 -0.087 
(3.327) (1.508) (-0.984) (-0.029) (-0.431) (-0.300) 
SIZE 0.048*** -0.114*** 0.097*** -0.022 0.040* -0.648*** 
(3.180) (-6.001) (4.128) (-0.966) (1.745) (-5.270) 
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.120 0.091 0.018 0.007 0.120 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.     
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables where GOV2 is the proxy for corporate governance.  The regressions 
include unreported industry dummy variables. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each 
estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
A closer examination of the results suggests that the presence of 
company size as a control variable is contributing to the insignificance of the 
corporate governance variable.  A correlation analysis indicates that GOV2 and 
SIZE have a correlation of 0.58 which is significant at the 1% significance level 
as shown in table 4.36.  This high correlation between GOV2 and SIZE 
suggests a possible multicollinearity between the two variables.  Consequently, 
the presence of SIZE in the regression is causing GOV2 to become statistically 
insignificant.  The method used to calculate GOV2 could provide a possible 
explanation as to why it correlates highly with size.  GOV2, which ranges from 
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zero to 140, allows for a high variability in the data.  As a result, the alternate 
corporate governance variable implicitly captures the heterogeneity in 
companies corresponding to corporate governance and therefore it could act as 
a proxy for size.  Consequently, SIZE is removed from the analysis, in order to 
test whether GOV2 contributes to explaining the variability in the debt 
contracting variables.   
 
Table 4.36: Correlation Analysis for the Two Corporate Governance 
Variables and Company Size 
 
  GOV2 SIZE 
GOV2 1.000   
SIZE 0.575*** 1.000 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 1%, two-tailed.     
 
 The regression results that exclude company size from the analysis are 
presented in Table 4.37.63  The results suggest that GOV2 is negatively related 
to ASFIN and NONBANK at the 10% and 1% significance levels respectively.    
The negative relationship between GOV2 and ASFIN could be caused by the 
initial negative relationship between SIZE and ASFIN, where large companies 
access less asset finance debt relative to other companies.  Furthermore, since 
GOV2 captures the size effect, an increase in corporate governance could result 
in a decrease in asset finance debt.  The results for the relationship between 
corporate governance and access to bank debt show that GOV2 is positively 
related to BANK at the 1% significance level. The positive relationship 
between GOV2 and BANK confirms the original test results which indicate that 
an increase in corporate governance results in an increase in access to bank 
                                                
63 Refer to Table K.22 in Section K.4 of Appendix K for the complete table with industry 
dummy variables. 
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debt.  Finally, GOV2 is negatively related to COST at the 1% significance 
level.  The negative relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt 
confirms the earlier results which suggest that an increase in the level of 
corporate governance lowers cost of debt. 
 
Table 4.37: Relationship between Corporate Governance (GOV2) and the 
Debt Contracting Variables (Without size)   
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE2GOVQUANT +++++= βββββ  
ii5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE2GOVTYPE +++++= βββββ,  
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE2GOVCOST +++++= βββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.460*** 0.142** 0.179 0.599*** 0.080 8.989*** 
(5.483) (2.077) (1.371) (5.330) (0.838) (14.555) 
GOV2 -0.0003 -0.001* 0.003*** -0.002*** 0.0001 -0.020*** 
(-0.542) (-1.778) (3.873) (-2.719) (0.125) (-5.368) 
AGE 0.001 -0.004*** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 -0.004 
(0.996) (-5.240) (2.023) (0.752) (1.257) (-1.124) 
COLLT 0.146*** 
 
0.048 -0.028 -0.009 -0.011 
 
-0.297 
(3.727) (0.820) (-0.463) (-0.166) (-0.199) (-1.011) 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.081 0.066 0.018 0.003 0.062 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables excluding the size control variable.  The regressions include 
unreported industry dummy variables. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
4.4.5 ALTERNATE COMPANY SIZE VARIABLE 
  
Hypothesis five focuses on the relationship between higher levels of 
corporate governance and the debt contracting variables for different sized 
companies.  The earlier analysis included two size-governance interaction terms 
to show the impact of corporate governance on debt contracting outcomes for 
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large and small companies.  The results of the earlier analysis, as shown in 
Table 4.27, suggest that small companies do not realise any debt contracting 
benefits from the presence of higher levels of corporate governance relative to 
larger companies.  The robustness of the results reported in Table 4.27 is tested 
by introducing alternative dummy variables for the company size. 
 
Table 4.38: Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Debt 
Contracting Variables for Small and Large Companies 
  
ii7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGELRGSMLGOVQUANT +++++++= βββββββ  
ii7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGELRGSMLGOVTYPE +++++++= βββββββ,  
ii7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGELRGSMLGOVCOST +++++++= βββββββ  
Quantity 
Accessed 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.476*** 0.130* 0.225* 0.566*** 0.079 8.978*** 
(5.556) (1.736) (1.719) (3.843) (0.672) (16.725) 
GOV -0.009** 0.004 0.012** -0.009* -0.008* -0.059** 
(-2.547) (0.860) (2.361) (-1.883) (-1.737) (-2.357) 
SML -0.039 0.140*** -0.202*** 0.072* -0.009 0.738*** 
(-1.329) (2.842) (-4.496) (1.671) (-0.231) (2.741) 
LRG 0.072** -0.166*** 0.063 -0.006 0.108*** -0.857*** 
 
(2.394) (-5.196) (1.383) (-0.145) (2.620) 
 
(-3.977) 
AGE 0.0003 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(0.498) (-4.210) (1.396) (0.894) (0.894) (-0.158) 
COLLT 0.140*** 0.071 -0.052 -0.003 -0.017 -0.162 
(3.589) 91.266) (-0.868) (-0.066) (-0.311) (-0.567) 
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.119 0.112 0.022 0.013 0.099 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables for different sized companies.  The regressions include unreported 
industry dummy variables.  SML is a dummy variable that equals one if the company is classed 
as small and zero otherwise.  LRG is a dummy variable that equals one if a company is classed 
as large and zero otherwise.  The regressions include unreported industry dummy variables. The 
t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
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The analysis is re-run with the variables SML and LRG introduced to 
represent small and large companies as shown in Table 4.38.64  The variable 
SML is a dummy variable which equals one if the company falls within the 
lower size quintile and zero otherwise (companies are ranked into quintiles 
based on total assets).  Similarly, the variable LRG equals one if the company 
falls within the upper size quintile and zero otherwise.  
 The results presented in Table 4.38 confirm the results reported in Table 
4.27, which show that small companies do not experience debt contracting 
benefits when higher levels of corporate governance are implemented.  
Although GOV is positively related to BANK at the 5% significance level, the 
coefficient for SML is opposite from what is expected.  Additionally, the result 
for the relationship between higher levels of corporate governance and cost of 
debt show the coefficient for SML is positive and significant at the 1% 
significance level.  This suggests that smaller companies do not experience an 
increase in the access to quantities and types of debt or a decrease in cost of 
debt in the presence of higher levels of corporate governance. 
An alternate size categorization is also explored to test the robustness of 
the relationship between corporate governance and debt contracting for 
different sized companies.  The new size classification centres on the Top 300 
companies listed on S&P All Ordinaries index in Australia.  The Top 300 
companies are mandated to implement specific corporate governance practices 
such as establishing an audit committee which complies with PGCG (Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2007b).  As a 
result, the Top 300 companies are expected to be larger than other companies 
                                                
64 Refer to Table K.23 in Section K.5 Appendix K for the complete table with industry dummy 
variables. 
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and are perceived to have a higher level of corporate governance structure 
relative to other companies.  A dummy variable, TOP300, is used to proxy for 
the alternate size categorization.  TOP300 equals one if the company is in the 
Top 300 and zero otherwise.   
    
 
 i
300TOP =  
      
 
                    (4.2)
 
 
The results for the regression estimation with the new size 
categorisation are presented in Table 4.39.65  GOV remains positively related to 
BANK and negatively related to COST at 1% significance level respectively.  
Additionally, in the regression estimation for GOV and BANK, the coefficient 
for TOP300 is positive and significant at the 1% significance level.  This 
suggests that companies in the Top 300 access higher quantities of bank debt in 
the presence of higher levels of corporate governance.  The regression for the 
impact of GOV on COST shows the coefficient for TOP300 is negative and 
significant at the 1% significance level. This suggests that companies in the Top 
300 pay a lower cost of debt, relative to other companies, in the presence of 
higher levels of corporate governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
65 Refer to Table K.24 in Section K.5 of Appendix K for the complete table with industry 
dummy variables. 
  1 if firm i belongs to Top 300 companies 
  0 otherwise 
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Table 4.39: Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Debt 
Contracting Variables for the Top300 Companies     
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGETOP300GOVQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGETOP300GOVTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGETOP300GOVCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.470*** 0.169*** 0.120 0.600*** 0.111 9.156*** 
(5.627) (2.579) (0.926) (5.337) (1.167) (15.226) 
GOV -0.007** -0.003 0.020*** -0.012*** -0.005 -0.101*** 
(-2.080) (-0.582) (3.941) (-2.774) (-0.982) (-4.672) 
AGE 0.0004 -0.003*** 0.002* 0.0004 0.001 -0.003 
(0.678) (-4.751) (1.681) (0.599) (1.248) (-0.808) 
COLLT 0.146*** 
 
0.053 -0.038 -0.008 -0.007 
 
-0.264 
(3.766) (0.933) (-0.635) (-0.154) (-0.126) (-0.898) 
TOP300 0.069** -0.154*** 0.117*** 0.007 0.029 -0.632*** 
(2.303) (-4.616) (2.550) (0.174) (0.742) (-3.009) 
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.098 0.088 0.018 0.004 0.074 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and the 
debt contracting variables for different sized companies.  The Top300 refers to a dummy 
variable which equals one if the company is in the top 300 and zero otherwise.  The regressions 
include unreported industry dummy variables. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each 
estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
 
A final examination of the relationship between corporate governance 
and debt contracting for different sized companies is conducted for a sub-
sample of small companies.  Companies that are ranked in the lower size 
quintile are grouped together and are tested independently of other companies.  
The purpose behind this sensitivity analysis is to investigate whether variations 
in corporate governance within small companies have an impact on debt 
contracting for those companies.  Specifically, the question is whether smaller 
companies with higher levels of corporate governance experience debt 
contracting impacts in terms of greater access to debt and lower cost of debt. 
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The results of the analysis for the sub-sample of small companies are 
presented in Table 4.40. 66   The results indicate that corporate governance 
lowers total quantity of debt accessed and access to non-bank debt while 
increasing access to asset finance debt.  A possible explanation is that an 
increase in QUANT and NONINT could signal an increase in risk which 
therefore indicates a reduction in GOV.  A likely explanation for the positive 
relationship between GOV and ASFIN is that smaller companies tend to favour 
asset finance debt over other debt types (refer to Table 4.5).  Finally, the results 
show that GOV is not statistically related to COST which is dissimilar to the 
original findings reported in Table 4.27. 
The various examinations of the impact of corporate governance on debt 
contracting for different sized companies yield similar results, particularly for 
smaller companies.  The descriptive analysis results presented in Tables 4.10 
and 4.11 show that smaller companies support a weaker governance structure 
relative to other companies.  The mean for GOV for small companies is 5.41 
while the mean for GOV for all companies is 8.19 and for large companies is 
10.82.  Given the low level of governance for even the best small firms, it is not 
surprising that the results reveal that smaller companies with strong governance 
are still unable to realise debt contracting benefits relative to other companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
66 Refer to Table K.25 in Section K.5 of Appendix K for the complete table with industry 
dummy variables. 
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Table 4.40: Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Debt 
Contracting Variables for Small Companies    
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVQUANT +++++= βββββ  
ii5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVTYPE +++++= βββββ,  
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVCOST +++++= βββββ  
Quantity of 
Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.512* -0.134 -0.006 1.105*** 0.035 12.039*** 
(1.878) (-0.2920 (-0.085) (2.664) (0.093) (27.187) 
GOV -0.016* 0.034** -0.007 -0.024* -0.003 0.030 
 
(-1.859) (2.343) (-0.688) (-1.863) (-0.252) (0.400) 
AGE 0.005* -0.008* 0.005* 0.004 -0.002 -0.022 
(1.929) (-1.853) (1.773) (1.078) (-0.480) (-1.131) 
COLLT 0.114 0.017 -0.114 0.229 -0.132 -1.098 
(1.078) (0.096) (-1.032) (1.428) (-0.911) (-1.302) 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.077 0.096 0.031 0.052 0.008 
N 119   119 119 119 119   119 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables for small companies only.  SIZE is excluded because the analysis is 
applied to small firms only.  The regressions include unreported industry dummy variables. The 
t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
  
4.4.6 SUMMARY OF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
 The analysis results presented in this section provide robustness checks 
on the results reported in section 4.3.  The findings indicate that default risk 
reduces access to bank debt and increases cost of debt.  Additionally, 
information risk increases access to asset finance debt and increases cost of 
debt.  The robustness tests indicate that higher levels of corporate governance 
are negatively related to the default risk and to the innate and discretionary 
components of the information risk.  Furthermore, the relationship between 
corporate governance and debt contracting is reassessed by introducing an 
alternate governance variable.  Similar to the results obtained in the original 
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analysis, the robustness results suggest that higher levels of corporate 
governance increase the access to bank debt and decrease cost of debt.  Finally, 
the assessment of the relationship between corporate governance and debt 
contracting for different sized companies under different circumstances yields 
similar results to the original findings.  The results indicate that small 
companies that implement higher levels of corporate governance do not realise 
debt contracting benefits in the form of higher access to debt or lower cost of 
debt.        
4.5 SUMMARY   
 
The chapter presents the results from the descriptive and multivariate 
analysis.  It is noted that approximately 50% of Australian companies have 
interest bearing debt as part of their financial liabilities.  Additionally, larger 
companies have a greater access to interest bearing debt relative to other 
companies.  The results also show that bank debt is the most accessed type of 
debt.  Although non-intermediated debt represents the highest quantity 
(volume) of interest bearing debt accessed, it is the least accessed type of debt.  
As for the economic sectors, the information technology sector is charged the 
highest cost of debt while the consumer staples sector pays the lowest cost of 
debt.  The non-intermediated debt contracts are charged the highest cost of debt 
while bank debt contracts are charged the lowest cost of debt.  Furthermore, 
small companies pay on average the highest cost of debt while large companies 
pay the lowest cost of debt.   
The chapter presents the results of the five hypotheses.  H1a which 
states that default risk is negatively related to the access to quantity of debt is 
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rejected.  However, H1b which states that default is negatively related to debt 
types is supported for asset finance and bank debts.  Additionally, H1c which 
states that default risk is positively related to the cost of debt is supported.   
Hypothesis two states that information risk is associated with the debt 
contracting variables.  The results show that information risk is not related to 
access to the quantity of debt; therefore H2a is not supported.  Additionally, the 
study does not support H2b which states that information risk is positively 
related to access to asset finance and negatively related to bank debt, non-bank 
debt and non-intermediated debt.  The results do, however, indicate that 
information risk is positively related to cost of debt, which supports H2c.   
The third hypothesis states that higher levels of corporate governance 
are negatively related to default risk and information risk.  The hypothesis is 
separated into H3a which states that higher levels of corporate governance 
reduces default risk and H3b which states that higher levels of corporate 
governance decreases the information risk.  The results suggest that an increase 
in the level of corporate governance reduces default risk and information risk 
thereby supporting H3a and H3b.  
The fourth hypothesis states that higher levels of corporate governance 
are related to the access and cost dimensions of debt contracting via risk 
assessment.  The 2SLS estimation, which uses corporate governance as an 
instrument for risk, supports the impact of corporate governance on debt 
contracting via risk assessment and paves the way for using OLS to test the 
direct relationship between corporate governance and access to and cost of debt.  
The OLS results show corporate governance is negatively related to access to 
the quantity of debt, therefore H4a is not supported.  However, the study 
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supports hypothesis H4b which states that access to bank debt is positively 
related to higher levels of corporate governance.  This finding suggests that 
higher levels of corporate governance lead to a greater access to bank debt.  
Lastly, the study supports H4c which states that higher levels of corporate 
governance are negatively related to cost of debt.  This implies that higher 
levels of corporate governance lower cost of debt.   
Hypothesis five states that small companies access greater quantities 
and types of debt and pay lower cost of debt in the presence of higher levels of 
corporate governance.  The study does not support H5a and H5b which state 
that smaller companies access greater quantities of debt and access more types 
of debt in the presence of higher levels of corporate governance.  Additionally, 
H5c, which states that smaller companies have lower costs of debt in the 
presence of higher levels of corporate governance, is also not supported.  The 
following chapter reflects on the results provided in this chapter and presents a 
discussion about the implications of the findings. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION   
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 This thesis contributes to understanding the links between corporate 
governance, risk assessment and debt contracting.  The previous chapters 
provide the theoretical foundation in the DCM and the econometric approach 
used to obtain the results.  This chapter offers a discussion of the results and 
their implications as well as the conclusion to the study.  Additionally, the 
chapter presents a summary of the study which includes the objectives and 
motivations as well as the theory and methods used to answer the primary 
question that underlies the examination of the DCM.  Finally, an overview of 
the limitations of this research is provided to assist in acknowledging the 
various constraints surrounding this topic as well as future research 
opportunities. 
 The remainder of the chapter is partitioned into six sections.  Section 5.2 
discusses the results of the study.  Section 5.3 details the implications of the 
research.  Section 5.4 presents the limitations of the study.  Section 5.5 
addresses future research that could develop from this study.  Finally, section 
5.6 provides the conclusion for the chapter and thesis. 
5.2 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
This study tests the five hypotheses developed from the DCM.  
Hypotheses one and two focus on the relationship between risk assessment and 
debt contracting while the third hypothesis centres on the relationship between 
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risk assessment and corporate governance.  The purpose behind testing 
hypothesis four is to assess the impact of higher levels of corporate governance 
on debt contracting, via risk assessment.  Finally, the fifth hypothesis centres on 
how higher levels of corporate governance influence debt contracting outcomes 
for different sized companies.  The remainder of this section discusses the 
results and implications for each of the five hypotheses.  
Hypothesis one focuses on the relationship between default risk and 
debt contracting.  H1a and H1b state that default risk is negatively related to 
access to quantity and type of debt respectively, while H1c states that default 
risk is positively related to cost of debt.   
The results indicate that the relationship between default risk and access 
to debt is not negative as stated in H1a.  On the contrary, the relationship is 
shown to be positive and significant at the 1% level.  The findings indicate that 
an increase in default risk results in an increase in access to quantity of debt.  
However, there are two possible explanations for this unexpected outcome.  
The first explanation stems from the inputs of the Z-score, which is the proxy 
for default risk.  The Z-score comprises five accounting ratios one of which is 
the debt to asset ratio.  An increase in interest bearing debt indirectly increases 
the Z-score and hence contributes to the positive relationship between default 
risk and access to quantity of debt.  The second explanation is that an increase 
in access to quantity of debt could ultimately lead to an increase in default risk.  
This presents an endogeneity problem between the quantity of interest bearing 
debt accessed and default risk as observed by Molina (2005).  However, the 
study uses alternate default risk measures and finds that they are also positively 
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related to the quantity of debt accessed.  This indicates that the higher levels of 
debt increase the company’s default risk.67   
The relationship between default risk and access to type of debt is 
evaluated by testing H1b.  The study supports H1b which states that default risk 
is negatively related to the access to asset finance debt and bank debt.  This 
suggests that asset finance debt and bank debt increase in the event of a 
decrease in default risk.  Similar results are reported by Bougheas et al (2006) 
who conclude that firms with higher default risk receive less bank debt.  
Furthermore, Gonzalez et al. (2007) find that default risk is negatively related to 
bank debt but the relationship is not statistically significant.  However, the 
results are not in accordance with the findings of Diamond (1991) and Denis 
and Mihov (2003) who find that riskier US firms seek private debt, (bank debt 
is considered private debt) relative to other firms.  However as noted earlier, the 
debt contracting environment in Australia differs significantly from that of the 
US and hence the US evidence may not be directly comparable to the current 
study.  In Australia, bank debt is more of the norm than in the US hence the 
relative proportions would be different.  
The associations between non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt are 
also examined by testing H1b.  The results show that access to non-bank debt 
and non-intermediated debt is positively related to default risk, which is 
contrary to the expected negative relationship between the variables.  A 
possible explanation is that an increase in the aggregate quantity of debt in each 
debt type increases the level of default risk.  The descriptive analysis shows that 
                                                
67 Refer to Tables K.8 and K.9 in Section K.2 of Appendix K for further details on the 
relationship between quantity of debt accessed and the two alternate default risk measures. 
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the aggregate amount of non-intermediated debt is $54.2 billion which places it 
at the top of all debt types in terms of quantity of debt (see section 4.2.2.2).       
The relationship between default risk and cost of debt is assessed by 
testing H1c.  The results support H1c which states that default risk is positively 
related to cost of debt.  This conclusion is in line with findings reported by 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Klock et al (2005), Pittman and Fortin (2004), 
Anderson et al. (2004), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and Sengupta (1998) who 
suggest that default risk increases cost of debt.  Additionally, the positive 
relationship between cost of debt and default risk is very strong and consistent 
across the US and the Australian markets.  
Hypothesis two states that information risk is related to the access and 
cost dimensions of debt contracting.  The hypothesis is separated into three sub-
hypotheses.  H2a states that a negative relationship exists between information 
risk and access to quantity of debt.  Additionally, H2b states that information 
risk is positively related to asset finance debt, negatively related to bank debt, 
non-bank debt, and non-intermediated debt.  Finally, H2c states that 
information risk is positively related to cost of debt.   
The study does not support H2a which indicates that the company’s 
access to quantities of debt is not influenced by information risk.  Furthermore, 
the results do not support H2b which suggests that the access to the different 
debt types is not influenced by information risk.  However, the results suggest 
that the positive, although insignificant, relationship between asset finance and 
information risk is in accordance with Krishnan and Moyer (1994) and Realdon 
(2006) who show that companies with high levels of risk access secured debt 
such as finance leases.   
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The study supports H2c which states that information risk increases cost 
of debt.  This finding supports the results obtained by prior studies that examine 
the association between information risk and cost of debt.  Francis et al. (2005) 
show that an increase in information risk results in a higher cost of capital.  
Similar results are reported by Lambert et al. (2009) which find a positive 
relationship between information risk and cost of debt.  Additionally, Gray et 
al. (2009) show that information risk increases cost of debt for Australian firms.   
Sensitivity analysis decomposes information risk into innate and 
discretionary components and tests the relationship to debt contracting 
outcomes similar to Dechow and Dichev (2002), Francis et al. (2005) and Gray 
et al. (2009).  The sensitivity analysis results suggest that the innate and 
discretionary accruals aspects of information risk, increase cost of debt which 
indicates that the two components are priced in debt contracting.  These results 
are similar to the findings of Francis et al. (2005) which show that innate and 
discretionary accruals increase cost of capital.  However, Francis et al. (2005) 
state that the innate component of information risk has a stronger influence on 
cost of capital relative to the discretionary component.  Gray et al. (2009) show 
that information risk increases cost of debt for Australian companies.  However, 
they find that only the innate portion of information risk is related to cost of 
debt while the discretionary portion is not reported to impact on cost of debt 
(Gray et al. 2009).  The results from Gray et al. (2009) are in agreement with 
the findings of the current study in terms of the relationship between the innate 
portion of information risk and cost of debt.  However, the two studies are 
dissimilar in the sense that Gray et al. (2009) does not find a relationship 
between discretionary accruals and cost of debt while the current study does. 
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Hypothesis three states that higher levels of corporate governance are 
related to default and information risks.  The hypothesis is partitioned into H3a 
and H3b which state that corporate governance is negatively related to default 
risk and information risk respectively.  The results support H3a and H3b 
thereby establishing that corporate governance is related to risk assessment.  
Furthermore, these results support the DCM’s theoretical expectations that 
corporate governance mitigates agency conflicts between managers and other 
stakeholders and also increases financial transparency and disclosure, thereby 
lowering default and information risks.  Prior evidence reported by Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Strydom et al. (2009) and 
Kent et al. (2010)  also suggests that corporate governance reduces default and 
information risks. 
The relationship between corporate governance and risk assessment is 
further explored in the sensitivity analysis by examining whether corporate 
governance impacts on the innate and discretionary components of information 
risk.  The results show that corporate governance is negatively related to both 
the innate and the discretionary components of information risk.  However, the 
influence of corporate governance is stronger for the innate component of 
information risk relative to the discretionary component of information risk.  
These results are similar to the findings of Kent et al. (2010) which report that 
corporate governance is related to both the innate and the discretionary 
components of accruals quality.  Furthermore, Kent et al. (2010) conclude that 
the innate component has a stronger relationship with corporate governance in 
comparison to the discretionary component. 
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The fourth hypothesis focuses on the relationship between corporate 
governance and the debt contracting dimensions via risk assessment.  H4a and 
H4b, state that higher levels of corporate governance are positively related to 
access to quantity and type of debt respectively via the reduction of default and 
information risk.  H4c states that higher levels of corporate governance impact 
negatively on cost of debt via risk reduction.   
The theorised impact of corporate governance on debt contracting via 
risk assessment is tested by using 2SLS estimation where corporate governance 
is used as the instrument for risk.  The 2SLS results suggest that corporate 
governance, as an exogenous variable, could have an impact on debt 
contracting.  The study further tests the relationship between corporate 
governance and debt contracting by using OLS and the results show that higher 
levels of corporate governance reduce the aggregate access to quantity of debt.  
The negative relationship is contrary to the expected positive relationship 
between governance and access to debt.  A possible explanation is that higher 
levels of corporate governance provide greater managerial monitoring; thereby 
influencing the ability to seek debt financing.  Furthermore, the result is in line 
with findings of previous studies.  Wen et al. (2002) show an increase in 
corporate governance results in a reduction in debt levels.  Similar results are 
presented by Berger et al. (1997) and Friend and Lang (1988) which find that 
managerial ownership reduces the debt component in the capital structure.  
Nevertheless, Funchal et al. (2008) and Abor (2007) report a different set of 
results which indicates that corporate governance is positively related to interest 
bearing debt levels.       
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The relationship between corporate governance and access to the 
different debt types is examined by testing H4b.  The study supports H4b which 
states that corporate governance increases access to bank debt.  However, 
corporate governance is not found to be related to access to asset finance and is 
negatively related to access to non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt.  A 
possible explanation for the negative relationship between corporate 
governance and both access to non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt could 
be found in the results to hypothesis one which show a positive relationship 
between default risk and access to non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt.  
As corporate governance is found to be negatively related to default risk, it 
could therefore be expected that corporate governance would also negatively 
affect non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt. 
Hypothesis 4c, which states that corporate governance is negatively 
related to cost of debt, is supported by the test results.  Earlier results from H3a 
and H3b indicate that corporate governance reduces default and information 
risk.  Additionally, results from testing H1c and H2c suggest that default and 
information risks increase cost of debt respectively.  The result from testing 
hypothesis 4c indicates that corporate governance reduces the agency conflict 
and lowers information asymmetry thereby decreasing default risk, information 
risk and cost of debt.  This result is in accordance with findings presented by 
Byun (2007), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Klock et al. (2005), Pitman and 
Fortin (2004), Anderson et al. (2004), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and 
Sengupta (1998) which suggest that corporate governance reduces cost of debt 
in markets other than Australian.        
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The descriptive results of the debt contracting variables as well as the 
independent variables used in the research indicate the importance of company 
size.  Smaller companies access less interest bearing debt in total relative to 
other companies.  However, they also access more asset finance debt and less 
bank debt in comparison to other companies.  Furthermore, smaller companies 
pay a higher cost of debt relative to other companies.  Smaller companies also 
implement lower levels of corporate governance and a have higher default risk 
and information risk in comparison to other companies.  Additionally, smaller 
companies are younger and have less collateral relative to other companies.  
The size difference found in this study supports examining the impact of 
corporate governance on debt contracting for different sized companies.  The 
bottom line is that the debt contracting outcomes are different for smaller 
companies relative to larger companies.  
Hypothesis five focuses on the debt contracting benefits obtained by 
small companies due to implementing corporate governance.  The hypothesis is 
partitioned into three sub-hypotheses.  H5a and H5b, state that smaller 
companies that implement higher levels of corporate governance have a greater 
access to quantity and type of debt relative to other companies.  The third sub-
hypothesis, H5c states that smaller companies that implement corporate 
governance, contracted debt at lower cost in comparison to other companies.  
The results indicate that none of the three sub-hypotheses are supported.  These 
results are confirmed by the sensitivity analysis which suggests that small 
companies do not benefit from high levels of corporate governance.   
The results from testing hypothesis five suggest that the cost of 
implementing improved governance may bring little benefit, at least in terms of 
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reduced debt contracting costs, for smaller companies.  This suggests that 
mandating a one-size-fits-all approach to governance is possibly sub-optimal 
and that smaller companies may rightly resist increased governance at least in 
part due to the proportionally lower cost-benefit trade off that results from 
implementing costly governance requirements. 
 
5.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
  
 
The research has several theoretical, practical and regulatory 
implications.  These implications represent the contributions of the study which 
are expected to benefit the existing body of knowledge within the accounting 
academic field, as well as the market via regulators, and providers of 
accounting services.   
5.3.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
One of the important contributions to the existing body of knowledge is 
the examination of the impact of corporate governance on multiple debt 
contracting dimensions under a different monitoring regime that is 
characterised by intermediated debt.  This study addresses the gap in the 
accounting literature, which to date has been limited either to the relationship 
between corporate governance and access to debt or cost of debt, but has not 
addressed both of these issues.  Furthermore, the examination of the impact of 
corporate governance on debt contracting outcomes for different sized 
companies is also an essential contribution.  The theoretical argument presented 
within the DCM expects higher levels of corporate governance to increase 
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access to debt and lower cost of debt for smaller companies.  However, the 
results show that smaller companies do not realise an increase in debt 
contracting benefits from implementing higher levels of corporate governance.  
Although the governance-size hypothesis is not supported, it does however 
show that corporate governance has a differential impact on debt contracting 
across different sized companies.        
This research is amongst a few studies that identify the effect of 
corporate governance on both access to debt and cost of debt in a market 
dominated by intermediated debt.  One of the vital theoretical contributions 
centres on investigating the association between corporate governance and debt 
contracting in a market that assumes differing characteristics relative to the 
traditionally-studied US market which has been the focus of prior studies 
(Anderson et al. 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta 
2003; Sengupta 1998; Klock et al. 2005).  The Australian debt market is 
characterised by intermediated financing (see section 4.2.2.2) which suggests 
different information flows relative to the US market.  As a result corporate 
governance, default risk and information risk are expected to have a differential 
impact on debt contracting in the Australian market relative to the US market.  
This study’s theoretical development in the area of agency theory could prove 
useful to future research that examines markets that are dominated by 
intermediated debt. 
Finally, the current study’s theoretical assumptions in the DCM and the 
econometric estimation methods differ from prior literature.  The DCM 
proposes that higher levels of corporate governance impact on debt contracting 
via the reduction of default and information risk.  Prior accounting literature 
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assumes that corporate governance along with risk influence debt contracting 
outcomes.  As a result, these studies rely on OLS to test the relationships 
between corporate governance and the debt contracting variables (Sengupta 
1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Klock et al. 2005).  However, they often 
include risk measures and corporate governance as covariates in the OLS 
regression (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 
2003; Beekes and Brown 2006).  The current study expects the inclusion of 
corporate governance and risk assessment as covariates may lead to 
endogeneity issues which distort the meaningfulness of the results.   
The econometric problems caused by endogeneity are addressed in the 
thesis by using 2SLS instrumental variable method (Larcker and Rusticus 2010; 
Hail 2002; DeFond et al. 2002).  The study initially uses 2SLS where corporate 
governance is the instrumental variable for risk.  Upon confirmation that 2SLS 
supports the intervening nature of risk the study then estimates OLS to further 
examine the direct relationship between corporate governance and debt 
contracting.  The study’s econometric approach could benefit future research 
that examines the influence of corporate governance on other firm relevant 
variables, via risk assessment.   
5.3.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The results of the study suggest that higher levels of corporate 
governance increase the access to bank debt and decrease cost of debt.  
Accounting firms and financial advisers can draw on the results of this study to 
advise their clients in an informed manner.  In Australia, non-audit services, 
which include financial counsel on risk management, are a significant source of 
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revenue for accounting firms (Green et al. 2007).  These firms could use the 
results to demonstrate to their clients that corporate governance influences 
access and cost dimensions of debt contracting.  Furthermore, accounting firms 
could counsel their clients about the relevance of financial disclosure and 
reporting quality within the context of debt contracting.  The evidence from this 
study indicates that companies with higher accruals quality (lower information 
risk) pay less for contracted debt.  However, small firms may not necessarily 
experience debt contracting benefits from higher levels of corporate governance 
or lower levels of default and information risk.   
The current study has identified the importance of further research in 
addressing several practical issues.   Firstly, a future study is needed to assess 
the relationship between corporate governance and risk assessment for 
companies that do not have interest bearing debt.  Secondly, further 
examination into cost of debt by debt type is necessary for counselling clients 
on the trade-offs associated with selecting debt types. 68     
5.3.3 REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The results from this research could assist regulators in understanding 
the impact of corporate governance regulations on business finance.  One of the 
important issues is the differential impact of regulations on small and large 
companies.  The ASX Corporate Governance Council Implementation Review 
Group (2005) focused on the governance issues faced by small companies.  The 
ASX Corporate Governance Council (2007a) responded to the claims that 
PGCG adversely impose costs on small companies by amending some of the 
                                                
68 A more detailed discussion of these studies is presented in section 5.5.   
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recommendations that were issued in 2003.  The empirical evidence provided 
by this thesis shows that small and large companies have different corporate 
governance structures.  Additionally, small companies do not realise any debt 
contracting benefits from following formal corporate governance principles or 
recommendations.  Regulators could utilise these results when considering 
future regulatory changes that specifically relate to small firms. 
 
5.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
Several limitations and threats to validity must be acknowledged when 
interpreting the results reported in the previous chapter.  The two primary 
threats to validity are threats to internal and external validity (Campbell and 
Stanley 1963).  The following sections detail the two threats to validity and the 
steps taken to address them.  
5.4.1 THREATS TO INTERNAL VALIDITY 
  
Internal validity focuses on the level of certainty with which statements 
can be made about the relationships between the various variables as measured 
by the study.  Due to the non-experimental nature of this study, many of the 
common threats to internal validity are not present.  Mortality, sample, and 
operationalistion of construct are the three most important threats to internal 
validity.  Although they are discussed separately, due to the nature of the study, 
the three threats to internal validity often overlap with each other and thus it is 
not uncommon to show their collective impact on the interpretations of the 
results.   
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The sample selection included all companies with a June 30 balance 
date in 2007.  However, due to the nature of the study which focuses on 
examining debt contracting, companies from the financial, banking and 
insurance industries were excluded.  The result was a reduction in the size of 
the sample which impacts on the validity of the results.  Additionally, the 
study’s focus on companies with interest bearing debt resulted in the exclusion 
of 50% of the companies from the initial sample which further impacted on the 
internal validity.   
This research is a cross-sectional study which should exclude the 
mortality threat.  However, the calculation of accruals quality requires 
companies to have at least five years of data.  This stringent requirement 
resulted in the exclusion of 390 companies from the sample, thereby 
influencing the validity of the results.  Nonetheless, this has been addressed by 
applying the majority of tests to the main sample which has 595 companies, 
therefore reducing the mortality threat.  The results of the 2SLS estimation, 
which is conducted on the sub-sample of 205 companies, suggest that the 
relationship between corporate governance and access to and cost of debt could 
be examined directly.  As a result, many of the estimations exclude the accruals 
quality variable thus using the main sample of 595 companies.    
The methods used to operationalise the constructs used in the study pose 
possible measurement threats to internal validity.  The constructs that relate to 
the access to quantity and type of debt have not been widely examined by prior 
studies.  Nevertheless, consistent with Bougheas et al. (2006) and Gonzalez 
(2007), the current study uses the proportion of interest bearing debt to total 
liability to proxy for the access to debt.  Furthermore, proportions are also used 
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to describe the four debt types by relating the quantity of each debt type to total 
interest bearing debt (González et al. 2007; Bougheas et al. 2006; Denis and 
Mihov 2003; Cantillo and Wright 2000).  These measurements could represent 
concepts other than what they purport to measure or they may not adequately 
capture what they are intended to measure and therefore they could present a 
threat to internal validity.   
To address this important issue, the study uses alternative measures for 
access to quantity and type of debt.  As part of sensitivity analysis, interest 
bearing debt is divided by total assets rather than total liabilities in order to 
proxy for access to quantity of debt.  Additionally, the quantity of interest 
bearing debt in each debt type is divided by total assets rather than the total 
interest bearing debt being used to calculate the access to the different debt 
types.  The sensitivity analysis results show similar findings to those originally 
reported which indicates that the initial proxies are appropriate for the purpose 
of this study.   
Construct validity is affected by the variables that are selected to proxy 
for corporate governance, default risk and information risk.  Corporate 
governance is a multi-dimensional concept measured using a composite score 
which combines fourteen individual corporate governance variables.  The 
fourteen variables are converted into binary variables and are then summed to 
produce a composite score which ranges from zero to fourteen.  However, due 
to the binary requirement, the composite is limited in capturing the variation in 
the corporate governance data.  To address this issue, the study introduces an 
alternate governance composite, which uses a different scaling method relative 
to the original measure.  Based on the new criteria, each of the fourteen 
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corporate governance variables is scaled between zero and ten and hence the 
maximum composite score is 140.  The alternate composite’s wider scale range 
reflects the heterogeneity in the sample companies which could have been 
missed by the original composite. 
An additional threat to the validity of the corporate governance 
construct is the missing data.  Missing corporate governance data influenced the 
calculation of the individual variables and hence the calculation of the overall 
composite variable.  A primary reason for the missing corporate governance 
data in annual reports is the fact that companies in Australia do not have to 
follow PGCG on the condition that they disclose the reasons for not adopting 
PGCG (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 
2003b). 
The Z-score estimation could have a possible impact on the validity of 
the default risk construct.  The Z-score is a function of five accounting ratios 
where each ratio is assigned a coefficient developed from a discriminant 
analysis of failed and non-failed companies.  Although the Z-score is widely 
used as a default risk measure that predicts the company’s failure, it could also 
represent other constructs such as performance or survivability (Altman 1977; 
Beaver 1966, 1968; Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980; Altman and Saunders 1998; 
Altman 1983).  However, the decomposition of the Z-score reveals that it is 
primarily driven by leverage ratios rather than profitability.  In an attempt to 
address the limitations of Z-score, the study introduces an alternate proxy for 
the default risk.  The alternate measure is a Z-score that is estimated using a 
stepwise discriminate analysis of ten accounting ratios rather than five ratios.  
The increase in the number of ratios used in the alternate measure should allow 
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for a better selection of the parameters that compose the alternate Z-score.  The 
decomposition of the alternate Z-score suggests that the debt to equity ratio is 
the driving factor.
69
  
Information risk is measured as accruals quality.  The study uses the 
Dechow and  Dichev (2002) model to assess the ability of working capital to 
map into operating cash flows.  As mentioned earlier, the nature of the 
calculation calls for the exclusion of 390 companies that do not satisfy the 
requirement of having at least five years of data.  Additionally, even though 
accruals quality represents many of the risks related to the level and precision 
of information, other information risks could be missed.  To further address this 
issue, the study decomposes accruals quality into innate and discretionary 
components.  The innate information risk refers to the company’s operating 
environments while the discretionary information risk is the result of 
management choices.70 
5.4.2 THREATS TO EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
  
The ability to generalise the results across populations, settings and 
times enhances the external validity of the study.  The sample selection plays an 
important role in determining the generalisability of the results.  Firstly, the 
sample excluded companies from the financial, banking and insurance sector.  
Secondly the remaining companies were chosen on availability basis rather than 
on random selection.  Thirdly, more than 63% of the companies which 
                                                
69 The ratio of times interest earned is introduced and tested as an additional proxy for default 
risk in Section K.2 of Appendix K.  Refer to Table K.9 in Appendix K for further details on the 
regression results that include times interest earned as a measure for default risk. 
70 The bid-ask spread and abnormal accruals are two alternate measures of information risk that 
are discussed and tested in Section K.3 of Appendix K.  Refer to Tables K.15 - K.17 for 
regression results that include the two alternate variables for information risk. 
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remained after excluding companies with no interest bearing debt are omitted in 
order to calculate the information risk variable.   
The study has made two significant attempts to mitigate threats to 
external validity.  The first attempt is the careful selection of the study period.  
The sample includes all companies from the year 2007 that meet the necessary 
requirements.  The year 2007 was selected because it represents the last period 
prior to the 2008-2009 global financial crises.  Due to the relative stability of 
the examined time period, the results obtained from studying the 2007 data 
could be generalised to other time periods. The second attempt focuses on the 
representation of the different industries in the sample.  Although many 
companies were excluded from the sample, the remaining companies represent 
all industries in the market and therefore the findings extend to all segments in 
the market. 
 
5.5 FUTURE RESEARCH    
 
The current thesis’ examination of corporate governance, risk 
assessment and debt contracting has paved the way for further research.  The 
current research could be extended to include the association between corporate 
governance, risk assessment and other facets of debt contracting.  Firstly, a 
possible extension to the current research is a study that addresses the impact of 
corporate governance on obtaining entry into the debt financial market.  Unlike 
the current study which focuses on companies that already have access to 
interest bearing debt, the proposed research would encompass all companies 
including those that do not have interest bearing debt.  The proposed research 
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would ask whether corporate governance practices along with default and 
information risks are barriers to obtaining interest bearing debt.  The objective 
of such a study would be to test whether the risk reductions advanced by higher 
levels of corporate governance can assist companies in obtaining interest 
bearing debt in the financial market.  Additionally, it would provide a valuable 
comparison between companies that have a varying debt composition and the 
role that corporate governance can play in influencing the debt contracting 
outcomes for those companies.   
Secondly, a future study could address the relationship between 
corporate governance, risk assessment and the mix of debt types.  The current 
study identifies that large and small companies have a differential mix of debt 
types (see section 4.2.2.2).  A follow on study would trace the cut off points 
where corporate governance and risk assessment begin to influence the mix of 
debt types.  The main question would be whether higher levels of corporate 
governance would allow companies to transit from accessing one debt type to 
another.  Additionally, the research could focus on the individual corporate 
governance variables rather than on corporate governance composite in order to 
identify which specific corporate governance practice has the most impact on 
the debt mix.  The ability to locate the appropriate level and specific component 
of corporate governance, which in turn influences the mix of debt types, allows 
companies to better manage their governance structure and to achieve optimal 
debt contracting outcomes. 
Thirdly, a separate study could focus on the relationship between 
corporate governance, risk assessment and the cost of each individual debt type.  
The current study centres on the association between corporate governance and 
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the weighted average cost of debt for all debt types.  Nonetheless, the results 
show that different debt types such as asset finance debt, bank debt, non-bank 
debt and non-intermediated debt have differing characteristics, one of which is 
cost of debt.  As a follow on from the current study, future research could 
examine whether corporate governance, via risk assessment, has a differential 
impact on cost of debt for the different debt types.  Such a study could 
contribute to identifying the relevance of corporate governance for specific debt 
types which would lead to a greater understanding of the dynamics within the 
financial debt market. 
Fourthly, a possible future study could address the relationship between 
corporate governance and debt maturities.  The descriptive analysis in the 
current study shows that 79% of interest bearing debt is long-term whereas only 
21% is short-term (see section 4.2.2.2).  The question posed for the future is 
whether higher levels of corporate governance have a differential impact on 
short-term interest bearing debt versus long-term interest bearing debt.  It is 
expected that companies with higher levels of corporate governance would have 
greater access to long-term debt.  The proposed study would contribute to 
further understanding the role of corporate governance in influencing debt 
contracting outcomes. 
Fifthly, a study could investigate the inter-relationships between the 
different debt contracting variables.  Debt contracting outcomes are suspected 
to be associated with each other.  In particular, cost of debt is shown in the 
current thesis to vary depending on the different debt types.  Although the 
interaction between access to debt and cost of debt is outside the scope of the 
current study, a future investigation could examine whether higher levels of 
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corporate governance could influence the relationships amongst access to and 
cost of debt.        
Finally, potential research could develop alternative models to assess the 
relationship between corporate governance and debt contracting.  This would 
entail the use of different measurements to represent corporate governance, 
default risk, information risk and the access and cost dimensions of debt 
contracting.  Furthermore, the study could be conducted over an extended 
period of time to assess the changes in the results over the period of the study.  
A longitudinal study allows the use of different econometric models which 
control for the time-series variations.  Finally, a comparative study which 
focuses on Australia and other countries could be implemented to gain greater 
generalisability of the results.  
 
5.6 CONCLUSION    
5.6.1 RESEARCH SUMMARY 
 
 The principal objective of this research is to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance and the access and cost dimensions of debt 
contraction within an Australian context where intermediated debt is the 
primary source of debt financing.  The study is motivated by the limited 
accounting research that addresses the impact of corporate governance on both 
access to and cost of debt.  In particular, a strong motive to undertake this study 
is the absence of prior investigation of the association of corporate governance 
and debt contracting in Australia.  The descriptive analyses of the debt 
contracting variables reveal that approximately 57% of interest bearing debt 
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carried by Australian companies is intermediated debt.  Although prior studies 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and limited aspects of 
debt contraction, they predominately focus on the United States where financial 
markets are characterised by non-intermediated debt financing (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Pittman and Fortin 2004; 
Sengupta 1998). 
The DCM focuses on the impact of corporate governance on the access 
to and cost of contracted debt, via risk assessment.  Higher levels of corporate 
governance ensure the monitoring of management and increase the disclosure 
of value-relevant information which leads to the reduction of agency conflicts 
and information asymmetries (Anderson et al. 2004; Pittman and Fortin 2004; 
Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003).  As a result, default and information risks are 
decreased thereby increasing the quantity and type of debt accessed and 
decreasing cost of debt (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj 
and Sengupta 2003; Beekes and Brown 2006; Klein 2002; Easley and O'Hara 
2004).  The model also assumes that smaller sized companies tend to have a 
greater default risk and information asymmetry, and thus they are expected to 
experience greater debt contracting benefits due to implementing higher levels 
of corporate governance relative to larger companies (Elfakhani and Zaher 
1998; Binks et al. 1992; Lean and Tucker 2001; Brewer 2007). 
The theorised impact of corporate governance on debt contracting via 
risk assessment leads to testing the relationship between higher levels of 
corporate governance and access to and cost of debt by estimating a series of 
2SLS and OLS regression models.  Prior accounting literature uses OLS to test 
the relationships between corporate governance and other firm relevant 
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variables however risk measures are often included together with corporate 
governance in the same estimation model (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; 
Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Beekes and Brown 2006).  The 
current study expects that the use of corporate governance and risk as covariates 
in an OLS estimation will result in endogeneity problems, which will cause the 
parameter estimates to be inconsistent thus obscuring the interpretation of the 
results.  The current study addresses the endogeneity problem by using 2SLS 
estimation (Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Hail 2002; DeFond et al. 2002).  In the 
2SLS estimation, the corporate governance variable is used as the instrumental 
variable for risk.  Upon confirmation that corporate governance is an instrument 
for risk, the study uses OLS to test the direct relationship between corporate 
governance and debt contracting.  
The dependent variables are the access to debt and cost of debt.  Access 
to debt comprises two sub-components.  The first is the quantity of debt, which 
is measured as the ratio of interest bearing debt to total liabilities (Bougheas et 
al. 2006).  The second is the type of debt, which is measured as the proportion 
of asset finance debt, bank debt, non-bank debt and non-intermediated debt to 
total interest bearing debt.  Cost of debt is measured as the weighted average 
interest rate for the company’s interest bearing debt as disclosed in the notes to 
the financial statements. 
Corporate governance is represented by a composite score (Defond et al. 
2005).  The composite is derived from fourteen individual corporate 
governance variables, which proxy for management oversight, financial quality, 
and the equity control dimensions of corporate governance.  The corporate 
governance composite variable aggregates the fourteen individual corporate 
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governance variables to produce an indicator of the company’s corporate 
governance structure (Defond et al. 2005).  A score of fourteen suggests strong 
corporate governance while a score of zero is an indicator of weak corporate 
governance. 
The independent variable, default risk, is measured by constructing a 
default risk model that uses discriminant analysis on a matched-pair design of 
failed and non-failed companies to estimate a Z-score for each company 
(Altman 1968).  The second independent variable, information risk, is measured 
by calculating accruals quality, which focuses on the mapping of working 
capital into operating cash flows (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 
2005).   
Following prior research, variables such as reputation, collateral level 
and company size are included in the DCM to control for the relationship 
between corporate governance, risk assessment and debt contracting (Abor 
2007; Cantillo and Wright 2000; Wen et al. 2002; Funchal et al. 2008).  The 
current study uses company age as a proxy for reputation.  Collateral level is 
measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.  Company size is 
represented by the log of total assets.  Categorical measures of company size 
are also used in the analysis to represent small and large companies and their 
relationship to debt contracting variables in the presence of higher levels of 
corporate governance. 
This thesis employs cross-sectional data from 2007 for 1,239 non-
financial companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange with a June 30 
balance date.  The sample frame is reduced after excluding 618 companies that 
do not have interest bearing debt.  It is further reduced by excluding 26 
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companies that have missing values and outliers.  As a result of excluding these 
644 companies from the initial sample, the main sample comprises 595 
companies.  The inclusion of the information risk variable requires a further 
reduction in the main sample.  The study excludes 390 companies with missing 
data from the main sample, resulting in 205 companies that have available 
information which comprise the study’s sub-sample.  This sub-sample is used 
only in multivariate analysis requiring the presence of the information risk 
variable. 
The study presents five hypotheses to assess the relationship between 
corporate governance and debt contracting.  Hypothesis one focuses on the 
relationship between default risk and debt contracting.  Hypothesis two 
addresses the association between information risk and the access and cost 
dimensions of debt contracting.  Hypothesis three states that higher levels of 
corporate governance are related to default and information risks.  Hypothesis 
four states that higher levels of corporate governance impact on the debt 
contracting variables via a reduction of default and information risk.  Finally, 
hypothesis five states that small companies access greater quantities and types 
of debt at a lower cost in the presence of higher levels of corporate governance.   
The results show that asset finance debt and bank debt are negatively 
related to default risk while cost of debt is positively related to default and 
information risks.  Additionally, higher levels of corporate governance reduce 
default and information risks, increasing the access to bank debt and lowering 
cost of debt.  Finally, the results show that small companies do not access more 
quantities or types of debt, or pay lower cost of debt in the presence of high 
levels of corporate governance.   
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5.6.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The chapter presented a summary of the research along with a 
discussion of the results.  Moreover, the chapter discussed the implications of 
the results for theory, practice and regulations, and the limitations of the study 
in terms of threats to internal and external validity.  Finally, various avenues for 
future research were suggested in order to build on the current research 
structure. 
In conclusion, the research question posed by the study asked whether 
corporate governance impacts on the access and cost dimensions of debt 
contracting via risk assessment in a market characterised by intermediated debt.  
The results principally support the theorised relationships in the DCM that 
higher levels of corporate governance are associated with debt contracting via 
the impact on risk assessment.  Specifically, the results show that higher levels 
of corporate governance, through risk reduction, increase the access to bank 
debt.  More importantly, higher levels of corporate governance reduce the cost 
of debt for all debt types.  However, the results show that smaller companies, in 
contrast to larger companies, do not realise the debt contracting benefits 
associated with implementing higher levels of corporate governance. 
These results contribute to the accounting literature by providing 
evidence that supports the positive role of corporate governance in corporate 
financing within Australia and possibly in other countries that rely heavily on 
intermediated debt.  Additionally, the results could provide accounting and 
finance practitioners as well as regulators with valuable insight into the 
complex interactions between corporate governance, risk assessment and debt 
contracting.  
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APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF 
LITERATURE 
 
 
A.1 QUANTITY OF DEBT   
 
Funchal et al. (2008) explore the association between corporate 
governance, the amount of debt and cost of debt for Brazilian companies 
between 1998 and 2006.  The study argues that corporate governance has a 
positive effect on the quantity of debt and lowers cost of debt.  Total debt, 
short-term debt and long-term debt are proxies for the amount of debt accessed 
by the company, while cost of debt is measured as interest expense divided by 
the average total debt.  The study finds that companies with higher levels of 
corporate governance have higher amounts of debt and a correspondingly lower 
cost of debt. 
Abor (2007) examines the relationship between corporate governance 
and capital structure decisions for twenty two listed Ghanaian companies for 
the period 1998 to 2003.  The study uses the debt ratio to proxy for the capital 
structure decision while corporate governance is represented by board size, 
board composition, duality of CEO and board chair, and CEO tenure.  The 
results indicate a positive relationship between debt levels and corporate 
governance practices. 
 Wen et al. (2002) explore the impact of corporate governance on the 
company’s capital structure for 60 listed Chinese companies for the period 1996 
to 1998.  The research posits that corporate governance is inversely related to 
the company’s capital structure decision.  The leverage ratio, measured as total 
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debt to total assets, is used to proxy for capital structure decisions whereas 
corporate governance is represented by board size, board composition, CEO 
tenure and CEO fixed compensation.  The study finds a negative relationship 
between leverage ratio and board composition and CEO tenure. 
 Berger et al. (1997) examine the association between managerial 
entrenchment and capital structure decisions for 452 large United States listed 
companies for the period 1984 to 1991.  The study argues that entrenched 
managers choose lower debt levels in order to reduce the company’s risk level.  
Leverage ratio is used to measure capital structure, while CEO stock ownership 
is used to proxy for managerial entrenchment.  The findings confirm the 
authors’ theory about the negative relationship between capital structure and 
managerial entrenchment. 
 Friend and Lang (1988) investigate the relationship between managerial 
ownership and the company’s debt levels for 984 United States listed 
companies for the period 1979 to 1983.  They propose that debt increases the 
company’s non-diversifiable risk, therefore insider stockholders prefer low 
levels of debt.  The study uses debt ratio to proxy for the company’s debt level.  
Additionally, it measures the proportion of shareholdings of dominant 
managerial and non-managerial stockholders.  The results show a negative 
relationship between debt levels and managerial ownership. 
The extant literature regarding the relationship between corporate 
governance and the amount of debt accessed by companies has produced 
varying results.  Funchal et al. (2008) and Abor (2007) find that corporate 
governance increases the amount of debt accessed by companies, while Wen et 
al. (2002), Berger et al. (1997), and Friend and Lang (1988) show that corporate 
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governance decreases the access to amount of debt.  The discrepancies in the 
evidence presented by other studies suggest a need to further examine the 
relationships between corporate governance and access to amount of debt.  A 
summary of the conflicting results is presented in Table A.1. 
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A.2 TYPE OF DEBT   
 
The decision to seek private or public debt is significantly influenced by 
the borrower’s credit quality and default risks (Vassalou and Xing 2004; Denis 
and Mihov 2003).  Prior studies from the US find that larger, older, and more 
successful companies tend to raise debt capital by issuing publicly traded 
corporate bonds (Diamond 1991; Cantillo and Wright 2000; Denis and Mihov 
2003; Hoshi et al. 1993).   
Companies that are young and less successful with high probabilities of 
default tend to choose private debt in order to establish financial and reputation 
credit (Diamond 1991).  Banks and non-bank financial intermediaries are 
efficient in monitoring management and in obtaining private information (Fama 
1985; Diamond 1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986).  Furthermore, financial 
intermediaries provide some flexibility for borrowers to reschedule payments 
and renegotiate debt contracts, which could prevent companies from formally 
entering into a state of default (Easterwood and Kadapakkam 1991; Berlin and 
Loyes 1988; Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994).  The following summaries of 
previous research detail the key drivers of the type of debt accessed.   
Gonzalez et al. (2007) study the determinants of debt financing from 
bank and non-bank sources for 60,000 Spanish listed companies for the period 
1992 to 2002.  The study presents macroeconomic and microeconomic factors 
that are expected to influence the company’s choice of bank and non-bank debt 
financing.  The debt measures used are short-term debt to total debt, short-term 
bank debt to total debt, short-term non-bank debt to total debt.  The analysis 
shows the dependence of Spanish companies on short-term non-bank financing.  
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Additionally, company size, age, profitability, collateral, and gearing levels are 
found to be important determinants of debt sources.  
 Bougheas et al. (2006) examine the determinants of debt sources for 
16,000 British manufacturing companies for the period 1992 to 1998.  The 
study considers short-term debt as a proxy for bank debt while long-term debt 
represents other financing sources.  The results indicate that small, young, 
risky, and indebted firms access bank financing. 
 Denis and Mihov (2003) examine the determinants of public and private 
financing for 1,560 new debt issues made by 1,480 United States companies for 
the period 1995 to 1996.  The study examines the probability of issuing public 
debt relative to bank and non-bank debt.  The empirical analysis shows that 
companies with the highest credit quality access public debt, firms with 
medium credit quality access bank debt, and firms with the lowest credit quality 
access non-bank debt.  In addition, firms that access public debt are larger, 
more profitable, more highly leveraged, have higher proportions of fixed assets 
relative to total assets and have fewer growth opportunities than firms that rely 
on bank debt. 
Cantillo and Wright (2000) explore the relationship between financing 
sources and various company characteristics for companies in the United States.  
The study used two sample sets.  The first included 291 companies with 
uninterrupted annual data from 1974 to 1992.  The second data set included 
5,554 companies with at least one-year’s worth of data for the period 1985 to 
1992.  The debt variables used are the ratings for bond and commercial papers.  
The results show that large companies with high collateral and high cash flows 
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tend to borrow from public lenders.  Additionally, closely held and family firms 
are more likely to borrow from private lenders. 
Prior research focuses on the predictors of the type of debt accessed by 
companies.  Default risk, collateral level, age, size, leverage level, and 
profitability have been determined as the main drivers of the type of debt 
contracted by companies (González et al. 2007; Bougheas et al. 2006; Denis 
and Mihov 2003; Cantillo and Wright 2000).  The evidence provided by past 
studies indicates that older, established, and profitable companies with low 
default risk tend to seek public debt while small, young, and less profitable 
companies with high default risk choose private debt (Bougheas et al. 2006; 
Denis and Mihov 2003; Cantillo and Wright 2000).  However, studies to date 
have not considered corporate governance as a determinant of access to the type 
of debt.  This study addresses this gap in the literature by examining the impact 
of corporate governance on the access to the type of debt dimension of debt 
contracting.  Table A.2 provides a summary of determinants of the access to the 
type of debt. 
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A.3 COST OF DEBT   
 
The cost of public debt is the required rate of return on risky bonds 
(Chen 1978).  Bond yield, or the return received if a bond is held until maturity, 
is affected by various factors. Prior studies state that bonds are impacted by 
issue and issuer characteristics (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Pittman and Fortin 
2004; Sengupta 1998).  Issue characteristics include size of the issue, years to 
maturity, call provisions, seniority of debt, and sinking fund provisions (Ziebart 
and Reiter 1992; Reeb, Mansi, and Allee 2001; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; 
Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003).  Issuer characteristics include 
default risk, leverage, performance, and ability to repay interest (Chi, Huang, 
and Xie 2008; Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris 2002; Fisher 
1959; Gu and Zhao 2006; Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller 2006; Mansi, Maxwell, 
and Miller 2004b; Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Pittman and Fortin 2004).   
The cost of private debt is highly dependent on the company’s credit 
and default risk (Denis and Mihov 2003; Diamond 1991).  Additionally, it is 
also affected by the profitability of the borrower, collateral provided to secure 
the debt, the relationship between lender and borrower, the amount of the loan, 
and the borrower’s size and age (Bonfim et al. 2007; Berger and Udell 1995; 
Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Niskanen and Niskanen 2010).  The cost of private 
debt is assumed to be higher than public debt for two reasons.  The first is that 
companies that seek private debt financing have higher credit and default risks 
(Denis and Mihov 2003; Diamond 1991).  The second is the potential 
bargaining power by private lenders due to their possession of borrowers’ 
private information (Rajan 1992).   
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Other factors, such as corporate governance, impact on cost of debt 
(Anderson et al. 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife and LaFond 2006).  The informational 
quality of corporate governance affects the company’s expected cash flows and 
default risk assessment, thereby reducing cost of debt.  The following studies 
address the relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt 
Byun (2007) examines the association between corporate governance 
practices and cost of debt for 331 South Korean companies for the period 2001 
to 2004.  The study develops a corporate governance score based on the 
composition of board of directors, shareholder rights, corporate disclosure, 
audit committee processes, and dividend polices.  The governance score was 
regressed against several costs of debt measures such as yield spreads, interest 
expense scaled by financial debt, weighted average bond ratings, and industry-
adjusted leverage ratio.  The results reveal a negative relationship between cost 
of debt and corporate governance practices, which is more pronounced in large 
companies relative to small companies.     
James and Cotter (2007) survey the impact of corporate governance 
disclosure on default risk and credit ratings for 38 Australian companies listed 
on the ASX during 2004.  The study predicts that a higher level of corporate 
governance disclosure decreases the company’s default risk.  The study 
constructs a corporate governance index that is based on annual report 
disclosures.  The results show no significant relationship between corporate 
governance disclosures and default risk.   
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) study the relationship between corporate 
governance and credit ratings for 894 US companies from the year 2002.  
Ownership, stakeholder rights, financial transparency, and board structure are 
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the four components of corporate governance.  The research proposes that 
corporate governance mechanisms mitigate agency costs, which subsequently 
lead to increasing the company’s credit ratings.  The results indicate that higher 
credit ratings, which are proxies for cost of debt, are positively related to 
financial transparency, board independence, board stock ownership, and board 
expertise.  Additionally, higher credit ratings are negatively associated with 
blockholders that own at least 5 percent of total shares and CEO power on the 
board.   
Ashbaugh-Skaife and LaFond (2006) expand the Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006) research by introducing the Governance Metrics International (GMI) 
score for 936 US companies from the year 2005.  The study tests whether an 
association exists between GMI score and the company’s credit rating.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife and LaFond (2006) conclude that companies with higher GMI 
scores had higher credit ratings leading to lower costs of debt.   
 Klock et al. (2005) investigate the relationship between a corporate 
governance index and the cost of debt financing for 678 US companies from the 
years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000.  The study argues that anti-takeover 
measures, while beneficial for shareholders, are harmful to debtholders.  The 
study asserts that management responds to takeover threats by certain actions, 
which ultimately favour shareholders as opposed to debtholders.  The two main 
variables of interest in the study are yield spread and a corporate governance 
index.  The yield spread represents the difference between a company’s yield to 
maturity and the yield to maturity on a United States treasury security, while the 
corporate governance index includes 24 anti-takeover measures.  The study 
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finds that a negative relationship exists between the corporate governance index 
and cost of debt financing. 
 Mansi et al. (2004a) study the relationship between auditor 
characteristics, such as quality and tenure, and cost of debt for 1,305 US 
companies during the period 1974 to 1998.  They propose that auditors provide 
an independent verification of the financial reports prepared by the company.  
Additionally, auditors could be held liable by investors if deficiencies are 
detected in the verification process.  As a result, the audit process should reduce 
the cost of debt.  Their results indicate that auditor quality and tenure are 
negatively related to cost of debt.   
Pittman and Fortin (2004) examine the association between auditor 
choice and cost of debt for initial public offerings for 371 US companies that 
were listed during the period 1977 to 1988. The study suggests that younger 
companies benefit from retaining a Big Six auditor.  The high-quality 
monitoring that is provided by a Big Six auditor leads to decreased cost of debt 
for young companies.  Additionally, they state that the benefits of having a Big 
Six auditor diminish as young companies mature in age.  The cost of debt is 
measured as the company’s annual interest rate divided by its average short-
term and long-term debt during the year.  These researchers report a negative 
relationship between hiring a Big Six auditor and cost of debt for young 
companies.     
 Anderson et al. (2004) investigate the relationship between board 
structure and the cost of debt for 252 US industrial companies found on the 
S&P 500 from the years 1993 to 1998.  The study posits that independent 
directors, bigger board sizes, audit committee independence, board expertise, 
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and audit committee meeting frequency increase monitoring effectiveness, 
which subsequently reduces the company’s cost of debt.  The cost of debt 
variable is measured by calculating the spread between the weighted-average 
yields to maturity on the company’s publicly traded debt and the yield to 
maturity of United States Treasury securities.  The study finds that independent 
boards, larger boards, and fully independent audit committees are associated 
with lower a cost of debt.   
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) examine the association between corporate 
governance and bond ratings and yields for 1,005 US companies from the years 
1991 to 1996.  The study argues that good governance practices decrease 
agency and information risk, hence reduce bond yields, and increase bond 
ratings.  It focuses on institutional investors and board control as the two main 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) use bond 
yields and bond ratings as the two dependent variables.  The corporate 
governance variables are institutional ownership, proportion of independent 
directors on the board, and ownership concentration.  The study controls for 
size, maturity, and seniority of board members.  The results demonstrate that 
large institutional ownership is associated with higher ratings and lower yields.  
In addition, as the concentration of institutional investors increases, the bond 
ratings decrease and the bond yields increase.  The presence of independent 
directors is positively related to a higher rating and to lower yields.   
Sengupta (1998) explores the link between the overall quality of 
disclosure and companies’ credit ratings for 114 US companies from the years 
1987 to 1991.  The study relates the quality of information released by 
companies to the market’s perception of default risk for those companies.   The 
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yield to maturity and the total interest cost are used as proxies for cost of debt.  
The study measures the quality of disclosure by using the Financial Analysts 
Federation score and controls for company size and maturity.  The results of the 
study indicate that a negative relationship exists between cost of debt and the 
quality of disclosure. 
Several public and private reports address empirical evidence on policy 
statements regarding the relationship between corporate governance and cost of 
debt.  The IFC/World Bank (2006)  states that good corporate governance 
practices enhance performance, increase stock value, and decrease cost of debt.  
This report is aimed at convincing companies to adopt corporate governance 
practices on an international level and to establish a link between good 
corporate governance practices and to lower interest premiums.  Fitch Ratings 
(2004) state that companies with weak governance practices encounter a lower 
credit rating assessment.    
Previous studies consistently find that corporate governance practices 
lower cost of debt.  The significant other factors that influence cost of debt are 
size, default and other risks, profitability, industry affiliation, collateral level, 
and age (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Byun 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; 
Klock et al. 2005; Pittman and Fortin 2004; Anderson et al. 2004; Sengupta 
1998).  A summary of previous studies that investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and cost of debt is provided in Table A.3.  It is evident 
that the majority of prior studies focus on large United States companies, which 
depend heavily on publicly traded debt for financing. 
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APPENDIX B: AGENCY CONFLICT AND 
DEBT CONTRACTING 
 
 
This study adopts an agency theory approach to the relationship between 
corporate governance and debt contacting.  It focuses on the various attributes 
of corporate governance that lower information asymmetry and agency costs 
and increase the quality of reported information.   
The agency theory focuses on the conflicts that eventuate from the 
separation of principals and agents (Berle and Means 1932; Coase 1937; Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Eisenhardt 1989; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997).  This separation results in information asymmetry, which 
leads to a moral hazard problem (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).  Principals are interested in maximizing their wealth while 
agents are interested in advancing their own financial position by expropriating 
funds from the principals.  Two types of agency conflicts exist which can 
reduce the value of the company.  The first conflict is between the management 
and the shareholders in the company.  The second conflict is between 
shareholders, represented by management, and debtholders (Whittred, Zimmer, 
Taylor, and Wells 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Eisenhardt 1989; Fama 
and Jensen 1983a; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The conflict between management and shareholders stems from 
management’s possession of information not available to owners (Coller and 
Yohn 1997; Jensen and Meckling 1976).  This concentration of information 
provides managers with incentives for self-seeking behaviour at the expense of 
 214 
other stakeholders (Fama and Jensen 1983b; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 
and Jensen 1983a).  The actions of self-interested management can encompass 
shirking, over-consumption of perquisites, unprofitable investments, and empire 
building (Sengupta 1998; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Dechow and Sloan 1991; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Farinha 2003; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Fan 
2004).  The negative effects of self-seeking managerial behaviour result in 
reducing the company’s expected cash flows which increases the default risk on 
debt (Sengupta 1998; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife and 
LaFond 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The second agency conflict occurs between shareholders, represented by 
management, and debtholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Whittred et al. 
2004).  Debtholders and shareholders have varying expectations regarding the 
return on investments.  This variance in expectations provokes an agency 
conflict between the two parties.  Shareholders expect variable returns in the 
form of cash flow rights such as dividends and share repurchases.  The 
debtholders’ return, however, is fixed and confined to contractual agreements.  
Shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from debtholders by claiming 
the company’s free cash flow.  An example of free cash flow allocation is asset 
substitution where the company diverts the borrowed funds from investments in 
low risk assets to risky projects (Whittred et al. 2004).  These projects, if 
successful, yield benefits to shareholders and if unsuccessful, adversely affect 
debtholders by reducing the company’s expected cash flows and increasing the 
default risk (Jensen and Meckling 1976).    
Agency conflicts between managers, shareholders, and debtholders 
result in costs being incurred by different parties.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
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identify three major components of agency costs.  The first is the monitoring of 
agents so that they act in the best interest of the principals.  Such costs could be 
audits and other reviews, along with incentive payments, such as profit sharing 
schemes or executive option plans.  The second are costs borne by the agent 
which guarantee that no actions are taken that harm the principal.  The third are 
monetary costs that are the results of divergence between the agents’ decisions 
and those of the principals.  Those costs are also known as residual losses 
because they lead to a reduction in company value (Whittred et al. 2004).   
Agency conflicts are usually mitigated by contracts that bind the parties 
to a specified set of agreements.  However, it is virtually impossible to create a 
contract for all possible eventualities (Cullen, Kirwan, and Brennan 2006).  The 
anticipated causes for misalignment of interest between the stakeholders could 
be remedied by the implementation of corporate governance practices 
(Anderson et al. 2004; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Sengupta 1998; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2006).  Corporate governance’s impact on agency conflict 
resolution can also benefit debtholders, via the reduction of information 
asymmetry between management and stakeholders.  The informational benefits 
associated with corporate governance allow capital providers to assess the risk 
of the company.  The risk assessment process significantly influences access 
and cost dimensions of debt contracting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 216 
APPENDIX C: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE OVERVIEW 
 
 
Corporate governance influences the company’s contracting 
arrangements, particularly debt contracts (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; 
Sengupta 1998; Mansi et al. 2004a; Anderson et al. 2004; Abor 2007; Funchal 
et al. 2008).  The recent accounting scandals and high profile corporate failures 
reaffirmed the importance of sound corporate governance practices.  The use of 
the term “corporate governance” became common amongst academics and 
practitioners during the 1980s which witnessed the rise of global privatisation, 
pension fund reforms, takeover activities, and deregulation and integration of 
capital markets (Jensen 1993; Murphy and Topyan 2005; McCabe 2002; Becht, 
Bolton, and Röell 2002).  However, implicit issues addressed by corporate 
governance, such as mitigation of the agency problem, date back as early as the 
modern corporation (Tricker 2005).  The following section presents several 
definitions of corporate governance, as stated in previous literature, along with 
the definition adopted by this study. 
 
C.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
DEFINITION  
 
Corporate governance impacts the company’s strategic and operational 
decisions.  As a result, management and corporate governance concepts have 
been used interchangeably, thus contributing to the confusion regarding the 
exact nature of corporate governance (Sharar 2007).  Management refers to the 
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operational aspect of running a company by a hierarchal system of 
accountability while governance conveys the strategic responsibilities that lie 
with the board of directors (Ziolkowski 2005).   
Corporate governance definitions are classified into regulatory, 
stakeholder, and agency conflict categories.  The regulatory definition states 
that corporate governance is the system by which companies are controlled and 
directed (Bosch 1993; Cadbury Committee 1992; Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2003b; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 1999).   
The stakeholder definition of corporate governance refers to the process 
by which firms respond to the rights and concerns of stakeholders (Demb and 
Neubauer 1992).  Siladi (2006) state that corporate governance mediates the 
relationship between the corporation and its stakeholders.  According to Daily, 
Dalton, and Cannella (2003) the governance of companies lies with boards of 
directors whose primary responsibility is to use all possible resources to resolve 
conflicts among the stakeholders in the company.  John and Senbet (1998) 
describe corporate governance as the mechanism used by stakeholders to 
protect their interest by exercising control over management and corporate 
insiders.  Turnbull (1997) defines corporate governance as all of the influences 
that affect the institutional process.   
The agency conflict definition of corporate governance focuses on the 
divergence of the interests for both principals and agents.  The study by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) defines corporate governance as the mechanism in which the 
suppliers of finance can assure themselves of receiving some return on their 
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investment.  Fan (2004) expresses corporate governance as the mechanisms and 
procedures that address the agency problem between managers and owners.   
This thesis adopts an agency conflict approach to describe corporate 
governance.  Corporate governance is defined as the methods employed by the 
owners via the board of directors to mitigate the debt agency conflict and to 
align the interests of managers and owners with those of the debtholders.  The 
following section describes some of the major milestones in the development of 
corporate governance practices. 
 
C.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE DEFINITION  
  
Formal corporate governance practices evolved rapidly during the last 
three decades, in part due to pressures from regulators and market authorities.  
For some companies, voluntary corporate governance practices have always 
been a part of their overall corporate strategy.  However, formal directives 
require companies to implement and disclose corporate governance practices.  
The following section describes some of the regulatory developments in 
corporate governance practices. 
Typically, the design and effective implementation of corporate 
governance practices undergo a thorough examination immediately following 
major corporate unrest (Charreaux 2004; Clarke 2004).  This heightens the 
significance of formally implementing such practices as a preventative measure 
against future corporate uncertainties.  The Cadbury (1992) and Blue Ribbon  
(1999) reports present formal responses to the economic and financial changes 
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witnessed in 1980s and 1990s by stressing the importance of board 
independence and recommending the establishment of audit committees 
(Tricker 2005; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2004).  Additionally, the 
Asian Financial Crises in 1997 and 1998 were partly attributed to weak 
corporate governance practices (Johnson et al. 2000).  In 1999, The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter OECD) 
proposed global corporate governance guidelines, which later became one of 
the benchmarks for country-specific corporate governance practices 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1999).  The early 
part of 2000s witnessed the collapse of major companies such as Enron and 
WorldCom in the United States, which resulted in the passing of the Public 
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, also known as 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002).  Similarly, Australia 
confronted its corporate crises by introducing a set of corporate governance 
guidelines in 2003 (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council 2003b). 
Corporate crises in the 1980s weakened investor confidence in the 
Australian capital market.  Until then, Australia had weak corporate regulations 
which impacted negatively on the corporate environment (Barry 1990 ; Clarke 
2007).  Corporate failures in the 1980s such as the collapse of Rothwells and 
Qintex and the manipulation of the accounts of GPI Leisure, Spedley Securities, 
and the scandal of Bond Corporation raised concerns about the governance 
structure in Australia (Sykes 1994; Tomasic 2001).  One of the early responses 
came from a working group chaired by Henry Bosch, chair of the Australian 
National Companies and Securities (which later became the Australian 
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Securities and Investment Commission) (Collett and Hrasky 2005).  The group 
developed guidelines for best practices in corporate governance and encouraged 
companies to adopt those guidelines.  In 1996, the Australian Stock Exchange 
developed listing rule 4.10 which required companies to include, in their annual 
reports, a corporate governance statement, detailing corporate governance 
practices followed during the financial period (Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2003b).   
The corporate collapses in 2001 of HIH, Harris Scarfe, Ansett, and 
OneTel had a considerable impact on the refinements of corporate governance 
in Australia.  The corporate crises prompted non-governmental bodies to 
evaluate corporate governance structures in Australia.  The University of 
Newcastle issued the Horwath Report (2002) which finds that Australian 
companies misunderstand certain governance practices, such as the 
independence of the board of directors.  The failure of Australia’s largest 
insurer, HIH, prompted the Federal Government in 2003 to appoint a Royal 
Commission headed by Justice Owen (Owen 2003).  The royal commission 
issued a report stating that weak corporate governance was a major reason for 
the demise of the large insurer (Owen 2003).  Furthermore, the report 
recommended reforms in corporate governance; however, it did not recommend 
a legislative response.   
In recent years, corporate governance practices have been refined and 
refocused.  In 2001, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) was empowered to regulate investments and securities in addition to 
enforcing listing rules and the Corporations Act (2001b) (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2001a).  In 2002, the Australian Securities Exchange formed the 
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Australian Corporate Governance Council.  The council issued the Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (PGCG) in 
March of 2003 to increase transparency and restore investor confidence 
(Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2003b).  
The ASX amended the listing rules 4.10 by introducing rule 4.10.3 which 
required companies to disclose in their annual reports the extent to which they 
follow PGCG (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council 2003a).  In 2004, the Federal Government implemented the 
Corporation Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2004).  CLERP 9 addresses issues such as auditor regulation and 
corporate disclosures (Commonwealth of Australia 2003).  In 2006, the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council released the Review of the Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (2006), which 
advocated for the amendment of the PGCG.  As a result of the review, the ASX 
issued the second edition of PGCG, entitled the Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations (CGPR) in 2007 (Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2007b).  The CGPR was 
introduced to reduce the overlapping between the ASX corporate governance 
recommendations and the Corporations Act and the accounting standards (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council 2006).   
It is noteworthy that the ASX principles and recommendations continue 
to remain guidelines that companies can elect not to adopt.  However, 
companies must disclose in their annual reports any reason for departing from 
the principles and recommendations (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council 2003b). 
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C.3 ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES 
              
The PGCG were designed to enhance the competitive standing of 
Australian companies and to bolster investor confidence (Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2003b).  The PGCG are 
suggestive in nature; however companies that choose not to follow the 
recommendations are expected, under the “if not why not” approach, to explain, 
in their annual reports, their reasons for not implementing the recommendations 
(Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2003b).  
Table C.1 presents the ten principles that were presented in the first ASX 
Corporate Governance Council report in 2003. 
 
Table C.1: Principles of Good Corporate Governance  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight  
 
2. Structure the board to add value  
 
3. Promote ethical and responsible decision-making  
 
4. Safeguard integrity in financial reporting  
 
5. Make timely and balanced disclosure  
 
6. Respect the rights of shareholders  
 
7. Recognize and manage risk  
 
8. Encourage enhanced performance  
 
9. Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
 
10. Recognize the legitimate interests of stakeholders 
 
 223 
The PGCG were revised in 2007 as a result of a perpetual review 
process of the core principles and recommendations (Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2007a).  The following 
section presents the second edition of the ASX’s Principles and 
Recommendations, which were issued in 2007. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council issued the second edition of 
the PGCG entitled Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
(CGPR) in August 2007 (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council 2007b).  The issuance of the latest principles and 
recommendations came as a response to the Review of the Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in 2006 (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council 2006).  The result of the review indicated the 
overlapping of some of the corporate governance recommendations with the 
amendments to the Corporations Act in CLERP 9 in 2004 and the 
implementation of the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 2006).  Additionally, some of the principles and 
recommendations needed further explaining to resolve ambiguities and to 
achieve greater consistency (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council 2007a).  Furthermore, the review suggested the 
restructuring of principles eight and ten along with recommendations from 
principles four, six, and nine to provide a better understanding of corporate 
governance practices. 
 The CGPR adopted the amendments suggested by the review of the 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations.  
The first edition of PGCG had ten principles and twenty eight 
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recommendations.  Although the number of recommendations remained 
unchanged in the second edition, the number of principles was reduced from ten 
to eight principles.  Principle eight, which focused on enhancing performance 
and Principle ten, which concentrated on recognising the legitimate interest of 
stakeholders, were consolidated with Principles one, two, three, and seven 
(refer to Table C.1).  An additional change to the new Principles and 
Recommendations included the amendment of Principle three to include all 
company codes of conduct.  One of the noticeable changes in the CGPR 
focused on the definition of independence in Principle two, which was amended 
to include a list of independence indicators.  In addition, the new edition of 
Principles and Recommendations clarified the nature of risk management and 
the risk management process.  Finally, the term “best practices” was replaced 
with “good practices” in the CGPR to indicate that alternative corporate 
governance practices are not to be viewed as “second best” (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 2006).   Table C.2 presents the eight principles as they 
were listed in the second edition of the Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (2007b). 
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Table C.2: Revised Corporate Governance Principles 
 
 
 
Corporate governance practices in Australia are regarded as guidelines 
which direct companies towards good corporate governance.  In contrast with 
companies in the United States, where corporate governance practices are 
mandatory, Australian companies can chose not to implement the ASX 
corporate governance principles as long as they disclose in their annual reports 
the reasons for not complying.  Appendix D details the corporate governance 
dimensions that are adopted by this study and links these dimensions to the 
ASX principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight  
 
2. Structure the board to add value  
 
3. Promote ethical and responsible decision-making  
 
4. Safeguard integrity in financial reporting  
 
5. Make timely and balanced disclosure  
 
6. Respect the rights of shareholders  
 
7. Recognize and manage risk  
 
8. Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
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APPENDIX D: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS AND 
ELEMENTS 
 
D.1 MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 
 
 
Board independence 
 
Corporate governance research has shown that agency costs are 
mitigated with the presence of independent directors on the board (Baysinger 
and Butler 1985).  The efficacy of the board of directors is directly linked to its 
independence from the company’s executive management (Dechow et al. 
1996).  Studies by Beasley (1996) and Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and 
Lapides (2000) investigate the possible relationship between fraud and board 
characteristics and find a negative association between the independence of the 
board of directors and the likelihood of fraud occurring in the company.  
Research by Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981) and Ajinkya, Bhojraj, 
and Sengupta (2005) find a positive relationship between corporate disclosure 
and board independence.   
 
Duality of the role of board chair and chief executive officer (CEO) 
  
Corporate governance guidelines recognise the negative impact of 
joining the roles of Chair of Board of Directors and the CEO on the monitoring 
power of the board of directors (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council 2003b; Cadbury Committee 1992).  Beasley 
(1996) finds that the ability of the board chair to effectively control and monitor 
senior management is potentially hindered if that individual is the company 
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CEO.  Daily and Dalton (1994) show that company performance is positively 
influenced by the separation of the role of CEO and board chairperson.  Forker 
(1992) finds a negative relationship between companies that combine the roles 
of CEO and board chair and the quality of disclosures.  However, studies by 
Dalton, Daily, Ellerstrand, and Johnson (1998) and Coulton, James, and Taylor 
(2001) find no relationship between company performance and the separation 
of the roles of CEO and board chair.     
 
Board size 
 
The size of the board of directors could influence its role in monitoring 
and controlling management (Jensen 1993).  The effect of board size on 
reducing agency costs remains a debatable issue.  Anderson et al. (2004) find 
that board size is inversely related to cost of debt financing.  Research by 
Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Chiange (2005) 
point to a positive relationship between board size and company performance.  
Other studies present conflicting results regarding the relationship between size 
and the governing ability of the board of directors (Beasley 1996). Gladstien 
(1984) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) conclude that large boards lead to weaker 
monitoring processes in corporations.   
 
Board meetings 
 
The board of directors can discharge their monitoring and control 
responsibilities during board meetings.  Meetings that are held frequently 
enable board members to better achieve their stated objectives of supervising 
and guiding their companies (Kent and Stewart 2008; Vafeas 1999a; Yatim et 
al. 2006).   
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Nomination committee 
 
The selection process of board members should be objective in order for 
the board to conduct its duties of monitoring and controlling the operations of 
the company (Siladi 2006).  The nomination committee is relevant because it 
recommends the appointment of independent directors on the board.  The ASX 
best practice principles recommend the establishment of a nomination 
committee (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council 2003b).  Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) argue that a CEO on 
nomination committees has an adverse effect on stock prices.  Vefeas (1999b) 
finds that not every company should have a nomination committee and that the 
importance of the committee depends on its available choices of control 
mechanisms, such as insider ownership.   
 
Remuneration committee 
 
The ninth ASX corporate governance principle recommends that 
companies establish a remuneration committee (Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2003b).  Vefeas and Afxentiou (1998) 
propose that in order for remuneration committees to be effective they should 
primarily consist of outside directors.  Conflicting evidence exists regarding the 
relationship between remuneration committees and the level of remuneration.  
Main and Johnston (1993) find that the presence of remuneration committees is 
positively related to the level of executives’ pay, while Conyon and Mallin 
(1997) indicate a negative relationship between the level of executives’ pay and 
the presence of a remuneration committee.   
 229 
D.2 FINANCIAL QUALITY  
 
 
Audit committee independence 
 
Prior research asserts that audit committees function more effectively 
when members are non-executives (Lynn 1996; Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) 
1999).  Research by McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) and Dechow et al., 
(1996) propose that audit committees should not include any executives and 
they should be comprised mainly of independent directors.  Jiambalvo (1996) 
finds that audit committee independence is associated with a reduction in 
financial statement fraud.   
 
Financial expertise of audit committee members  
 
The duties and responsibilities of audit committee members require that 
they possess experience in finance and accounting.  Dezoort (1998) finds that 
audit committee members with experience in auditing were able to make 
control evaluation decisions that were consistent with requirements of external 
auditors.  Previous literature in  auditing finds that external auditors perceive 
the information provided by audit committee members who have financial 
expertise to be more reliable (Knapp 1987; Cohen et al. 2002).  Audit 
committee members with knowledge in accounting or finance are more capable 
in communicating and cooperating with external auditors than those without 
financial expertise (Cohen et al. 2004).    
 
 
 
Audit committee meetings 
 
Audit committees must interact and liaise with different parties 
internally and externally in order to achieve their intended purposes of 
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monitoring and facilitating the financial reporting process.  The recurrence of 
audit committee meetings can be used to gauge the diligence and thoroughness 
of the committee’s members (Farber 2005; Hughes 1999; Collier 1993).  A 
study by Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) reports a negative relationship 
between frequency of audit meetings and earnings management.  Kent and 
Stewart (2008) find a positive relationship between the frequency of audit 
committee meetings and the level of financial disclosures.   
 
Size of audit committee 
 
 The number of audit committee members could influence the 
committee’s efficiency and productivity.  The Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations suggest a minimum of three 
members should be appointed to the audit committee (Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2003b).  Researchers have 
proposed that larger audit committees have greater authority over the financial 
reporting process (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993).  The number of members should 
be conducive for the committee to discharge its duties effectively.  Karamanou 
and Vafeas (2005) contend that larger audit committees have a greater 
knowledge base.  However if committees become too large then they lose their 
ability to carry out their obligations (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005).    
 
Audit committee charter 
 
A charter provides the audit committee with a clear vision of the 
necessary responsibilities and duties of the committee (Warrick 1999).  The 
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) considers the presence of an audit committee 
charter as an important part of the success of the audit committee.  The PGCG 
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recommends companies to have a formal audit committee charter that states the 
role, structure, and composition of the audit committee (Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 2003b).  Marsh and Powell 
(1989) suggest that an audit committee charter improves the flow of 
information between the audit committee, the internal auditor, external auditor, 
and management.  Prior research by Carcello, Hermanson and Neal (2002) 
finds that audit committees diverge from their intended responsibilities that are 
set out in the charter.  Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) find that a formal audit 
charter plays a pivotal role in empowering the audit committee.   
 
Identity of the external auditor 
 
The auditor-client relationship is an important corporate governance 
mechanism.  Prior research argued that larger audit companies are more 
inclined to protect their reputation in the market place (Kim, Chung, and Firth 
2003; Francis and Krishnan 1999; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999).  
Clarkson, Ferguson, and Hall (2003) find a strong association between the use 
of a Big Six auditor and the level of disclosure.  Pittman and Fortin (2004) 
show that companies audited by a Big Six auditor have a lower cost of debt.   
D.3 EQUITY CONTROL      
 
Blockholders 
 
Researchers contest that the presence of blockholders can restrict 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Fu 2004).  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
argue that blockholders have the ability and the incentive to monitor 
management.  Holderness and Sheehan (1985) find that company value 
increases after a block purchase.  Other research finds a possible negative 
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impact of blockholders on company value (Woidtke 2002).  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) state that the presence of blockholders results in the neglect of 
other stakeholders’ interests.  Denis (2001) argues that while the presence of 
blockholders could increase company value, it could also encourage 
blockholders to seek benefits that are not available to other shareholders.      
 
Insider ownership 
 
  Stock ownership by managers and directors can align the interests of 
both agents and principals.  Jensen (1993) finds that insider ownership 
increased company performance.  Other researchers found a non-linear 
relationship between insider ownership and company value (McConnell and 
Servaes 1990; McConnell and Servaes 1995; Morck et al. 1988).  Kole (1995) 
suggests that managerial ownership could affect company value differently, 
depending on company size. 
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APPENDIX E: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
 
 
E.1 MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 
VARIABLES 
  
Management oversight is represented by the board structure and 
processes.  This includes the independence of the board, separation of the role 
of CEO and board Chair, board size, number of board meetings, and the 
presence of a nomination and remuneration committee.   
 
a) Board independence (INDP) 
Following previous studies by Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley 
(2002) Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Piot and Missonier-Peiera (2007), Kent 
and Stewart (2008), Anderson et al. (2004) board independence, INDP, is 
measured as the ratio of non-executive independent directors on the board to the 
total board members.   
 
b) Role separation of board chair and CEO (DUAL) 
 Following research by Beasley (1996), Bugshan (2005), Goodwin and 
Kent (2006), Kent and Stewart (2008) this study uses the categorical variable, 
DUAL, to proxy for duality of the chair and CEO.  The variable is coded one if 
the role of CEO is separate from the board Chair, and zero otherwise.   
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c) Board size (BDSIZE) 
 Research by Yatim et al. (2006),  Anderson et al., (2004), Yermack 
(1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), Chiange (2005), Beasley 
(1996), Gladstien (1984) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) measure board size as 
the number of directors on the board.  This study uses the variable BDSIZE to 
represent the number of directors on the board.  
 
d) Board meetings (BDMEET) 
 Corporate governance literature uses the number of board meetings to 
proxy for board effectiveness (Vafeas 1999a; Yatim et al. 2006; Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent 2006; Kent and Stewart 2008).  The board meeting variable 
BDMEET is represented by the number of board meetings held each year.   
 
e) Nomination and remuneration committees (NOM) (REM) 
 This study follows Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and  Vefeas (1999b) 
in operationalizing nomination committee.  The categorical variable NOM is 
used to represent the presence of a nomination committee.  The variable equals 
one if the company has a nomination committee, and zero otherwise.  
Following previous empirical research by Vefeas and Afxentiou (1998), Main 
and Johnston (1993), and Conyon and Mallin (1997), this study uses the 
categorical variables REM to proxy for the presence of a remuneration 
committee.  The variable equals one if the company has a remuneration 
committee, and zero otherwise. 
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E.2 FINANCIAL QUALITY VARIABLES 
  
Financial quality is measured by attributes of the audit process, which 
include the functions of the audit committee and the identity of the external 
auditor.  The audit process is achieved by the presence and independence of the 
audit committee, financial expertise of audit committee members, audit 
committee meetings, the size of audit committee, the existence of an audit 
committee charter, and the identity of the external auditor. 
 
a) Audit committee charter (AUDCHRT) 
 Studies by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) and Warrick (1999) stress the 
importance of audit committee charters in providing vision and guidance to the 
audit committee.  This research uses AUDCHRT to represent the presence of an 
audit committee charter.  The variable is coded as one if a company has an audit 
committee charter, and zero otherwise.   
 
b) Audit committee independence (AUDIND)   
 Corporate governance literature measures the independence of audit 
committees by comparing the number of independent members to the total 
members in the committee (Klein 2002; Anderson et al. 2004).  This study 
proxies audit committee independence by using the variable AUDIND, which is 
the proportion of non-executive independent members on the audit committee. 
 
c) Financial expertise of audit committee members (AUDEXP) 
Following previous research by Dezoort (1998), Anderson et al. (2004), 
and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006), this study measures the financial 
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expertise of the audit committee, AUDEXP, as the proportion of audit 
committee members with accounting and finance qualifications.   
 
 
d) Size of audit committee (AUDSIZE)  
In accordance with studies by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), Anderson 
et al. (2004), Goodwin and Kent (2006), and Kalbers and Fogarty (1993), this 
research measures the variable AUDSIZE as the number of members on the 
audit committee.   
 
e) Audit committee meetings (AUDMEET)  
 Following prior studies in the area of corporate governance, audit 
committee meetings, AUDMEET, are measured by the number of meetings each 
year (Farber 2005; Hughes 1999; Collier 1993; Anderson et al. 2004).   
 
f) Identity of the external auditor (AUDITOR)  
Empirical research in the area of corporate governance and the audit 
process uses a categorical variable to account for the presence of a Big Four, 
Big Five, or Big Eight audit company (Pittman and Fortin 2004; Kent and 
Stewart 2008; Goodwin and Kent 2006).  Big Four auditors are Deloitte and 
Touche LLP, Ernst and Young LLP, KPMG LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP (Francis and Yu 2007).  This study measures the presence of a Big Four 
audit company by using a categorical variable labelled AUDITOR.  The variable 
is coded one if the company is audited by a Big Four company, and zero 
otherwise.   
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E.3 EQUITY OWNERSHIP VARIABLES 
  
Ownership structure is measured by blockholders, and insider 
ownership (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006). 
 
a) Blockholder (BLOCK) 
This study uses the variable BLOCK to measure blockholders as the 
percentage of the company’s shares owned by investors owning 5 percent of the 
company’s stock.  Similar measures are used by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), 
Anderson, et al. (2004), and Brickley, et al. (1988).   
 
b) Insider ownership (INSIDER) 
 Previous research calculates the ratio of shares owned by insiders to the 
total shares issued by the company (McConnell and Servaes 1990; McConnell 
and Servaes 1995; Morck et al. 1988).  This study uses the variable INSIDER to 
measures insider ownership.  The variable is defined as the percentage of 
company’s shares that are owned by executives and officers and directors of the 
company.   
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APPENDIX F: EXTENDED DISCUSSION 
ON DEBT CONTRACTING   
 
F.1 DISCUSSION ON ACCESS TO QUANTITY 
OF DEBT   
 
The study analyses interest bearing debt for the sampled companies 
across economic sectors with two-digit Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) codes.  As shown in Table F.1, there are 142 companies from the 
materials sector that have interest bearing debt which represent 24% of the 595 
companies in the main sample.  Other economic sectors that report a high 
employment of interest bearing debt are the industrials and consumer 
discretionary sectors with 122 and 105 companies respectively.  However, the 
utilities, the telecommunication services, and consumer staples have fewer 
companies with interest bearing debt relative to other economic sectors with 
only 2%, 3% and 6% of the companies taking on interest bearing debt 
respectively.  
 
 
Table F.1: Number of Companies with Interest Bearing Debt by Economic 
Sectors  
 
Sector 
Number of 
Companies  
% 
Consumer Discretionary 105 18 
Consumer Staples 33 6 
Energy 54 9 
Health Care 59 10 
Industrials 122 21 
Information Technology 52 9 
Materials 142 24 
Telecommunication Services 17 3 
Utilities 11 2 
Total 595 100 
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The quantities of interest bearing debt across the various economic 
sectors are shown in Table F.2.  The total interest bearing debt for the 595 
companies is $125.1 billion.  More than 70% of all interest bearing debt can be 
attributed to the consumer discretionary, industrials and materials sectors.  In 
particular, the consumer discretionary sector accounts for 30.9% of all interest 
bearing debt.  A closer investigation into the consumer discretionary sector 
reveals that out of the 105 companies in the sector, four companies are 
responsible for $26.5 billion, or almost 21.2% of the total interest bearing debt.  
Additionally, a single company within the consumer discretionary sector, News 
Corporation, is solely responsible for $12.7 billion, or approximately 10.1%, of 
all interest bearing debt. 
 
Table F.2: Quantity of Interest Bearing Debt by Economic Sectors 
 
Sector Debt Quantities (Billions) % 
Consumer Discretionary $38.7 30.9 
Consumer Staples 13.2 10.6 
Energy 5.6 4.5 
Health Care 4.2 3.4 
Industrials 28.4 22.7 
Information Technology 1.3 1.1 
Materials 25.8 20.7 
Telecommunication Services 0.1 0.1 
Utilities 7.7 6.1 
               Total $125.1 100.0 
  
Several economic sectors in the sample, such as information technology, 
health care, and energy have lower quantity of interest bearing debt compared 
to other sectors.  A review of the three sectors’ total assets reveals that they 
have low total assets relative to other sectors.  Telecommunication services, 
information technology, and health care sectors represent 0.2%, 1%, and 3% 
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respectively of the total assets for the 595 companies.  As assets are funded by 
equity and debt, low amounts of assets are an indicator of a relatively lower 
demand for finance capital.  As the sectors’ total assets grow, so does their need 
to acquire debt capital, particularly interest bearing debt. 
The study further examines interest bearing data for industry groups 
with four-digit GICS codes, in an attempt to provide a deeper understanding of 
the quantity of debt accessed by companies.  On an industry group level, the 
materials and media industries have the two highest quantities of interest 
bearing debt compared to other industry groups.  The materials industry group 
which is represented by 142 companies comprise 20.7% of all quantities of 
interest bearing debt.  However, the media industry group which makes up 
22.8% of all quantity of interest bearing debt is represented by only 26 
companies.  A closer investigation into the media industry group reveals that a 
single company, News Corporation, has $12.7 billion of interest bearing debt 
which is 44% of the total interest bearing debt for the industry group.  The 
quantities of interest bearing debt across industry groups are presented in Table 
F.3. 
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Table F.3: Quantities of Interest Bearing Debt by Industry Groups 
 
Industry Group Companies 
Debt Quantities 
(Billions) % 
Automobiles & Components   8 $0.2 0.1 
Capital Goods   67 4.4 3.5 
Commercial & Professional Services   38 7.0 5.6 
Consumer Durables & Apparel   16 0.8 0.6 
Consumer Services   30 6.8 5.4 
Energy   54 5.6 4.5 
Food and Staples Retailing  4 8.2 6.5 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco   29 5.0 4.0 
Health Care Equipment & Services   37 3.1 2.5 
Materials 142 25.8 20.7 
Media   26 28.5 22.8 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotech & Life Sciences   23 1.1 0.9 
Retailing   24 2.5 2.0 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment   2 0.04 0.04 
Software & Services   29 0.9 0.7 
Technology Hardware & Equipment   21 0.4 0.3 
Telecommunication Services 17 0.1 0.1 
Transportation   17 17.0 13.6 
Utilities   11 7.7 6.1 
 Total 595 $125.1 100.0 
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F.2 DISCUSSION ON ACCESS TO TYPE OF 
DEBT   
 
 
Access to types of debt is examined by studying the sources of interest 
bearing debt as stated in various line items in the annual reports.  As shown in 
Table F.4, the line items are organised into short-term and long-term debt where 
78.7% of interest bearing debt is long-term while only 21.3% is short term.  
Short-term bank loans at $15.6 billion represents 12.4% of total interest bearing 
debt which makes it the most significant short-term line item.  Additionally, at 
$24.2 billion, long-term bank loans are the most significant line item under 
long-term debt.  Other long-term line items, such as bonds, notes and non-bank 
debt represent 14%, 16% and 17% of total interest bearing debt respectively.  
However, bank loans, both short and long term, remain the most accessed line 
items at approximately 32% of total interest bearing debt.    
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Table F.4: Interest Bearing Debt by Line Items 
 
 
Debt Types Line Items 
Debt Quantities 
(Billions) % 
 
         Short-Term Debt 
   
Asset finance debt Hire purchase liabilities $0.2 0.14 
 Lease liabilities 0.8 0.67 
 
   Bank debt Bank loans 15.6 12.43 
     Bank overdrafts 0.9 0.71 
 
   Non-bank debt Non-bank loans 2.6 2.07 
 Insurance finance 0.03 0.03 
 Trade financing 0.01 0.01 
 Bailment 0.5 0.39 
 Private equity loans 0.00 0.00 
 Loans from other companies 0.04 0.03 
 Loans from director  0.2 0.1 
 
Non-intermediated 
debt Notes 3.2 2.6 
 Bonds 0.9 0.7 
 Convertible loan/Notes 0.5 0.4 
 Commercial paper 1.3 1.0 
 Total Short-Term Debt 26.7 21.3 
 
               Long-Term Debt 
 
Asset finance debt Hire purchase liabilities 0.4 0.3 
 Lease liabilities 2.9 2.3 
 
Bank debt Bank loans 24.2 19.3 
 Bank facilities 1.8 1.4 
 
   Non-bank debt Non-bank debt 20.0 16.0 
 Loans from other entities 0.6 0.5 
 Loans from director / controlled 
entities 0.1 0.1 
 Property loans 0.01 0.01 
 Construction loan facilities 0.01 0.01 
 
   Non-intermediated 
debt Eurobond 1.1 0.9 
 US$ convertible loan 0.0 0.0 
 Commercial Papers 1.1 0.9 
 Convertible notes 2.3 1.9 
 Convertible bonds 0.4 0.3 
 Redeemable preference shares 0.5 0.4 
 Private Placement 2.9 2.3 
 Bonds 17.7 14.2 
 Notes 22.2 17.8 
 Total Long-Term Debt 98.4 78.7 
 Total Debt 125.1 100.0 
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F.3 DISCUSSION ON COST OF DEBT   
 
 
Cost of debt for the main sample is examined across the different 
economic sectors.  As presented in Table F.5, the consumer staples sector has 
the lowest cost of debt at 7.66% while the information technology sector has the 
highest of cost of debt at 9.12%.  The ANOVA results presented in Table F.6 
shows that the means for the two sectors are statistically different.  This 
indicates that companies that operate within food, beverage and household 
products could be perceived to be less risky than other companies in other 
economic sectors and hence also pay a lower cost of debt.  Typically companies 
within the information technology, such as software and hardware companies, 
would have fewer tangible assets to use as collateral relative to other companies 
and therefore they face higher costs of debt when compared to other economic 
sectors (Newman, Newman, and Evans 1987). 
 
Table F.5: Cost of Debt by Economic Sectors (%) 
  
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Consumer Discretionary  105 7.81 7.50 1.78 5.30 17.80 
Consumer Staples  33 7.66 7.34 1.25 5.41 10.59 
Energy   54 8.38 8.33 2.29 2.30 17.07 
Health Care    59 8.36 7.95 3.21 3.00 24.03 
Industrials  122 8.17 7.74 1.88 4.83 15.67 
Information Technology    52 9.12 8.93 2.59 4.00 19.03 
Materials  142 7.99 7.99 1.87 1.05 13.00 
Telecommunication 
Services    17 9.05 8.65 3.64 0.90 19.52 
Utilities  11 7.71 6.90 2.05 6.10 12.00 
     Total  595           
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Table F.6: ANOVA Results for the Consumer Staples and Information 
Technology Sectors   
        
Mean  
Variable 
Consumer 
Staples 
Information 
Technology  F Statistic P value  
COST 7.66 9.12 7.716 0.007*** 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 1%, two-tailed.   
 
Table F.7 provides further details on cost of debt at an industry group 
level.  The semiconductors and equipment, retailing, automobiles and 
components, food and staples industry groups contracted the lowest cost of debt 
at 6.92%, 7.52%, 7.60%, and 7.64% respectively.  The software and services, 
telecommunications services, commercial and professional services, technology 
hardware and equipment industry groups on average pay the highest cost of 
debt at 9.59%, 9.05%, 8.80%, and 8.68% respectively. 
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Table F.7: Cost of Debt by Industry Groups (%) 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Automobiles & Components  8 7.60 7.11 1.20 6.73 10.35 
Capital Goods  67 7.94 7.80 1.37 4.83 13.36 
Commercial & Professional 
Services   38 8.80 8.23 2.50 5.69 15.67 
Consumer Durables & 
Apparel    16 8.02 7.48 1.92 5.69 13.90 
Consumer Services  30 8.08 7.69 2.20 5.30 17.80 
Energy 54 8.38 8.33 2.29 2.30 17.07 
Food & Staples Retailing  4 7.64 6.68 1.97 6.59 10.59 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco   29 7.66 7.35 1.17 5.41 9.85 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services   37 8.48 7.95 3.05 4.90 24.03 
Materials  142 7.99 7.99 1.87 1.05 13.00 
Media      27 7.70 7.25 1.92 5.77 15.92 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotech & 
Sciences   22 8.16 7.83 3.52 3.00 20.46 
Retailing  24 7.52 7.53 1.01 5.50 10.31 
Semiconductors & Equipment    2 6.92 6.92 1.01 6.21 7.64 
Software & Services 29 9.59 9.02 2.81 5.30 19.03 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment 21 8.68 8.72 2.24 4.00 12.15 
Telecommunication Services 17 9.05 8.65 3.64 0.90 19.52 
Transportation  17 7.66 7.34 1.75 5.45 13.00 
Utilities 11 7.71 6.90 2.05 6.10 12.00 
     Total 595           
 
 
The cost of debt across the four debt type variables is shown in Table 
F.8.  BANK, on average pays the lowest cost of debt at 7.76% while NONINT, 
on average faces the highest cost of debt at 8.42%.  The study conducts an 
ANOVA test and finds that the means for cost of debt across the four debt type 
variables are significantly different as reported in Table F.9.  Additionally, 
Tukey’s HSD post hoc test, presented in Table F.10, shows that the cost of debt 
means for BANK and NONINT are significantly different from other debt 
types. 
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Table F.8: Cost of Debt by Debt Types (%) 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ASFIN   404 8.13 7.92 1.97 1.05 26.21 
BANK    295 7.76 7.60 1.52 4.12 17.80 
NONBANK  237 8.20 7.92 2.48 2.11 18.00 
NONINT  182 8.42 7.98 2.91 1.00 22.38 
 
 
The low cost of debt for BANK could be partly attributed to the 
relationship that usually develops between companies and banks which is 
known as relationship banking (Berger and Udell 2002; Diamond 1991).  It is 
not uncommon for companies that develop a good relationship with their 
banking institutions to receive preferential treatment which could influence the 
cost of debt.  However, the high cost of debt for NONINT is reflective of the 
perceived risk associated with lending without intermediation.  The presence of 
information asymmetry in non-intermediated debt is a risk component that 
influences cost of debt. 
 
Table F.9: ANOVA Results for Cost of Debt by Debt Types 
              
Mean (%) 
Variable ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT F Statistic P value  
       COST 8.13 7.76  8.20 8.42 3.897 0.009*** 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 1%, two-tailed. 
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Table F.10: Results of Tukey’s HSD Post Hoc Test for Cost of Debt by Debt 
Types 
 
Variables Type (A) Type (B) 
Mean 
Difference 
(A-B) 
Standard 
Error Significance 
COST ASFIN BANK 0.363 0.166 0.126 
NONBANK -0.076 0.177 0.973 
    NONINT -0.293 0.193 0.428 
BANK ASFIN -0.363 0.166 0.126 
NONBANK -0.440 0.189 0.092 
NONINT -0.656*** 0.204 0.007 
NONBANK ASFIN 0.076 0.177 0.973 
BANK 0.440 0.189 0.092 
NONINT -0.216 0.213 0.741 
NONINT ASFIN 0.293 0.193 0.428 
BANK 0.656*** 0.204 0.007 
    NONBANK 0.216 0.213 0.741 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 1%, two-tailed. 
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APPENDIX G: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
FOR ALL QUINTILES FOR MAIN 
SAMPLE 
 
 
This section provides the complete summary statistics for the five size 
quintiles in the main sample which represents 595 companies.  Additionally, it 
shows the Tukey’s HSD post hoc test results for the different dependent, 
independent and control variables that are used in the study.   
 
Table G.1: Summary Statistics for Quantity of Debt Accessed for All Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
QUANT  595 0.39 0.39 0.26 0.00 0.97 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
QUANT  119 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.00 0.94 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
QUANT  119 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.01 0.97 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
QUANT  119 0.34 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.97 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
QUANT  119 0.45 0.47 0.24 0.00 0.93 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
QUANT  119 0.47 0.50 0.26 0.00 0.94 
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Table G.2: Results of Tukey’s HSD Post Hoc Test for Quantity of Debt 
Accessed 
 
Variables Size (A) Size (B) 
Mean 
Difference 
(A-B) 
Standard 
Error Significance 
QUANT Small Medium 0.014 0.035 0.914 
Large -0.113*** 0.035 0.004 
Medium Small -0.014 0.035 0.914 
Large -0.127*** 0.035 0.001 
Large Small 0.113*** 0.035 0.004 
    Medium 0.127*** 0.035 0.001 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 1%, two-tailed. 
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Table G.3: Summary Statistics for Access to the Four Debt Types for All 
Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
ASFIN   595 0.27 0.03 0.40 0.00 1.00 
BANK   595 0.33 0.01 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  595 0.19 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
NONINT   595 0.20 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
ASFIN  119 0.42 0.09 0.47 0.00 1.00 
BANK 119 0.11 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  119 0.27 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONINT  119 0.20 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
ASFIN  119 0.32 0.05 0.42 0.00 1.00 
BANK 119 0.30 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  119 0.16 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
NONINT  119 0.22 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
ASFIN   119 0.33 0.07 0.41 0.00 1.00 
BANK   119 0.31 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  119 0.18 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 119 0.18 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
ASFIN   119 0.21 0.04 0.32 0.00 1.00 
BANK   119 0.46 0.34 0.43 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  119 0.19 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 119 0.14 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
ASFIN  119 0.09 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 
BANK  119 0.48 0.49 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  119 0.18 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 119 0.25 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
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Table G.4: Results of Tukey’s HSD Post Hoc Test for Asset Financed Debt 
and Bank Debt  
 
Variables Size (A) Size (B) 
Mean 
Difference 
(A-B) 
Standard 
Error Significance 
ASFIN Small Medium 0.090 0.050 .165 
Large 0.328*** 0.050 .000 
Medium Small -0.090 0.050 .165 
Large 0.238*** 0.050 .000 
Large Small -0.328*** 0.050 .000 
    Medium -0.238*** 0.050 .000 
BANK Small Medium -0.196*** 0.048 .000 
Large -0.363*** 0.048 .000 
Medium Small 0.196*** 0.048 .000 
Large -0.167*** 0.048 .002 
Large Small 0.363*** 0.048 .000 
    Medium 0.167*** 0.048 .002 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 1%, two-tailed. 
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Table G.5: Summary Statistics for Cost of Debt for All Quintiles (%) 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
COST   595 8.17 7.85 2.20 0.90 24.03 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
COST 119 9.08 8.55 2.45 4.00 24.03 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
COST 119 8.54 8.35 2.33 0.90 19.52 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
COST 119 8.33 8.02 2.14 2.30 20.46 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
COST 119 7.79 7.52 1.77 2.45 15.92 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
COST 119 7.12 7.04 1.70 1.05 17.80 
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Table G.6: Results of Tukey’s HSD Post Hoc Test for Cost of Debt 
 
Variables Size (A) Size (B) 
Mean 
Difference 
(A-B) 
Standard 
Error Significance 
COST Small Medium 0.745** 0.275 0.019 
Large 1.962*** 0.275 0.000 
Medium Small -0.745** 0.275 0.019 
Large 1.217*** 0.275 0.000 
Large Small -1.962*** 0.275 0.000 
    Medium -1.217*** 0.275 0.000 
 
Notes: 
***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 255 
Table G.7: Summary Statistics for the Independent variables for All Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
GOV  595 8.19 9.00 3.59 0.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  595 0.49 0.75 1.46 -3.73 4.58 
ACCRL   205 0.50 0.29 0.58 0.04 3.07 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
GOV  119 5.41 6.00 2.97 0.00 11.00 
ZSCORE  119 1.64 1.46 0.95 -2.89 4.58 
ACCRL   41 0.87 0.67 0.72 0.14 3.07 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
GOV  119 6.40 6.00 3.27 0.00 13.00 
ZSCORE  119 0.88 1.10 1.29 -3.42 4.10 
ACCRL   41 0.66 0.34 0.76 0.07 2.69 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
GOV  119 8.09 9.00 2.96 0.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  119 0.30 0.46 1.49 -3.73 2.52 
ACCRL   41 0.35 0.28 0.33 0.07 1.81 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
GOV  119 10.24 11.00 2.62 2.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  119 -0.09 -0.29 1.44 -2.80 4.11 
ACCRL   41 0.38 0.26 0.43 0.09 2.50 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
GOV  119 10.82 12.00 2.71 2.00 14.00 
ZSCORE  119 -0.28 -0.43 1.182 -2.87 3.35 
ACCRL  41 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.04 1.41 
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 A discriminant analysis is performed on 46 failed and 71 non-failed 
companies in Australia.  Table G.8 presents the coefficients for the estimated 
parameters that are used in the Z-score model.   
 
Table G.8: Discriminant Analysis Results for Default Risk (ZSCORE)   
 
 
Variable 
Canonical Discriminant 
Function Coefficients 
Constant -0.380 
X1 0.159 
X2 2.049 
X3 3.061 
X4 -2.912 
X5  1.091 
 
Notes: 
X1 = Working capital divided by total assets 
X2 = Retained earnings divided by total assets 
X3 = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets 
X4 = Book value of total debt divided by total assets 
X5 = Sales divided by total assets 
 
 
The following is the function used to estimate ZSCORE: 
54321 091.1912.2061.3049.2159.038.0 XXXXXZSCORE i +−+++−=  
         (G.1) 
Where: 
iZSCORE =   Default risk score. 
 1X =   Working capital/Total assets 
 2X =   Retained earnings/Total assets 
 3X =   Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets 
 4X =   Book value of total debt/Total assets 
 5X =   Sales/Total assets 
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The model was able to correctly classify 82.1% of the original grouped cases.   
A decomposition of the ZSCORE presented in Table G.9 reveals that it is 
mainly driven by debt to asset and sales to asset ratios.  The decomposition is 
conducted by multiplying each of the five ratios by their respective coefficients 
then dividing the outcome by the total ZSCORE.   
 
Table G.9: Decomposition of ZSCORE  
 
Variable 
Canonical Discriminant 
Function Coefficients Average weight of each ratio  
Constant -0.380 0.311 
X1 0.159 -0.085 
X2 2.049 -0.060 
X3 3.061 0.085 
X4 -2.912 1.550 
X5  1.091 -0.801 
 
 
It can be noted from Table G.9 that X4, debt to asset ratio, accounts for 155% 
of the ZSCORE and therefore it is the primary driving factor behind the overall 
default risk variable.  As a result, companies with a high debt to asset ratio will 
receive a higher ZSCORE which means they have a higher default risk.  
Additionally, X5, sales to total assets, also has a significant impact on ZSCORE 
with an average weight of -80% of the total Z-score.  Consequently, companies 
with greater sales to total assets will have a lower ZSCORE and hence a lower 
default risk.   
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Table G.10: Results of Tukey’s HSD Post Hoc Test for the Independent 
Variables 
 
Variables Size (A) Size (B) 
Mean 
Difference 
(A-B) 
Standard 
Error Significance 
GOV Small Medium -2.681*** 0.374 .000 
Large -5.412*** 0.374 .000 
Medium Small 2.681*** 0.374 .000 
Large -2.731*** 0.374 .000 
Large Small 5.412*** 0.374 .000 
    Medium 2.731*** 0.374 .000 
ACCRL Small Medium 0.397*** 0.088 .000 
  
Large 0.497*** 0.088 .000 
Medium Small -0.397*** 0.088 .000 
  
Large .100 0.088 .491 
Large Small -0.497*** 0.088 .000 
    Medium -.100 0.088 .491 
ZSCORE Small Medium 1.334*** 0.159 .000 
Large 1.915*** 0.159 .000 
Medium Small -1.334*** 0.159 .000 
Large 0.580*** 0.159 .001 
Large Small -1.915*** 0.159 .000 
    Medium -0.580*** 0.159 .001 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 1%, two-tailed. 
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Table G.11: Summary Statistics for the Control Variables for All Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
AGE   595 19.98 15.00 18.33 1.00 124.00 
COLLT  595 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.00 1.18 
SIZE  595 7.78 7.67 0.93 5.71 10.87 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
AGE  119 13.92 10.00 10.91 1.00 54.00 
COLLT  119 0.25 0.16 0.26 0.00 1.07 
SIZE  119 6.62 6.75 0.32 5.71 7.01 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
AGE 119 18.06 13.00 16.52 1.00 101 
COLLT  119 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.00 0.87 
SIZE  119 7.24 7.25 0.115 7.02 7.44 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
AGE  119 18.36 16.00 13.63 1.00 94.00 
COLLT  119 0.36 0.24 0.32 0.00 1.18 
SIZE  119 7.67 7.67 0.13 7.45 7.90 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
AGE 119 21.54 16.00 19.51 1.00 121.00 
COLLT  119 0.38 0.32 0.28 0.00 1.07 
SIZE  119 8.18 8.18 0.20 7.20 8.49 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
AGE 119 28.04 20.00 24.92 1.00 124.00 
COLLT  119 0.44 0.41 0.30 0.00 1.08 
SIZE  119 9.20 9.10 0.53 8.49 10.87 
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Table G.12: Results of Tukey’s HSD Post Hoc Test for the Control Variables 
 
Variables Size (A) Size (B) 
Mean 
Difference 
(A-B) 
Standard 
Error Significance 
AGE Small Medium -4.437 2.277 .127 
Large -14.118*** 2.277 .000 
Medium Small 4.437 2.277 .127 
Large -9.681*** 2.277 .000 
Large Small 14.118*** 2.277 .000 
    Medium 9.681*** 2.277 .000 
COLLT Small Medium -0.102** 0.038 .020 
Large -0.188*** 0.038 .000 
Medium Small 0.102** 0.038 .020 
Large -0.086 0.038 .063 
Large Small 0.188*** 0.038 .000 
    Medium 0.086 0.038 .063 
 
Notes: 
***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed. 
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APPENDIX H: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
FOR ALL QUINTILES FOR SUB-SAMPLE 
 
 
This section provides the complete summary statistics for the five size 
quintiles in the sub-sample which represents 205 companies.   
 
Table H.1: Sub-sample Summary Statistics for Quantity of Debt Accessed for 
All Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
QUANT  205 0.43 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.97 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
QUANT  41 0.38 0.30 0.27 0.01 0.97 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
QUANT  41 0.39 0.43 0.26 0.01 0.77 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
QUANT  41 0.44 0.52 0.25 0.03 0.86 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
QUANT  41 0.40 0.46 0.25 0.00 0.88 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
QUANT  41 0.51 0.52 0.21 0.00 0.86 
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Table H.2: Sub-sample Summary Statistics for Access to the Four Debt Types 
for All Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
ASFIN   205 0.21 0.03 0.35 0.00 1.00 
BANK   205 0.38 0.23 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  205 0.19 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
NONINT   205 0.22 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
ASFIN  41 0.32 0.05 0.43 0.00 1.00 
BANK 41 0.28 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  41 0.20 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
NONINT  41 0.21 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
ASFIN  41 0.29 0.06 0.39 0.00 1.00 
BANK 41 0.25 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  41 0.23 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
NONINT  41 0.23 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
ASFIN   41 0.23 0.07 0.32 0.00 1.00 
BANK   41 0.47 0.40 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  41 0.16 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 41 0.14 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
ASFIN   41 0.18 0.01 0.31 0.00 1.00 
BANK   41 0.49 0.49 0.42 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  41 0.20 0.02 0.33 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 41 0.13 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
ASFIN  41 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 
BANK  41 0.42 0.46 0.37 0.00 1.00 
NONBANK  41 0.16 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
NONINT 41 0.38 0.31 0.36 0.00 1.00 
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Table H.3: Sub-sample Summary Statistics for Cost of Debt for All Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
COST   205 8.04 7.51 2.43 1.05 20.46 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
COST 41 9.38 8.78 2.72 5.60 19.52 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
COST 41 8.91 8.13 2.92 5.96 20.46 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
COST 41 7.78 7.47 1.63 6.03 15.92 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
COST 41 7.35 7.25 2.34 1.05 17.80 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
COST 41 6.77 6.67 1.09 4.49 10.84 
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Table H.4: Sub-sample Summary Statistics for the Independent Variable for 
All Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
GOV  205 9.51 11.00 3.16 1.00 14.00 
ACCRL   205 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.04 2.50 
ZSCORE  205 -0.01 -0.16 1.36 -2.81 3.32 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
GOV  41 6.90 7.00 3.10 1.00 12.00 
ACCRL   41 0.75 0.61 0.53 0.14 2.20 
ZSCORE  41 1.22 1.38 1.105 -2.35 3.32 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
GOV  41 8.02 9.00 2.95 2.00 13.00 
ACCRL   41 0.51 0.37 0.49 0.07 2.3 
ZSCORE  41 -0.11 -0.11 1.46 -2.81 2.52 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
GOV  41 10.34 11.00 2.39 5.00 14.00 
ACCRL   41 0.36 0.27 0.36 0.07 1.81 
ZSCORE  41 -0.13 -0.16 1.40 -2.80 2.77 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
GOV  41 11.15 11.00 1.82 6.00 14.00 
ACCRL   41 0.40 0.28 0.43 0.09 2.50 
ZSCORE  41 -0.57 -0.77 1.14 -2.65 2.04 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
GOV  41 11.10 12.00 2.90 2.00 14.00 
ACCRL  41 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.04 1.41 
ZSCORE  41 -0.45 -0.45 0.90 -2.04 2.08 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 265 
Table H.5: Sub-sample Summary Statistics for the Control Variables for All 
Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
AGE   205 28.67 23.00 21.18 2.00 124.00 
COLLT  205 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.00 1.18 
SIZE  205 8.22 8.08 0.97 6.07 10.87 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
AGE  41 21.56 17.00 17.23 2.00 101.00 
COLLT  41 0.37 0.29 0.28 0.00 1.07 
SIZE  41 6.99 7.08 0.386 6.07 7.41 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
AGE 41 25.95 23.00 15.50 9.00 94.00 
COLLT  41 0.45 0.36 0.36 0.01 1.18 
SIZE  41 7.63 7.66 0.11 7.42 7.79 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
AGE  41 24.80 22.00 16.13 10.00 99.00 
COLLT  41 0.41 0.37 0.26 0.04 0.94 
SIZE  41 8.08 8.08 0.18 7.80 8.43 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
AGE 41 34.02 24.50 24.99 8.00 98.00 
COLLT  41 0.46 0.39 0.30 0.04 1.08 
SIZE  41 8.71 8.70 0.21 8.43 9.10 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
AGE 41 37.02 29.00 26.29 4.00 124.00 
COLLT  41 0.45 0.41 0.32 0.00 1.06 
SIZE  41 9.69 9.62 0.41 9.14 10.87 
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Table H.6: ANOVA Results for the Variables in the Sub-sample  
          
Mean 
Variable Small Medium Large F Statistic P value  
QUANT 0.38 0.44 0.51 3.025 0.05** 
ASFIN   0.32 0.23 0.04 8.192 0.000*** 
BANK   0.28 0.47 0.42 2.519 0.085 
NONBANK  0.20 0.16 0.16 0.173 0.840 
NONINT   0.21 0.14 0.38 5.374 0.006*** 
COST 9.38 7.78 6.76 18.010 0.000*** 
GOV  6.90 10.34 11.10 25.611 0.000*** 
ACCRL   0.75 0.36 0.26 17.919 0.000*** 
ZSCORE  1.22 -0.13 -0.45 24.044 0.000*** 
AGE   21.56 24.80 37.02 6.553 0.000*** 
COLLT   0.37 0.41 0.45 0.844 0.432 
 
Notes: 
***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively. 
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Table H.7: Tukey’s HSD Post Hoc Test Results for the Variables in the Sub-
Sample 
Variables Size (A) Size (B) 
Mean 
Difference 
(A-B) 
Standard 
Error Significance 
QUANT Small Medium -0.06 0.053 0.487 
Large -0.131** 0.053 0.041 
Medium Small 0.06 0.053 0.487 
 
Large -0.07 0.053 0.392 
Large Small 0.131** 0.053 0.041 
    Medium 0.07 0.053 0.392 
ASFIN Small Medium 0.08 0.070 0.468 
Large 0.277*** 0.070 0.000 
Medium Small -0.08 0.070 0.468 
Large 0.194** 0.070 0.018 
Large Small -0.277*** 0.070 0.000 
    Medium -0.194** 0.070 0.018 
NONINT Small Medium 0.07 0.074 0.637 
Large -0.17 0.074 0.063 
Medium Small -0.07 0.074 0.637 
Large -0.236*** 0.074 0.005 
Large Small 0.17 0.074 0.063 
    Medium 0.236*** 0.074 0.005 
COST Small Medium 1.595*** 0.427 0.001 
Large 2.615*** 0.427 0.000 
Medium Small -1.595*** 0.427 0.001 
Large 1.019** 0.427 0.049 
Large Small -2.615*** 0.427 0.000 
    Medium -1.019** 0.427 0.049 
GOV Small Medium -3.441*** 0.624 0.000 
Large -4.198*** 0.624 0.000 
Medium Small 3.441*** 0.624 0.000 
Large -0.756 0.620 0.444 
Large Small 4.198*** 0.624 0.000 
    Medium 0.756 0.620 0.444 
ACCRL Small Medium 0.397*** 0.088 0.000 
Large 0.497*** 0.088 0.000 
Medium Small -0.397*** 0.088 0.000 
Large 0.100 0.088 0.491 
Large Small -0.497*** 0.088 0.000 
    Medium -0.100 0.088 0.491 
ZSCORE Small Medium -0.528*** 0.107 0.000 
Large -0.630*** 0.107 0.000 
Medium Small 0.528*** 0.107 0.000 
Large -0.100 0.107 0.605 
Large Small 0.630*** 0.107 0.000 
    Medium 0.100 0.107 0.605 
AGE Small Medium -3.24 4.505 0.752 
Large -15.463*** 4.505 0.002 
Medium Small 3.24 4.505 0.752 
Large -12.220** 4.505 0.021 
Large Small 15.463*** 4.505 0.002 
    Medium 12.220** 4.505 0.021 
 
Notes: 
***, ** Significant at 1%, 5%, two-tailed respectively. 
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Table H.8: Calculation Results for the Accruals Quality Variable (ACCRL)  
 
 
ttitititititi PPEREVCFOCFOCFOWCA εββββββ ++∆−+−+=∆ +− ,5,41,3,21,10,  
Variables 
2003,iWCA∆
 
2004,iWCA∆
 
2005,iWCA∆
 
2006,iWCA∆
 
2007,iWCA∆
 
Intercept  0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.147) (0.844) (-0.825) (0.412) (-0.101) 
2002,iCFO  0.275*** 
      (4.942) 
2003,iCFO  -0.210*** 0.023 
     (-3.351) (0.786) 
2004,iCFO  0.270*** -0.073 0.275*** 
    (4.206) (-0.493) (3.964) 
2005,iCFO  
 
-1.448 -0.151* -0.295*** 
   (-0.149) (-1.832) (-3.151) 
2006,iCFO  
  
-0.670*** 0.230* 0.390*** 
  (-9.488) (1.925) (-3.850) 
2007,iCFO  
   
-0.098 -0.125 
  (-1.264) (-1.268) 
2008,iCFO  
    
0.413** 
  (4.649) 
tiREV ,∆
 0.682*** 1.103 0.143** 0.272*** 0.299** 
 (13.552) (0.271) (2.534) (3.504) (-3.524) 
tiPPE ,  -0.719 0.550 -0.099* 0.047** 0.041 
 (0.473) (0.583) (-0.1753) (0.482) (0.631) 
Adjusted 
R2 0.476 0.016 0.458 0.120 0.128 
Sample 
213 213 213 213 213 
 
Note:  
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.     
tiWCA ,∆  
=  Change in current assets - change in cash - change in current liabilities + change in short-
term debt. 
tiCFO ,  
=  Cash flow from operations for the ith firm in year t. 
tiREV ,∆  
=  Change in revenue for the ith firm in year t. 
tiPPE ,  
=  Property, plant, and equipment for the ith company for year t.  
tε  =  Firm specific residual for the ith company for year t. 
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APPENDIX I: MULTICOLLINEARITY 
TEST 
 
 
The study provides the results of the variance inflation factor for the 
independent variables. 
 
 
Table I.1: Variance Inflation Factor for Independent and Control Variables 
 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
GOV 0.761 1.486 
ACCRL 0.689 1.276 
ZSCORE 0.703 1.358 
AGE 0.375 1.273 
COLLT 0.451 1.222 
SIZE 0.597 1.730 
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APPENDIX J: HYPOTHESES TESTS 
 
Table J.1: Relationship between Default risk and the Debt Contracting 
Variables Including Industry Dummies 
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCORETYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCORECOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  -0.283** 1.312*** -0.302 0.545** -0.555*** 11.753*** 
(-2.007) (7.781) (-1.337) (2.357) (-3.018) (9.960) 
ZSCORE 0.065*** -0.056*** -0.040*** 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.317*** 
(-7.911) (4.695) (3.067) (-3.970) (-4.814) (-4.655) 
AGE 0.0004 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
(0.751) (-4.335) (1.111) (1.135) (1.066) (0.320) 
COLLT 0.150*** 
 
0.068 -0.071 0.011 -0.007 0.009 
(4.058) (1.206) (-1.189) (0.229) (-0.136) (0.030) 
SIZE 0.072*** -0.134*** 0.083*** -0.013 0.064*** -0.501*** 
(5.426) (-7.956) (3.925) (-0.657) (3.414) (-4.542) 
CON 0.076 -0.032 0.017 -0.251* 0.266*** -0.012 
(0.882) (-0.431) (0.129) (-1.694) (2.788) (-0.017) 
STP 0.107 -0.099 0.112 -0.245 0.232** -0.227 
(1.172) (-1.299) (0.794) (-1.584) (2.179) (-0.308) 
EGY 0.039 0.052 0.033 -0.343** 0.259*** 0.155 
(0.442) (0.632) (0.251) (-2.301) (2.566) (0.225) 
HTH 0.045 0.064 0.001 -0.336** 0.271*** 
 
-0.055 
(0.500) (0.731) (0.010) (-2.222) (2.664) (-0.078) 
IND 0.049 0.061 0.092 -0.310** 0.157* 0.419 
(0.566) (0.830) (0.725) (-2.112) (1.733) (0.629) 
IT -0.023 -0.034 0.017 -0.221 0.237** 1.139* 
(-0.263) (-0.414) (0.127) (-1.419) (2.337) (1.605) 
MAT -0.031 0.220*** -0.089 -0.309** 0.178** -0.222 
(-0.365) (2.933) (-0.704) (-2.106) (1.950) (-0.335) 
TLS -0.106 0.073 0.004 -0.340** 0.263** -0.023 
(-1.124) (0.574) (0.028) (-1.988) (2.056) (-0.027) 
Adjusted R2 0.153 
 
0.148 0.104 0.037 0.042 
 
0.133 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between debt contracting variables and 
default risk, where ZSCORE is the proxy for default risk.  The t-values, given in parenthesis 
 271 
below each estimate are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  The new variables in the regression 
estimate are defined as follows: 
TYPER   = Access to type of debt where R refers to the following debt types: 
    ASFIN  =  Asset finance debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
    BANK  =  Bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
    NONBANK  =  Non-bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt. 
    NONINT  =  Non-intermediated debt divided by total interest bearing 
debt. 
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Table J.2: Relationship between Information Risk and the Debt Contracting 
Variables Including Industry Dummies 
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.261 0.594* -0.096 0.919*** -0.417 14.589*** 
(1.095) (1.936) (-0.257) (2.709) (-1.263) (8.752) 
ACCRL -0.026 
 
0.072 -0.077 0.002 0.004 
 
0.824** 
 
(-0.627) (1.331) (-1.174) (0.031) (0.066) (2.035) 
AGE -0.001 -0.002 0.003* -0.0001 -0.001 -0.002 
(-0.794) (-1.294) (1.768) (-0.052) (-0.760) (-0.380) 
COLLT 0.086 0.257*** -0.214** -0.068 0.025 -0.724 
(1.394) (3.227) (-2.200) (-1.131) (0.286) (-1.364) 
SIZE 0.026 -0.089*** 0.028 -0.014 0.074** -0.724*** 
(1.247) (-3.254) (0.852) (-0.488) (2.538) (-4.250) 
CON -0.062 0.270 0.272 -0.594*** 0.051 -0.936* 
(-0.469) (1.576) (1.303) (-2.637) (0.277) (-1.785) 
STP 0.030 0.100 0.251 -0.432* 0.082 
 
-0.909* 
(0.211) (0.543) (1.119) (-1.829) (0.412) (-1.958) 
EGY 0.002 0.198 0.450* -0.752*** 0.104 1.169 
(0.012) (0.991) (1.846) (-3.426) (0.484) (0.951) 
HTH -0.032 0.095 0.335 -0.565** 0.134 -0.706 
(-0.231) (0.532) (1.538) (-2.407) (0.694) (-0.930) 
IND -0.012 0.261 0.444** -0.649*** -0.057 -0.499 
(-0.094) (1.539) (2.145) (-2.899) (-0.311) (-1.051) 
IT -0.162 0.314* 0.039 -0.461* 0.107 0.304 
(-1.141) (1.721) (0.175) (-1.941) (0.547) (0.286) 
MAT -0.098 
 
0.345** 0.258 -0.660*** 0.058 
 
-0.935* 
(-0.738) (2.007) (1.235) (-2.982) (0.312) (-1.854) 
TLS -0.218 0.367* 0.447* -0.664*** -0.150 -1.205** 
(-1.291) (1.685) (1.686) (-2.758) (-0.640) (-1.988) 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.156 0.095 0.093 0.014 0.152 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between both debt contracting 
variables and information risk, where ACCRL is the proxy for information risk.  The t-values, 
given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
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Table J.3: Relationship between Default and Information Risks and 
Corporate Governance Including Industry Dummies   
 
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVZSCORE ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVACCRL ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
  ZSCORE ACCRL 
Intercept 6.610*** 2.317*** 
 
(9.948) (4.214) 
GOV -0.071*** -0.031** 
 
(-4.134) (-2.320) 
AGE -0.003 0.002 
 
(-1.132) (1.161) 
 COLLT -0.297 -0.173 
 
(-1.580) (-1.385) 
SIZE -0.504*** -0.137*** 
 
(-7.106) (-4.269) 
CON -1.853*** -0.455 
 
(-4.639) (-1.149) 
STP -1.642*** -0.414 
 
(-3.746) (-1.018) 
EGY -0.808** -0.266 
 
(-1.961) (-0.660) 
HTH -1.448*** -0.461 
 
(-3.465) (-1.145) 
IND -1.746*** -0.501 
 
(-4.439) (-1.291) 
IT -1.556*** -0.432 
 
(-3.688) (-1.056) 
MAT -1.204*** -0.318 
 
(-3.047) (-0.808) 
TLS -1.139** -0.444 
 
(-2.295) (-0.992) 
Adjusted R2 0.291 0.156 
N 595 205 
 
Notes:   
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between both default risk and 
information risk and corporate governance.  The t-values, given in parenthesis below each 
estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
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Table J.4: Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Debt 
Contracting Variables Using 2SLS Including Industry Dummies   
 
iiiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLZSCOREQUANT +++++++= 7654321 βββββββ  
ii7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLZSCORETYPE +++++++= βββββββ,  
 
ii7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLZSCORECOST +++++++= βββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  -0.102 0.896*** 0.067 0.679** -0.641* 12.495*** 
(-0.431) (3.516) (0.171) (1.977) (-1.870) (7.446) 
ZSCORE 0.068*** -0.055** -0.030 0.040*** 0.045** 0.408*** 
(5.007) (-2.517) (-1.330) (2.674) (2.282) (3.373) 
ACCRL -0.058 0.101* -0.062 -0.026 -0.012 0.653* 
(-1.456) (1.841) (-0.932) (-0.523) (-0.214) (1.686) 
AGE -0.0004 -0.002* 0.002* 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001 
(-0.458) (-1.904) (1.716) (0.013) (-0.650) (0.007) 
COLLT 0.105* 
 
0.242*** -0.222 -0.057 0.037 
 
-0.614 
(1.787) (2.845) (-2.281) (-0.943) (0.440) (-1.187) 
SIZE 0.058*** -0.116*** 0.014 0.009 0.093*** -0.543*** 
(2.785) (-4.846) (0.391) (0.305) (3.072) (-3.267) 
CON 0.056 0.173* 0.218 -0.522** 0.131 -0.232 
(0.441) (1.858) (1.026) (-2.217) (0.703) (-0.365) 
STP 0.111 0.032 0.213 -0.381 0.136 -0.436 
(0.816) (0.388) (0.941) (-1.541) (0.692) (-0.779) 
EGY 0.063 0.148 0.422* -0.717*** 0.147 1.539 
(0.430) (1.101) (1.721) (-3.114) (0.688) (1.267) 
HTH 0.046 
 
0.030 0.299 -0.515** 0.186 
 
-0.245 
(0.351) (0.321) (1.360) (-2.105) (0.966) (-0.296) 
IND 0.091 0.181** 0.402* -0.586** 0.003 0.110 
(0.720) (2.093) (1.912) (-2.503) (0.019) (0.194) 
IT -0.061 0.232** -0.006 -0.398* 0.173 0.893 
(-0.452) (2.045) (-0.028) (-1.614) (0.879) (0.812) 
MAT 0.003 0.270*** 0.216 -0.620*** 0.134 -0.291 
(0.020) (3.089) (1.016) (-2.673) (0.720) (-0.511) 
TLS -0.157 0.316** 0.419 -0.625** -0.110 -0.847 
(-0.980) (2.035) (1.574) (-2.507) (-0.473) (-1.233) 
Adjusted R2 0.144 
 
0.197 0.098 0.124 0.036 
 
0.190 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents 2SLS regression results for the relationship between corporate governance 
and debt contracting variables where corporate governance is an instrumental variable.  The t-
values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
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Table J.5: Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Debt 
Contracting Variables Using OLS Including Industry Dummies     
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.082 0.965*** -0.466** 0.765*** -0.263 13.643*** 
(0.597) (6.354) (-2.192) (3.485) (-1.443) (13.133) 
GOV -0.011*** 0.006 0.013** -0.009* -0.010* -0.043* 
(-3.165) (1.216) (2.348) (-1.837) (-1.888) (-1.696) 
AGE 0.0001 -0.003*** 0.001 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 
(0.241) (-4.043) (1.294) (0.911) (0.833) (0.115) 
COLLT 0.131*** 0.084 -0.061 -0.001 -0.023 -0.082 
(3.370) (1.493) (-1.012) (-0.013) (-0.410) (-0.285) 
SIZE 0.054*** 
 
-0.110*** 0.081*** -0.022 0.051** 
 
-0.616*** 
(3.658) (-6.105) (3.585) (-0.989) (2.349) (-5.454) 
CON -0.030 0.067 0.069 -0.316** 0.180* -0.554 
(-0.365) (0.993) (0.539) (-2.181) (1.866) (-1.093) 
STP 0.014 -0.012 0.157 -0.302** 0.157 -0.705 
(0.152) (-0.167) (1.119) (-1.987) (1.443) (-1.371) 
EGY -0.012 0.096 0.063 -0.376*** 0.216** -0.097 
(-0.142) (1.237) (0.480) (-2.557) (2.079) (-0.172) 
HTH -0.038 0.141* 0.042 -0.387*** 0.203** -0.479 
(-0.444) (1.733) (0.315) (-2.608) (1.972) (-0.781) 
IND -0.053 
 
0.155** 0.145 -0.374*** 0.074 
 
-0.098 
(-0.656) (2.297) (1.147) (-2.599) (0.812) (-0.200) 
IT -0.110 0.049 0.057 -0.273* 0.168* 0.692 
(-1.254) (0.617) (0.421) (-1.786) (1.629) (1.090) 
MAT -0.105 0.286*** -0.048 -0.356** 0.117 -0.590 
(-1.286) (4.038) (-0.378) (-2.472) (1.262) (-1.160) 
TLS -0.156 0.128 0.013 -0.367** 0.225* -0.308 
(-1.520) (1.051) (0.083) (-2.166) (1.699) (-0.398) 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.119 0.098 0.020 0.014 0.104 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables.  The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
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Table J.6: Impact of Corporate Governance on Debt Contracting Variables 
for Different Sized Companies Including Industry Dummies  
 
iiiiiiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGELGOVSGOVLRGSMLGOVQUANT ++++++++++= 10987654321 __ ββββββββββ  
ii10i9i8i7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGELGOVSGOVLRGSMLGOVTYPE ++++++++++= ββββββββββ __,  
 
ii10i9i8i7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGELGOVSGOVLRGSMLGOVCOST ++++++++++= ββββββββββ __  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.471*** 0.183 0.206 0.525*** 0.086 9.437*** 
(5.316) (1.429) (1.520) (3.476) (0.705) (17.342) 
GOV -0.007* -0.003 0.016** -0.004 -0.009* -0.111*** 
(-1.760) (-0.465) (2.451) (-0.718) (-1.608) (-4.019) 
SML 0.032 -0.070 -0.073 0.192** -0.049 -0.349 
(0.527) (-0.792) (-0.780) (2.007) (-0.576) (-0.739) 
LRG 0.006 -0.204 0.005 0.080 0.120 -2.176*** 
(0.052) (-1.328) (0.029) (0.500) (0.818) (-3.097) 
GOV_S -0.013 
 
0.035*** -0.022* -0.020 0.007 
 
0.174** 
(-1.405) (2.722) (-1.635) (-1.502) (0.545) (2.175) 
GOV_L 0.006 0.005 0.005 -0.009 -0.001 0.134** 
(0.588) (0.370) (0.307) (-0.627) (-0.059) (2.076) 
AGE 0.0003 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(0.420) (-3.048) (1.326) (0.885) (0.911) (-0.195) 
COLLT 0.143 0.074 -0.049 -0.008 -0.017 -0.089 
(3.642) (1.302) (-0.814) (-0.161) (-0.317) (-0.309) 
CON -0.047 0.076 0.034 -0.303** 0.194* -0.534 
(-0.565) (0.630) (0.262) (-2.053) (1.678) (-1.064) 
STP -0.002 
 
-0.010 0.132 -0.293* 0.171 
 
-0.727 
(-0.023) (-0.077) (0.942) (-1.887) (1.352) (-1.444) 
EGY -0.026 0.102 0.013 -0.350** 0.235** -0.139 
(-0.297) (0.809) (0.097) (-2.330) (1.962) (-0.250) 
HTH -0.061 0.154 0.017 -0.374** 0.203* -0.413 
(-0.706) (1.223) (0.129) (-2.488) (1.697) (-0.700) 
IND -0.063 0.154 0.112 -0.359** 0.094 -0.121 
(-0.765) (1.284) (0.885) (-2.441) (0.821) (-0.248) 
IT -0.131 0.067 0.005 -0.255* 0.183 0.781 
(-1.478) (0.522) (0.036) (-1.640) (1.503) (1.236) 
MAT -0.121 0.295** -0.091 -0.339** 0.134 
 
-0.571 
(-1.452) (2.458) (-0.719) (-2.309) (1.175) (-1.139) 
TLS -0.185* 0.162 -0.045 -0.357** 0.239* -0.104 
(-1.788) (1.082) (-0.282) (-2.081) (1.676) (-0.135) 
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.127 0.114 0.023 0.010 0.107 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:  
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 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
both the access to debt and cost of debt for different sized companies.  The t-values, given in 
parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  GOV_S is an interaction 
term which is measured by multiplying GOV by SML.  SML equals one if the company is in 
the lower quintile and zero otherwise.  GOV_L is an interaction term which is measured by 
multiplying GOV by LRG.  LRG equals one if the company is in the upper quintile and zero 
otherwise. 
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APPENDIX K: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
K.1 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF ACCESS 
TO DEBT  
 
The study uses alternate measures to represent access to quantity and 
type of debt.  Unlike the original measures which were scaled by debt, the new 
measures are divided by total assets.  The following is the calculation for 
QUANT, ASFIN, BANK, NONBANK and NONINT. 
 
i
i
i
ASSET
IDEBT
QUANT =                              (K.1) 
Where: 
iQUANT   = Total interest bearing debt divided by total liabilities for 
firm i. 
  
iIDEBT     = Total interest bearing debt for firm i. 
iASSET     = Total assets for firm i. 
 
i
i
i
ASSET
AFDEBT
ASFIN =                              (K.2) 
Where: 
iASFIN    =  Asset finance debt divided by total interest bearing debt 
for firm i. 
  
iAFDEBT  = Asset finance debt for firm i which includes hire 
purchase and finance lease liabilities. 
 
iASSET    = Total assets for firm i. 
 
 279 
 
i
i
i
ASSET
BKDEBT
BANK =                              (K.3) 
Where: 
iBANK    =  Bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt for firm 
i. 
  
iBKDEBT  = Bank debt for firm i which includes bank loans, facilities, 
and overdraft. 
 
iASSET    = Total assets for firm i. 
 
 
i
i
i
ASSET
NBKDEBT
NONBANK =                  (K.4) 
Where: 
iNONBANK   =  Non-bank debt divided by total interest bearing debt 
for firm i. 
  
iNBKDEBT  = Non-bank debt for firm i which includes loans made 
by non-bank financial institutions. 
 
iASSET    = Total assets for firm i. 
 
i
i
i
ASSET
NINDEBT
NONINT =                  (K.5) 
Where: 
iNONINT    =  Non-intermediated debt divided by total interest 
bearing debt for firm i. 
  
iNINDEBT  = Non-intermediated debt for firm i which includes 
commercial papers, notes, and bond. 
 
iASSET    = Total assets for firm i 
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Table K.1: Relationship between Default risk and Debt Contracting Variables 
(Debt Contracting Variables Scaled by Total Assets) 
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCORETYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCORECOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  -0.261** 0.015 -0.225*** 0.087 -0.138 11.753*** 
(-2.055) (0.679) (-2.626) (0.989) (-1.357) (10.688) 
ZSCORE 0.091*** 
 
0.002 0.011** 0.043*** 0.035*** 
 
0.317*** 
 
(6.101) (0.932) (2.046) (3.324) (4.463) (5.170) 
AGE 0.001** -0.0002** 0.0001 0.001* 0.0003 0.002 
(2.260) (-2.084) (0.462) (1.895) (1.149) (0.433) 
COLLT 0.181*** 0.060*** 0.017 0.088** 0.016 0.009 
(3.970) (4.798) (0.784) (2.466) (0.598) (0.033) 
SIZE 0.042*** -0.005** 0.036*** -0.007 0.017* -0.501*** 
(2.979) (-2.040) (5.112) (-0.747) (1.721) (-4.946) 
CON 0.091 0.019** 0.021 -0.006 0.056 -0.012 
(1.436) (2.411) (0.366) (-0.106) (0.848) (-0.021) 
STP 0.032 0.020** 0.020 -0.035 0.028 
 
-0.227 
(0.489) (2.393) (0.331) (-0.628) (0.422) (-0.414) 
EGY -0.100* 0.012 -0.025 -0.110** 0.022 0.155 
(-1.687) (1.302) (-0.435) (-2.108) (0.338) (0.262) 
HTH 0.054 0.029*** 0.001 -0.049 0.073 -0.055 
(0.805) (3.167) (0.018) (-0.873) (1.082) (-0.084) 
IND 0.078 0.048*** 0.042 -0.045 0.033 0.419 
(1.200) (4.753) (0.710) (-0.831) (0.503) (0.790) 
IT 0.072 0.017** -0.007 0.040 0.022 1.139* 
(0.890) (2.087) (-0.119) (0.505) (0.341) (1.722) 
MAT -0.052 
 
0.025*** -0.026 -0.079 0.028 
 
-0.222 
(-0.831) (2.720) (-0.450) (-1.469) (0.420) (-0.412) 
TLS -0.040 0.021** -0.010 -0.082 0.030 -0.023 
(-0.539) (2.227) (-0.167) (-1.341) (0.441) (-0.028) 
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.149 0.086 0.105 0.071 0.133 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between debt contracting variables and 
default risk, where ZSCORE is the proxy for default risk.  The debt contracting variables are 
divided by total assets. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.   
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Table K.2: Relationship between Information Risk and Debt Contracting 
Variables (Debt Contracting Variables Scaled by Total Assets) 
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.495** 0.057 -0.040 0.386* 0.092 14.589*** 
(2.017) (1.283) (-0.278) (1.810) (0.507) (8.752) 
ACCRL -0.052 -0.003 -0.015 -0.027 -0.007 0.824** 
(-1.844) (-0.464) (-0.834) (-1.283) (-0.367) (2.035) 
AGE -0.0001 -0.0002* 0.001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.002 
(-0.280) (-1.625) (1.129) (-0.139) (-1.222) (-0.380) 
COLLT 0.006 0.086*** -0.055 -0.007 -0.017 -0.724 
(0.116) (3.726) (-1.294) (-0.215) (-0.618) (-1.364) 
SIZE -0.008 
 
-0.012** 0.009 -0.019 0.013* 
 
-0.724*** 
(-0.415) (-2.452) (0.637) (-1.042) (1.799) (-4.250) 
CON -0.184 0.027 0.084*** -0.156 -0.139 -0.936* 
(-1.305) (1.428) (2.676) (-1.340) (-0.830) (-1.785) 
STP -0.122 0.033* 0.062 -0.109 -0.107 -0.909* 
(-0.842) (1.694) (1.575) (-0.920) (-0.641) (-1.958) 
EGY -0.176 0.055 0.077** -0.202* -0.107 1.169 
(-1.226) (1.260) (2.195) (-1.785) (-0.617) (0.951) 
HTH -0.164 0.025 0.089** -0.158 -0.119 -0.706 
(-1.126) (1.254) (2.333) (-1.331) (-0.709) (-0.930) 
IND -0.121 
 
0.062*** 0.143*** -0.180 -0.146 
 
-0.499 
(-0.871) (2.859) (5.599) (-1.559) (-0.870) (-1.051) 
IT -0.175 0.030 -0.002 -0.079 -0.124 0.304 
(-1.172) (1.537) (-0.054) (-0.644) (-0.743) (0.286) 
MAT -0.180 0.051** 0.060** -0.186* -0.104 -0.935* 
(-1.284) (2.104) (2.320) (-1.635) (-0.622) (-1.854) 
TLS -0.326** 0.037 0.040 -0.225* -0.178 -1.205** 
(-2.298) (1.503) (1.205) (-1.933) (-1.059) (-1.988) 
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.185 0.067 0.038 0.017 0.153 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between both debt contracting 
variables and information risk, where ACCRL is the proxy for information risk.  The debt 
contracting variables are divided by total assets. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each 
estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
 
 
 
 282 
Table K.3: Impact of Corporate Governance on Debt Contracting Variables 
Using 2SLS (Debt Contracting Variables Scaled by Total Assets)  
 
iiiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLZSCOREQUANT +++++++= 7654321 βββββββ  
ii7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLZSCORETYPE +++++++= βββββββ,  
 
ii7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEACCRLZSCORECOST +++++++= βββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.095 0.023 -0.104 0.217 -0.041 12.495*** 
(0.504) (0.518) (-0.836) (1.192) (-0.244) (7.446) 
ZSCORE 0.077*** 0.007 0.013 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.408*** 
(5.969) (1.381) (1.315) (2.717) (4.429) (3.373) 
ACCRL -0.085*** -0.006 -0.020 -0.042* -0.017 0.653* 
(-2.905) (-0.715) (-1.047) (-1.765) (-0.920) (1.686) 
AGE 0.0002 -0.0002 0.001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
(0.523) (-1.387) (1.338) (0.212) (-0.860) (0.007) 
COLLT 0.027 
 
0.087*** -0.052 0.001 -0.010 
 
-0.614 
(0.591) (3.760) (-1.261) (0.044) (-0.372) (-1.187) 
SIZE 0.026* -0.009** 0.014 -0.004 0.025*** -0.543*** 
(1.704) (-2.037) (1.172) (-0.249) (3.523) (-3.267) 
CON -0.051 0.038* 0.105*** -0.101 -0.093 -0.232 
(-0.403) (1.703) (3.379) (-0.861) (-0.582) (-0.365) 
STP -0.031 0.040* 0.076** -0.072 -0.076 -0.436 
(-0.244) (1.831) (1.989) (-0.598) (-0.474) (-0.779) 
EGY -0.107 0.061 0.088** -0.173 -0.083 1.539 
(-0.824) (1.356) (2.436) (-1.492) (-0.498) (1.267) 
HTH -0.076 
 
0.032 0.103*** -0.122 -0.089 
 
-0.245 
(-0.580) (1.456) (2.795) (-1.018) (-0.552) (-0.296) 
IND -0.006 0.073*** 0.163*** -0.133 -0.109 0.110 
(-0.051) (2.945) (4.852) (-1.134) (-0.677) (0.194) 
IT -0.063 0.040* 0.016 -0.033 -0.086 0.893 
(-0.467) (1.721) (0.555) (-0.256) (-0.539) (0.812) 
MAT -0.061 0.063** 0.080** -0.141 -0.062 -0.291 
(-0.484) (2.085) (2.886) (-1.218) (-0.386) (-0.511) 
TLS -0.258** 0.043* 0.050 -0.197* -0.154 -0.847 
(-1.980) (1.649) (1.576) (-1.671) (-0.956) (-1.233) 
Adjusted R2 0.230 
 
0.200 0.073 0.102 0.105 
 
0.190 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents 2SLS regression results for the relationship between corporate governance 
and debt contracting variables where corporate governance is an instrumental variable. The debt 
contracting variables are divided by total assets. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each 
estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
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Table K.4: Impact of Corporate Governance on Debt Contracting Variables 
Using OLS (Debt Contracting Variables Scaled by Total Assets)     
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.344* 0.024 -0.148** 0.391*** 0.077 13.643*** 
(1.879) (1.237) (-1.904) (2.712) (0.668) (13.133) 
GOV -0.006* 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.004* -0.043* 
(-1.694) (-0.605) (-0.191) (-0.379) (-1.645) (-1.696) 
AGE 0.001* 
-
0.0001** 0.0001 0.001* 0.0002 0.0004 
(1.646) (-2.151) (0.337) (1.650) (0.759) (0.115) 
COLLT 0.154*** 0.060*** 0.013 0.075** 0.005 -0.082 
(3.200) (4.810) (0.629) (2.209) (0.199) (-0.285) 
SIZE -0.005 -0.005** 0.030*** -0.033* 0.003 -0.616*** 
(-0.238) (-2.116) (4.317) (-1.831) (0.235) (-5.454) 
CON -0.079 0.017** 0.000 -0.090* -0.005 -0.554 
(-1.178) (2.384) (-0.001) (-1.674) (-0.080) (-1.093) 
STP -0.118* 0.017** 0.001 -0.110* -0.027 -0.705 
(-1.651) (2.293) (0.017) (-1.932) (-0.391) (-1.371) 
EGY -0.174*** 0.010 -0.034 -0.145*** -0.006 -0.097 
(-2.625) (1.178) (-0.590) (-2.807) (-0.085) (-0.172) 
HTH -0.078 0.027*** -0.016 -0.115** 0.025 -0.479 
(-1.078) (3.162) (-0.269) (-2.027) (0.356) (-0.781) 
IND -0.081 0.046*** 0.022 -0.123** -0.025 -0.098 
(-1.249) (4.924) (0.374) (-2.361) (-0.379) (-0.200) 
IT -0.070 0.015** -0.025 -0.031 -0.029 0.692 
(-0.874) (2.021) (-0.431) (-0.444) (-0.428) (1.090) 
MAT -0.162** 0.024*** -0.040 -0.132** -0.014 -0.590 
(-2.416) (2.803) (-0.687) (-2.573) (-0.201) (-1.160) 
TLS -0.146* 0.020** -0.024 -0.138** -0.003 -0.308 
(-1.783) (2.1370 (-0.399) (-2.197) (-0.044) (-0.398) 
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.148 0.075 0.034 -0.002 0.104 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables.  The debt contracting variables are divided by total assets. The t-
values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   
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Table K.5: Impact of Corporate Governance on Debt Contracting Variables 
for Different Sized Companies (Debt Contracting Variables Scaled 
by Total Assets)   
 
ii9i8i7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGELGOVSGOVLRGSMLGOVQUANT +++++++++= βββββββββ __  
ii9i8i7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGELGOVSGOVLRGSMLGOVTYPE +++++++++= βββββββββ __,  
 
ii9i8i7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGELGOVSGOVLRGSMLGOVCOST +++++++++= βββββββββ __  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.246*** -0.008 0.077 0.090* 0.087 9.437*** 
(3.298) (-0.850) (1.317) (1.679) (1.177) (17.342) 
GOV -0.006 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.006* -0.111*** 
(-1.599) (-0.744) (0.674) (-0.711) (-1.724) (-4.019) 
SML 0.091 0.007 0.020 0.075* -0.012 -0.349 
(1.138) (0.570) (0.471) (1.852) (-0.214) (-0.739) 
LRG -0.024 -0.036** -0.024 0.037 -0.001 -2.176*** 
(-0.282) (-2.207) (-0.514) (0.520) (-0.021) (-3.097) 
GOV_S -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 0.004 0.005 0.174** 
(-0.126) (-0.556) (-1.633) (0.608) (0.653) (2.175) 
GOV_L 0.008 0.002 0.006 -0.004 0.004 0.134 
(1.076) (1.399) (1.301) (-0.562) (0.844) (2.076) 
AGE 0.001 -0.0002** 0.0001 0.001* 0.0001 -0.001 
(1.528) (-2.130) (0.414) (1.606) (0.512) (-0.195) 
COLLT 0.155*** 0.061*** 0.021 0.068** 0.006 -0.089 
(3.434) (4.815) (0.951) (2.128) (0.231) (-0.309) 
CON -0.051 0.011* -0.010 -0.063 0.011 -0.534 
(-0.765) 
 
(1.691) (-0.176) (-1.171) (0.163) 
 
(-1.064) 
STP -0.094 0.012 -0.008 -0.088 -0.010 -0.727 
(-1.318) (1.571) (-0.127) (-1.539) (-0.149) (-1.444) 
EGY -0.138** 0.004 -0.044 -0.109** 0.011 -0.139 
(-2.073) (0.500) (-0.769) (-2.089) (0.161) (-0.250) 
HTH -0.057 0.023*** -0.026 -0.092* 0.038 -0.413 
(-0.790) (2.691) (-0.451) (-1.643) (0.543) (-0.700) 
IND -0.048 0.040*** 0.016 -0.096* -0.007 -0.121 
(-0.713) (4.526) (0.267) (-1.831) (-0.102) (-0.248) 
IT -0.029 0.009 -0.037 0.006 -0.006 0.781 
(-0.331) 
 
(1.258) (-0.639) (0.074) (-0.095) 
 
(1.236) 
MAT -0.127* 0.018** -0.049 -0.101* 0.005 -0.571 
(-1.922) (2.274) (-0.854) (-1.936) (0.077) (-1.139) 
TLS -0.102 0.014 -0.040 -0.100* 0.023 -0.104 
(-1.337) (1.547) (-0.641) (-1.654) (0.328) (-0.135) 
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.153 0.077 0.048 0.004 0.107 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
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Notes:  
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
both the access to debt and cost of debt for different sized companies.  The regressions include 
unreported industry dummy variables.  The debt contracting variables are divided by total 
assets. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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K.2 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF DEFAULT 
RISK 
 
 
The study introduces two additional measures of default risk which are 
alternate Z-score and times interest earned.  The calculation and testing of the 
two measures are detailed as follows. 
The alternate Z-score is calculated by performing a discriminant 
analysis on 46 failed and 71 non-failed companies in Australia.  Table K.6 
presents the coefficients for the estimated parameters that are used in the 
alternate Z-score model. 
 
 
Table K.6: Discriminant Analysis Results for Default Risk (ZSCORE2)  
 
Variable 
Canonical Discriminant 
Function Coefficients 
Constant 0.380 
X1 -0.895 
X2 1.480 
X3 11.797 
X5  0.962 
 
Notes: 
X1 = Book value of total liabilities divided by book value of total equity. 
X2 = Net income divided by total sales 
X3 = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets 
X4 = Sales divided by total assets 
 
The following is the function used to estimate ZSCORE2: 
4321 962.0797.11480.1895.038.02 XXXXZSCORE i −++−=  
         (K.6) 
Where: 
iZSCORE 2 =  Alternate default risk score. 
 1X  =   Total liabilities/Total equities 
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 2X  =   Net income/Total assets 
 3X  
=   Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets 
 4X  
=   Sales/Total assets 
The model was able to correctly classify 83.8% of the originally grouped cases.   
A decomposition of the ZSCORE2 shown in Table K.7 reveals that it is mainly 
driven by debt to equity and sales to asset ratios.  The decomposition is 
conducted by multiplying each of the four ratios by their respective coefficients 
then dividing the outcome by the total ZSCORE2. 
   
Table K.7: Decomposition of ZSCORE2   
 
Variable 
Canonical Discriminant 
Function Coefficients Average weight of each ratio  
Constant 0.380 0.435 
X1 -0.895 -3.614 
X2 1.480 0.300 
X3 11.797 0.997 
X4  0.962 2.882 
 
 
It can be noted from Table K.7 that X1, total liabilities to total equity ratio, 
accounts for -361% of the ZSCORE and therefore it is the primary driving 
factor behind the overall default risk variable.  As a result, companies with high 
liabilities to equity ratio will receive a higher ZSCORE which means they have 
a higher default risk.  Additionally, X4, sales to total assets, also has a 
significant impact on ZSCORE2 with an average weight of 288% of 
ZSCORE2.  Consequently, companies with greater sales to total assets will 
have a lower ZSCORE2 and hence a lower default risk.   
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Table K.8: Relationship between Default risk (ZSCORE2) and Debt 
Contracting Variables 
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2ZSCOREQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2ZSCORETYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2ZSCORECOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  -0.013 0.957 -0.273 0.629*** -0.313* 12.842*** 
(-0.0940 (6.124) (-1.318) (2.794) (-1.673) (12.186) 
ZSCORE2 0.017*** 
 
-0.006 -0.027*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 
 
0.103*** 
 
(4.524) (-0.953) (-4.151) (4.015) (2.680) (3.280) 
AGE 0.0003 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
(0.634) (-4.095) (0.899) (1.185) (1.025) (0.412) 
COLLT 0.149*** 0.080 -0.089 0.019 -0.010 0.026 
(3.911) (1.419) (-1.473) (0.389) (-0.178) (0.093) 
SIZE 0.057*** -0.104*** 0.067*** -0.011 0.049** -0.546*** 
(4.053) (-6.084) (3.184) (-0.537) (2.447) (-5.119) 
CON 0.007 0.062 0.000 -0.267* 0.205 -0.274 
(0.083) (0.882) (0.002) (-1.837) (2.109) (-0.528) 
STP 0.036 -0.012 0.113 -0.271* 0.169 
 
-0.522 
(0.391) (-0.167) (0.787) (-1.782) (1.568) (-1.009) 
EGY -0.008 0.097 0.056 -0.372** 0.219** -0.068 
(-0.085) (1.236) (0.420) (-2.529) (2.121) (-0.121) 
HTH -0.021 0.132 0.004 -0.355** 0.219** -0.304 
(-0.236) (1.567) (0.031) (-2.389) (2.113) (-0.480) 
IND -0.018 0.149** 0.080 -0.328** 0.098 0.162 
(-0.209) (2.173) (0.629) (-2.268) (1.063) (0.324) 
IT -0.086 0.049 0.010 -0.240 0.181* 0.885 
(-0.991) (0.627) (0.075) (-1.572) (1.743) (1.388) 
MAT -0.091 
 
0.285*** -0.072 -0.339** 0.126 
 
-0.495 
(-1.085) (4.003) (-0.565) (-2.360) (1.356) (-0.972) 
TLS -0.143 0.136 -0.024 -0.340** 0.228* -0.140 
(-1.502) (1.076) (-0.162) (-2.011) (1.705) (-0.176) 
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.117 0.118 0.035 0.016 0.117 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between debt contracting variables and 
cost of debt and default risk, where ZSCORE2 is the proxy for default risk.  The t-values, given 
in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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The second additional measure for default risk is TIMES, which is a 
financial ratio known as times interest earned.  Unlike the original Z-score 
measure, TIMES is not driven by leverage. The ratio assesses the company’s 
ability to repay interest from earnings before interest and tax (Baker and 
Johnson 1988; Cheng 1988).  Companies with higher earnings before interest 
and tax relative to interest expense can have greater access to debt and borrow 
at a lower cost.  Times interest earned is calculated as follows.  
i
i
i
INTEXP
EBIT
TIMES =                (K.7) 
     Where: 
  =iTIMES  Times interest earned for firm i. 
=iEBIT    Earnings before interest and tax for firm i. 
=iINTEXP    Interest expense and capitalised interest for firm i. 
A possible issue that needs to be addressed is the interpretation of the 
times interest earned ratio.  A high times interest earned ratio infers a lower 
default risk, which could complicate the reading of the results.  In order to 
simplify the interpretation of the results, the study multiplies each company’s 
time interest earned by negative one.  As a result, a high interest earned ratio 
signals a high default risk. 
The results in Table K.9 are similar to the original results obtained when 
ZSCORE is used as a proxy for default risk.  TIMES is positively related to 
QUANT at the 1% significance level. TIMES is also positively related to 
NONBANK and NONINT at the 1% significance level while it is negatively 
related to ASFIN at the 1% significance level respectively.  Finally, TIMES is 
positively related to COST at the 5% significance level. 
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Table K.9: Relationship between Default risk (TIMES) and Debt Contracting 
Variables 
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGETIMESQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGETIMESTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGETIMESCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.189 0.943*** -0.589*** 0.805*** -0.159 14.144*** 
(1.438) (6.501) (-2.825) (3.786) (-0.901) (14.437) 
TIMES 0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 0.0003 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.002** 
 
(4.948) (-7.013) (1.311) (4.506) (4.607) (2.454) 
AGE -0.0001 -0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(-0.071) (-3.591) (1.076) (0.821) (0.684) (-0.269) 
COLLT 0.126*** 0.089 -0.065 0.007 -0.030 -0.069 
(3.269) (1.610) (-1.062) (0.136) (-0.542) (-0.237) 
SIZE 0.031** -0.102*** 0.109*** -0.036* 0.029 -0.716*** 
(2.465) (-6.752) (5.542) (-1.894) (1.604) (-7.642) 
CON -0.037 0.057 0.104 -0.328** 0.168** -0.562 
(-0.460) (0.846) (0.806) (-2.296) (1.738) (-1.129) 
STP -0.001 -0.017 0.187 -0.311** 0.140 -0.758 
(-0.010) (-0.239) (1.325) (-2.070) (1.298) (-1.508) 
EGY -0.0001 0.065 0.083 -0.380*** 0.232** 0.055 
(-0.003) (0.834) (0.620) (-2.606) (2.195) (0.101) 
HTH -0.047 0.124 0.069 -0.386*** 0.193* -0.521 
(-0.552) (1.497) (0.511) (-2.625) (1.857) (-0.848) 
IND -0.064 0.147** 0.171 -0.380*** 0.062 -0.139 
(-0.797) (2.190) (1.347) (-2.675) (0.674) (-0.289) 
IT -0.111 0.018 0.094 -0.270* 0.158 0.681 
(-1.290) (0.235) (0.691) (-1.787) (1.535) (1.0840 
MAT -0.085 
 
0.245*** -0.027 -0.344** 0.126 -0.529 
(-1.051) (3.427) (-0.215) (-2.411) (1.353) (-1.059) 
TLS -0.167* 0.097 0.071 -0.373** 0.205 -0.363 
(-1.663) (0.767) (0.447) (-2.238) (1.556) (-0.471) 
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.156 0.086 0.020 0.014 0.134 
N 585   585 585 585 585 585 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between debt contracting variables and 
cost of debt and default risk, where TIMES is the proxy for default risk.  The t-values, given in 
parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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K.3 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF 
INFORMATION RISK 
 
 
The study tests the robustness of the results by introducing alternate 
measures for information risk.  The information risk variable, ACCRL, is 
decomposed into innate and discretionary components.  Also, two additional 
measures for information risk are introduced and tested, which are the bid-ask 
spread and abnormal accruals.  The following tables present the results of 
innate and discretionary parts of accruals quality. 
 
Table K.10: Relationship between Information Risk (ACCRL) and the Five 
Innate Factors    
 
( ) ( ) iiiiiii LOSSOPCYCLESALESCFOSIZEACCRL εββσβσβββ ++++++= 543210  
  ACCRL 
    Intercept 0.878*** 
 
(2.839) 
SIZE -0.078** 
 
(-2.331) 
σ(CFO) 1.209*** 
 
(5.335) 
 σ(SALES) 0.085 
 
(1.128) 
OPCYCLE 0.107 
 
(0.978) 
LOSS 0.024 
 
(0.393) 
Adjusted R2 0.243 
N 205 
 
Notes:   
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between both ACCRL and the five 
innate factors.  The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.  The following are the definitions of the variables:    
SIZE =  Log of total assets. 
σ(CFO) = The standard deviation of cash flow from operations. 
σ(SALES) = The standard deviation of sales revenue. 
OPCYCLE    = Log of the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory. 
  LOSS =  One if earnings after tax are negative and zero otherwise. 
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Table K.11: Summary Statistics for the Innate and Discretionary Components 
of Information risk for All Quintiles 
 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 All companies  
INACCRL   205 0.45 0.42 0.24 0.13 1.81 
DSACCRL  205 -0.0000001 -0.22 0.99 -3.34 5.17 
 Small Companies (1st Quintile) 
INACCRL   41 0.73 0.61 0.34 0.41 1.81 
DSACCRL  41 0.08 -0.06 1.17 -3.34 3.71 
 Medium Companies (2nd Quintile) 
INACCRL   41 0.49 0.46 0.09 0.36 0.74 
DSACCRL  41 0.04 -0.27 1.21 -1.53 4.66 
 Medium Companies (3rd Quintile)  
INACCRL   41 0.44 0.41 0.10 0.33 0.82 
DSACCRL  41 -0.20 -0.36 0.82 -0.88 2.96 
 Medium Companies (4th Quintile)  
INACCRL   41 0.36 0.34 0.09 0.22 0.62 
DSACCRL  41 0.06 -0.19 0.99 -0.83 5.17 
 Large Companies (5th Quintile) 
INACCRL   41 0.24 0.24 0.08 0.12 0.52 
DSACCRL  41 0.02 -0.15 0.65 -0.95 2.58 
 
 Notes: 
INACCRL = Innate component of accruals quality. 
DSACCRL = Discretionary component of accruals quality. 
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Table K.12: ANOVA Results for the Innate and Discretionary Components of 
Information risk 
          
Mean 
Variable Small Medium Large F Statistic P value  
INACCRL   0.73 0.44 0.24 56.620 0.000*** 
DSACCRL  0.08 -0.20 0.23 1.147 0.321 
 
 
 
 
Table K.13: Tukey’s HSD Post Hoc Test Results for the Innate and 
Component of Information risk 
 
Variables Size (A) Size (B) 
Mean 
Difference 
(A-B) 
Standard 
Error Significance 
INACCRL Small Medium 0.294*** 0.046 0.000 
 
Large 0.489*** 0.046 0.000 
Medium Small -0.294*** 0.046 0.000 
Large 0.195*** 0.046 0.000 
Large Small -0.489*** 0.046 0.000 
    Medium -0.195*** 0.046 0.000 
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 1%, two-tailed. 
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Table K.14: Relationship between the Innate Component of Information Risk 
and the Debt Contracting Variables  
 
iiiiiii eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEZSCOREINACCRLQUANT ++++++= 654321 ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEZSCOREINACCRLTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEZSCOREINACCRLCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.539*** -0.256*** 0.170 0.797*** 0.289 7.878*** 
(4.086) (-3.576) (0.808) (3.528) (1.575) (9.001) 
INACCRL -0.192** 0.346*** -0.177 0.013 -0.181* 2.399** 
(-2.428) (3.227) (-1.408) (0.111) (-1.646) (2.474) 
AGE -0.001 -0.002** 0.002* -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.007 
(-0.884) (-2.258) (1.767) (-0.301) (-0.172) (-1.192) 
COLLT 0.091 0.260*** -0.225** -0.073 0.039 -0.581 
(1.488) (3.205) (-2.304) (-1.184) (0.453) (-1.036) 
CON -0.050 
 
0.282*** 0.290 -0.584*** 0.011 
 
-0.804 
(-0.385) (4.129) (1.409) (-2.648) (0.063) (-1.015) 
STP 0.045 0.115** 0.269 -0.420* 0.036 -0.729 
(0.327) (2.117) (1.215) (-1.831) (0.186) (-0.917) 
EGY 0.008 0.188 0.468* -0.750*** 0.093 1.040 
(0.054) (1.453) (1.922) (-3.452) (0.438) (0.703) 
HTH -0.016 0.112 0.353* -0.552** 0.088 -0.500 
(-0.115) (1.586) (1.639) (-2.412) (0.466) (-0.514) 
IND -0.001 0.264*** 0.469** -0.640*** -0.093 -0.504 
(-0.005) (4.549) (2.301) (-2.932) (-0.520) (-0.659) 
IT -0.141 
 
0.333*** 0.065 -0.430* 0.033 
 
0.709 
(-1.017) (2.808) (0.293) (-1.828) (0.170) (0.614) 
MAT -0.100 0.370*** 0.281 -0.646*** -0.005 -0.871 
(-0.767) (4.779) (1.351) (-2.950) (-0.030) (-1.088) 
TLS -0.192 0.365*** 0.479* -0.652*** -0.192 -1.150 
(-1.160) (3.097) (1.820) (-2.748) (-0.836) (-1.289) 
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.132 0.091 0.100 -0.004 0.087 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between the innate component of 
information risk, INACCRL, and the debt contracting variables and information risk. 
INACCRL and SIZE are highly correlated (ρ = -0.715) at the 1% significance level and hence 
the presence of SIZE in the regression estimation caused INACCRL to be insignificant.  The 
study removes SIZE whenever INACCRL is present in the regression model. The t-values, 
given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
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Table K.15: Relationship between the Discretionary Component of 
Information Risk and the Debt Contracting Variables   
 
iiiiiiii eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREDSACCRLQUANT +++++++= 7654321 βββββββ
ii7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREDSACCRLTYPE +++++++= βββββββ,  
 
ii7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEZSCOREDSACCRLCOST +++++++= βββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.150 0.771*** -0.206 0.920*** -0.485* 15.511*** 
(0.685) (2.727) (-0.598) (2.945) (-1.633) (10.884) 
DSACCRL 0.010 0.058 -0.077 0.008 0.011 1.027** 
(0.208) (0.975) (-1.067) (0.145) (0.178) (2.491) 
AGE -0.001 -0.002 0.003* -0.0001 -0.001 -0.003 
(-0.848) (-1.298) (1.758) (-0.114) (-0.715) (-0.573) 
COLLT 0.104* 0.239*** -0.222** -0.075 0.057 -0.667 
(1.670) (2.978) (-2.262) (-1.225) (0.673) (-1.283) 
SIZE 0.035* 
 
-0.104*** 0.038 -0.014 0.079*** 
 
-0.807*** 
(1.772) (-4.054) (1.226) (-0.496) (2.946) (-5.123) 
CON -0.039 0.257 0.268 -0.592*** 0.067 -0.792 
(-0.294) (1.490) (1.276) (-2.632) (0.369) (-1.537) 
STP 0.052 0.089 0.245 -0.430* 0.096 -0.744* 
(0.365) (0.478) (1.088) (-1.824) (0.493) (-1.607) 
EGY 0.013 0.193 0.450* -0.750*** 0.107 1.231 
(0.081) (0.964) (1.838) (-3.426) (0.506) (0.999) 
HTH -0.009 0.083 0.329 -0.563** 0.150 -0.531 
(-0.067) (0.463) (1.498) (-2.394) (0.792) (-0.685) 
IND 0.010 
 
0.249 0.442 -0.646*** -0.046 
 
-0.367 
(0.077) (1.461) (2.124) (-2.887) (-0.256) (-0.786) 
IT -0.138 0.306* 0.036 -0.442* 0.100 0.696 
(-0.962) (1.651) (0.159) (-1.839) (0.516) (0.650) 
MAT -0.096 0.349* 0.267 -0.653*** 0.038 -0.919* 
(-0.720) (2.024) (1.269) (-2.953) (0.207) (-1.823) 
TLS -0.192 0.356* 0.438* -0.661*** -0.133 -0.971 
(-1.131) (1.624) (1.638) (-2.731) (-0.578) (-1.599) 
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.158 0.094 0.097 0.021 0.158 
N 205   205 205 205 205   205 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between the discretionary component 
of information risk, DSACCRL, and the debt contracting variables.  The t-values, given in 
parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
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Hypothesis two states that information risk is related to the debt 
contracting variables.  The results presented in Table 4.20 indicate that ACCRL 
is positively related to ASFIN and COST.  To test the sensitivity of the results, 
the study uses ACCRL2 and ACCRL3 as alternate measures for information 
risk.  ACCRL2 is the ask-bid spread which represents information asymmetry 
(Francis and Martin 2010; LaFond and Watts 2008) while ACCRL3 focuses on 
abnormal accruals which is a proxy for information risk (Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney 1995; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Subramanyam 1996; Bartov, Gul, 
and Tsui 2000).   
 Uncertainty in the information environment leads to an increase in the 
bid-ask spread in the market. The firm’s accounting information quality impacts 
the overall information environment thus affecting the firm’s trading activity.  
A decrease in information asymmetry results in a reduction in the bid-ask 
spread.  In accordance with LaFond and Watts (2008) and Francis and Martin  
(2010) bid-ask spread is used as a proxy for information asymmetry.  The 
current research assumes that information risk is represented by ACCRL2 
which is the bid-ask spread. 
 
i
ii
i
LASSET
BIDASK
ACCRL2
−
=                 (K.8) 
Where: 
iACCRL2   = Information asymmetry firm i. 
  
iASK     = Ask price for firm i. 
iBID      = Bid price for firm i. 
iLASSET     = Log of total assets for firm i. 
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The study estimate regression analysis to investigate the relationship 
between information risk, represented by ACRRL2, and the debt contracting 
variable for 493 companies.  The results reported in Table K.16 suggest that the 
direction of the relationship between ACCRL2 and COST is in line with the 
original results obtained by using ACCRL.  This suggests that an increase in 
information risk raises cost of debt.  However, the relationship is not 
statistically significant. 
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Table K.16: Relationship between Information Risk (ACCRL2) and Debt 
Contracting Variables   
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2ACCRLQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2ACCRLTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2ACCRLCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.204 1.073*** -0.657*** 0.609*** -0.024 13.881*** 
(1.393) (6.360) (-2.905) (2.644) (-0.121) (13.125) 
ACCRL2 0.004 -0.012*** 0.021** -0.005 -0.003 0.061 
(0.666) (-2.728) (2.152) (-1.506) (-0.359) (0.849) 
AGE -0.0001 -0.003**** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(-0.161) (-3.638) (1.092) (0.792) (0.839) (-0.368) 
COLLT 0.156*** 0.075 -0.099 0.020 0.004 -0.126 
(3.617) (1.202) (-1.479) (0.367) (0.069) (-0.385) 
SIZE 0.028** 
 
-0.114*** 0.121*** -0.020 0.013 
 
-0.713*** 
(2.057) (-6.591) (5.667) (-0.988) (0.633) (-6.869) 
CON -0.035 0.046 0.068 -0.263* 0.148 -0.234 
(-0.402) (0.596) (0.503) (-1.721) (1.387) (-0.490) 
STP -0.054 -0.003 0.125 -0.238 0.116 -0.661 
(-0.545) (-0.034) (0.825) (-1.471) (0.967) (-1.404) 
EGY -0.025 0.071 0.036 -0.308** 0.201* 0.097 
(-0.276) (0.820) (0.257) (-1.988) (1.772) (0.183) 
HTH -0.080 0.143 0.064 -0.339** 0.132 -0.054 
(-0.864) (1.558) (0.453) (-2.176) (1.185) (-0.092) 
IND -0.084 
 
0.152** 0.152 -0.342** 0.038 
 
0.066 
(-0.971) (2.020) (1.141) (-2.271) (0.379) (0.148) 
IT -0.143 -0.005 0.069 -0.225 0.161 0.836 
(-1.523) (-0.058) (0.479) (-1.391) (1.388) (1.252) 
MAT -0.105 0.254*** -0.055 -0.295** 0.096 -0.321 
(-1.205) (3.173) (-0.408) (-1.949) (0.930) (-0.681) 
TLS -0.229** 0.181 0.050 -0.281 0.051 0.321 
(-2.073) (1.290) (0.292) (-1.533) (0.389) (0.549) 
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.137 0.101 0.010 0.0003 0.107 
N 493   493 493 493 493   493 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between debt contracting variables and 
information risk, where ACCRL2 (measured using the ask-bid spread) is the proxy for 
information risk.  The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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ACCRL3 is measured as the difference between total working capital 
accruals and expected working capital accruals using a cross sectional version 
of the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995; DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994; Subramanyam 1996; Bartov et al. 2000).   
The abnormal accruals model assumes that total accruals are separated 
into discretionary accruals (DACL) and non-discretionary accruals (NDACL) 
where a high level of discretionary accruals suggests the presence of 
information risk.  The calculation is partitioned into two steps.  The first step is 
to estimate an expectation model where non-discretionary accruals are a 
function of change in revenue and are adjusted for change in accounts 
receivable and the level of plant, property and equipment.  The following is the 
model used to calculate NDACL.  
[ ] [ ] [ ]1,,,,31,,,,,,21,,1,, //)(/1 −
∧
−
∧
−
∧
+∆−∆+= tjitjitjitjitjitjitji APPEARECREVANDACL βββ
 
                             (K.9a) 
Where
1
∧
β , 2
∧
β and 
3
∧
β are fitted coefficients from equation K.9a.  The 
coefficients are estimated for each industry separately.   
[ ] [ ] [ ] tjitjitjitjitjitjitjitji APPEAREVAATACL ,,1,,,,31,,,,21,,11,,,, ///1/ εβββ ++∆+= −−−−  
                           
         (K.9b) 
 Where, 
tiTACL , = Total accruals for the ith firm from industry j in year t. 
   Total accruals are measured as change in current assets - 
change in cash - change in current liabilities + change in 
short-term debt + depreciation and amortization expense. 
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tiREV ,∆ = Change in revenue for the ith firm from industry j in year t. 
tiREC ,∆ = Change in accounts receivable for the ith firm from industry 
in year t. 
 
1,, −tjiA   = Total assets for the ith company from industry j at the end of 
the previous year. 
tiPPE ,  = Property, plant, and equipment for the ith company for year t.   
tε         = Firm specific residual for the ith company for year t. 
 
The second step is to calculate DACL which is measured as the difference 
between TACL and NDACL.  The following equation shows the calculation for 
DACL. 
 
 
                   (K.9c) 
Where  
tiDACL , = Difference between total accruals and non-
discretionary accruals for the ith firm from industry j in year t. 
 
The estimation of the industry-specific coefficients to calculate 
abnormal accruals are shown in Table K.17.  The relationship between 
information risk, represented by ACRRL3, and the debt contracting variables is 
examined for 446 companies.  The regression results reported in Table K.18 
suggest that ACCRL3 is not related to any of the debt contracting variables.   
tjitjitji NDACLTACLDACL ,,,,,, −=
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Table K.18: Relationship between Information Risk (ACCRL3) and the Debt 
Contracting Variables   
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE3ACCRLQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE3ACCRLTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE3ACCRLCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.095 0.922*** -0.453* 0.823*** -0.293 15.460*** 
(0.613) (5.329) (-1.817) (3.401) (-1.408) (14.900) 
ACCRL3 0.010 0.024 -0.031 -0.026 0.033 -0.052 
(0.154) (0.323) (-0.302) (-0.424) (0.330) (-0.096) 
AGE 0.0002 -0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(0.329) (-3.492) (1.285) (0.935) (0.331) (0.296) 
COLLT 0.142*** 0.096 -0.128 0.026 0.006 -0.317 
(2.680) (1.332) (-1.504) (0.428) (0.079) (-0.681) 
SIZE 0.034** 
 
-0.096*** 0.100*** -0.048** 0.044** 
 
-0.862*** 
(2.385) (-5.588) (4.392) (-2.379) (2.207) (-8.627) 
CON -0.013 0.082 0.057 -0.274* 0.135 -0.798 
(-0.132) (0.972) (0.375) (-1.635) (1.084) (-1.599) 
STP 0.058 -0.055 0.109 -0.176 0.121 -0.627 
(0.565) (-0.664) (0.660) (-0.993) (0.895) (-1.285) 
EGY 0.031 0.086 -0.014 -0.283* 0.211 0.017 
(0.314) (0.882) (-0.089) (-1.644) (1.601) (0.030) 
HTH -0.011 0.134 -0.018 -0.319* 0.203 -0.572 
(-0.114) (1.348) (-0.113) (-1.848) (1.544) (-0.911) 
IND -0.019 
 
0.128 0.132 -0.307* 0.047 
 
-0.249 
(-0.207) (1.535) (0.873) (-1.842) (0.396) (-0.537) 
IT -0.067 0.072 -0.015 -0.201 0.144 0.584 
(-0.672) (0.740) (-0.093) (-1.137) (1.097) (0.890) 
MAT -0.060 0.202** -0.015 -0.286* 0.099 -0.465 
(-0.623) (2.194) (-0.098) (-1.705) (0.792) (-0.916) 
TLS -0.137 0.147 0.013 -0.307 0.147 -0.759 
(-1.220) (1.083) (0.075) (-1.605) (0.978) (-0.973) 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.088 0.065 0.012 0.008 0.143 
N 446   446 446 446 446   446 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between debt contracting variables and 
information risk, where ACCRL3 is the proxy for information risk (measured sing the Modified 
Jones Model).  The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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K.4 ALTERNATIVE MEASURE FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
  
An alternate corporate governance measure, GOV2, is introduced and 
tested.  GOV2 represents a corporate governance score which ranges from zero 
to 140, where 140 is the highest score that can be achieved. The following 
tables show the results for the relationship between the alternate corporate 
governance variable, the different risk assessment measures and the debt 
contracting variables. 
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Table K.19: Relationship between Default Risk (ZSCORE and ZSCORE2) 
and Corporate Governance (GOV and GOV2)   
 
 
iiiiiiRiR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGEGOVZSCORE ++++++= 6543,21, ββββββ
 
Default Risk   
Variable ZSCORE ZSCORE2 ZSCORE2   
Intercept 
6.833*** 11.636*** 11.106***
 (10.098) (9.511) (9.304)
GOV -0.092**
(-2.447)
GOV2 -0.008** -0.006 
(-2.480) (-0.876) 
AGE -0.003 -0.009 -0.009*
(-0.965) (-1.520) (-1.626)
COLLT -0.304* -1.113** -1.102**
(-1.604) (-2.546) (-2.521)
SIZE -0.555*** -1.503*** -1.386***
(-7.569) (-9.970) (-9.743)
CON -1.919*** -3.561*** -3.431***
(-4.764) (-5.684) (-5.428)
STP -1.695*** -2.569*** -2.454***
(-3.829) (-3.414) (-3.247)
EGY -0.809** -0.366 0.358
(-1.944) (-0.566) (-0.546)
HTH -1.486*** -2.268*** -2.178***
(-3.520) (-3.333) (-3.182)
IND -1.807*** -3.212*** -3.101***
(-4.557) (-5.184) (-4.941)
IT -1.622*** -2.751*** -2.620***
(-3.809) (-3.814) (-3.630)
MAT -1.221*** -1.186* -1.150*
(-3.062) (-1.885) (-1.804)
TLS -1.251** -3.057*** -2.839**
(-2.501) (-2.693) (-2.471)
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.355 0.360
N 595 595 595   
 
Notes:   
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between both default risk and 
information risk and corporate governance.  GOVR  refers to GOV and GOV2. ZSCORER refers 
to ZSCORE and ZSCORE2. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table K.20: Relationship between the Innate and Discretionary Components 
of Information Risk and Corporate Governance (GOV and GOV2)   
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE2GOVACCRL +++++= βββββ  
iiiiiRi eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVINACCRL +++++= 543,21 βββββ  
iiiiiRi eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVDSACCRL +++++= 543,21 βββββ  
  ACCRL INACCRL INACCRL DSACCRL DSACCRL 
Intercept 1.237*** 0.601*** 0.607*** 0.540 0.677*** 
(4.859) (4.817) (4.818) (1.071) (3.020) 
GOV -0.019*** -0.037*** 
(-3.814) (-2.778) 
GOV2 -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
(-4.007) (-3.757) (-2.718) 
AGE 0.0005 -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.002 0.003*** 
(0.287) (-2.935) (-2.638) (1.496) (1.815) 
 COLLT -0.150 -0.059 -0.049 -0.147 -0.123 
(-1.368) (-1.087) (-0.908) (-1.257) (-1.275) 
SIZE 0.029 
(0.857) 
CON -0.381 0.122 0.100 -0.449 -0.492** 
(-1.636) (1.069) (0.873) (-1.279) (-2.416) 
STP -0.299 0.176 0.162 -0.429 -0.469** 
(-1.196) (1.442) (1.322) (-1.164) (-2.148) 
EGY -0.269 0.033 0.018 -0.259 -0.288 
(-0.977) (0.247) (0.131) (-0.727) (-1.196) 
HTH -0.346 0.157 0.147 -0.490 -0.507** 
(-1.421) (1.318) (1.231) (-1.377) (-2.378) 
IND -0.452** 0.093 0.071 -0.489 -0.531*** 
(-1.956) (0.825) (0.624) (-1.421) (-2.627) 
IT -0.301 0.221* 0.208* -0.493 -0.528** 
(-1.216) (1.815) (1.703) (-1.364) (-2.430) 
MAT -0.258 0.113 0.095 -0.306 -0.339* 
(-1.096) (0.982) (0.816) (-0.879) (-1.643) 
TLS -0.332 0.272* 0.240* -0.492 -0.579** 
(-1.126) (1.879) (1.658) (-1.358) (-2.243) 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.157 0.155 0.074 0.046 
N 205 205 205 205 205 
 
Notes:   
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between the innate and discretionary 
components of information risk and corporate governance.  The t-values, given in parenthesis 
below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  SIZE is only included in the 
regressions that exclude GOV2 and INACCRL due to the high correlation between SIZE and 
GOV2 and INACCRL. The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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Table K.21: Relationship between Corporate Governance (GOV2) and the 
Debt Contracting Variables    
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2GOVQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2GOVTYPE ++++++= ββββββ,  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYSIZECOLLTAGE2GOVCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity of 
Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.105 0.983*** -0.534** 0.765*** -0.214 13.783*** 
(0.753) (6.349) (-2.479) (3.426) (-1.128) (12.891) 
GOV2 -0.001** 0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.005 
(-2.218) (1.412) (0.977) (-1.605) (-0.873) (-0.959) 
AGE 0.000 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.367) (-4.112) (1.210) (1.003) (0.904) (0.189) 
COLLT 0.130*** 
 
0.085 -0.059 -0.001 -0.024 
 
-0.087 
(3.327) (1.508) (-0.984) (-0.029) (-0.431) (-0.300) 
SIZE 0.048*** -0.114*** 0.097*** -0.022 0.040* -0.648*** 
(3.180) (-6.001) (4.128) (-0.966) (1.745) (-5.270) 
CON -0.038 0.066 0.086 -0.319** 0.167* -0.595 
(-0.463) (0.987) (0.670) (-2.218) (1.721) (-1.184) 
STP 0.008 -0.015 0.172 -0.303** 0.146 -0.738 
(0.086) (-0.208) (1.220) (-2.005) (1.335) (-1.444) 
EGY -0.012 0.095 0.064 -0.376** 0.216** -0.097 
(-0.138) (1.229) (0.485) (-2.567) (2.068) (-0.175) 
HTH -0.042 0.138* 0.054 -0.387*** 0.195* -0.503 
(-0.486) (1.701) (0.400) (-2.620) (1.876) (-0.826) 
IND -0.062 0.155** 0.159 -0.378*** 0.063 -0.136 
(-0.753) (2.332) (1.261) (-2.646) (0.686) (-0.280) 
IT -0.118 0.047 0.074 -0.276* 0.155 0.652 
(-1.340) (0.601) (0.546) (-1.814) (1.495) (1.040) 
MAT -0.107 0.285*** -0.043 -0.356** 0.114 -0.601 
(-1.305) (4.058) (-0.339) (-2.492) (1.218) (-1.194) 
TLS -0.170* 0.127 0.042 -0.372** 0.204 -0.378 
(-1.652) (1.050) (0.263) (-2.212) (1.517) (-0.491) 
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.120 0.091 0.018 0.007 0.120 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables where GOV2 is the proxy for corporate governance.  The t-values, 
given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table K.22: Relationship between Corporate Governance (GOV2) and the 
Debt Contracting Variables (Without size)   
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE2GOVQUANT +++++= βββββ  
ii5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE2GOVTYPE +++++= βββββ,  
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGE2GOVCOST +++++= βββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.460*** 0.142** 0.179 0.599*** 0.080 8.989*** 
(5.483) (2.077) (1.371) (5.330) (0.838) (14.555) 
GOV2 -0.0003 -0.001* 0.003*** -0.002*** 0.0001 -0.020*** 
(-0.542) (-1.778) (3.873) (-2.719) (0.125) (-5.368) 
AGE 0.001 -0.004*** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 -0.004 
(0.996) (-5.240) (2.023) (0.752) (1.257) (-1.124) 
COLLT 0.146*** 
 
0.048 -0.028 -0.009 -0.011 
 
-0.297 
(3.727) (0.820) (-0.463) (-0.166) (-0.199) (-1.011) 
CON -0.086 0.179*** -0.010 -0.297*** 0.128 0.048 
(-1.047) (2.807) (-0.076) (-2.697) (1.346) (0.083) 
STP -0.045 0.111* 0.066 -0.278** 0.102 -0.023 
(-0.500) (1.768) (0.467) (-2.302) (0.954) (-0.039) 
EGY -0.050 0.186** -0.012 -0.358*** 0.184* 0.417 
(-0.584) (2.499) (-0.092) (-3.124) (1.776) (0.654) 
HTH -0.108 0.293*** -0.077 -0.357*** 0.141 0.377 
(-1.262) (3.780) (-0.582) (-3.126) (1.396) (0.553) 
IND -0.103 0.252*** 0.077 -0.358*** 0.029 0.418 
(-1.262) (4.123) (0.608) (-3.293) (0.322) (0.735) 
IT -0.178** 0.190*** -0.047 -0.248** 0.105 1.465** 
(-2.061) (2.553) (-0.350) (-2.145) (1.044) (2.105) 
MAT -0.153* 0.395*** -0.136 -0.335*** 0.076 0.023 
(-1.883) (5.984) (-1.072) (-3.068) (0.828) (0.039) 
TLS -0.244** 0.302*** -0.107 -0.338** 0.143 0.621 
(-2.414) (2.581) (-0.678) (-2.494) (1.093) (0.763) 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.081 0.066 0.018 0.003 0.062 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively. 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between the alternate corporate 
governance measure and debt contracting variables excluding the size control variable.  The t-
values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
308 
 
K.5 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES FOR 
COMPANY SIZE 
 
 
The robustness of the results for the relationship between higher levels 
of corporate governance and debt contracting for different size firms is assessed 
by introducing additional tests.  The first test excludes the governance-size 
interaction terms and replaces them with small and large company size 
dummies.  The second test excludes the small and large size dummies and 
introduces a dummy variable that show if a company belongs to the Top 300 
companies on the ASX.  The final test is run only on small companies to assess 
whether higher levels of corporate governance has any differential impact on 
small companies in isolation of other companies.  The following table present 
the result for the different tests. 
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Table K.23: Impact of Corporate Governance on Debt Contracting Variables 
for Small and Large Companies Including Industry Dummies  
ii7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGELRGSMLGOVQUANT +++++++= βββββββ  
ii7i6i5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGELRGSMLGOVTYPE +++++++= βββββββ,  
ii7i6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGELRGSMLGOVCOST +++++++= βββββββ  
Quantity 
Accessed                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.476*** 0.130* 0.225* 0.566*** 0.079 8.978*** 
(5.556) 
 
(1.736) (1.719) (3.843) (0.672) 
 
(16.725) 
GOV -0.009** 0.004 0.012** -0.009* -0.008* -0.059** 
 
(-2.547) (0.860) (2.361) (-1.883) (-1.737) (-2.357) 
SML -0.039 0.140*** -0.202*** 0.072* -0.009 0.738*** 
(-1.329) (2.842) (-4.496) (1.671) (-0.231) (2.741) 
LRG 0.072** -0.166*** 0.063 -0.006 0.108*** 
-
0.857*** 
 
(2.394) (-5.196) (1.383) (-0.145) (2.620) (-3.977) 
AGE 0.0003 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(0.498) (-4.210) (1.396) (0.894) (0.894) (-0.158) 
COLLT 0.140*** 0.071 -0.052 -0.003 -0.017 -0.162 
(3.589) 91.266) (-0.868) (-0.066) (-0.311) (-0.567) 
CON -0.040 0.070 0.042 -0.304** 0.191* -0.490 
(-0.480) (1.047) (0.333) (-2.087) (1.665) (-0.953) 
STP 0.005 -0.016 0.142 -0.294* 0.169 -0.681 
(0.059) (-0.235) (1.011) (-1.927) (1.338) (-1.306) 
EGY -0.019 0.104 0.020 -0.357** 0.234** -0.022 
(-0.216) (1.298) (0.150) (-2.417) (1.965) (-0.039) 
HTH -0.058 0.156** 0.020 -0.378*** 0.203* -0.344 
(-0.670) (1.953) (0.149) (-2.547) (1.698) (-0.572) 
IND -0.058 0.151** 0.118 -0.361** 0.092 -0.077 
(-0.704) (2.249) (0.934) (-2.487) (0.810) (-0.155) 
IT -0.124 0.060 0.014 -0.255* 0.181 0.810 
(-1.402) (0.760) (0.103) (-1.656) (1.489) (1.257) 
MAT -0.114 0.291*** -0.083 -0.340** 0.132 -0.522 
(-1.373) (4.085) (-0.655) (-2.349) (1.162) (-1.017) 
TLS -0.176* 0.144 -0.030 -0.349** 0.235* -0.158 
(-1.699) (1.159) (-0.190) (-2.061) (1.651) (-0.203) 
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.119 0.112 0.022 0.013 0.099 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables for different sized companies.  The regressions include unreported 
industry dummy variables.  SML is a dummy variable that equals one if the company is classed 
as small and zero otherwise.  LRG is a dummy variable that equals one if a company is classed 
as large and zero otherwise.  The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity.     
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Table K.24: Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Debt 
Contracting Variables for the Top300 Companies     
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRY300TOPCOLLTAGEGOVQUANT ++++++= ββββββ  
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRY300TOPCOLLTAGEGOVTYPE ++++++= ββββββ  
 
ii6i5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRY300TOPCOLLTAGEGOVCOST ++++++= ββββββ  
Quantity 
of Debt 
 
                      Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.470*** 0.169*** 0.120 0.600*** 0.111 9.156*** 
(5.627) (2.579) (0.926) (5.337) (1.167) (15.226) 
GOV -0.007** -0.003 0.020*** -0.012*** -0.005 -0.101*** 
(-2.080) (-0.582) (3.941) (-2.774) (-0.982) (-4.672) 
AGE 0.0004 -0.003*** 0.002* 0.0004 0.001 -0.003 
(0.678) (-4.751) (1.681) (0.599) (1.248) (-0.808) 
COLLT 0.146*** 
 
0.053 -0.038 -0.008 -0.007 
 
-0.264 
(3.766) (0.933) (-0.635) (-0.154) (-0.126) (-0.898) 
TOP300 0.069** -0.154*** 0.117*** 0.007 0.029 -0.632*** 
(2.303) (-4.616) (2.550) (0.174) (0.742) (-3.009) 
CON -0.061 0.127** 0.026 -0.291*** 0.138 -0.140 
(-0.745) (2.095) (0.205) (-2.620) (1.466) (-0.241) 
STP -0.020 0.053 0.111 -0.275** 0.111 -0.259 
(-0.220) (0.847) (0.794) (-2.255) (1.051) (-0.443) 
EGY -0.037 0.144** 0.029 -0.357*** 0.183* 0.232 
(-0.433) (2.001) (0.221) (-3.099) (1.788) (0.369) 
HTH -0.085 0.232*** -0.023 -0.354*** 0.145 0.116 
(-0.992) (3.094) (-0.173) (-3.075) (1.452) (0.172) 
IND -0.080 0.205*** 0.109 -0.351*** 0.037 0.258 
(-0.983) (3.500) (0.863) (-3.204) (0.420) (0.456) 
IT -0.147* 0.119 0.006 -0.241** 0.116 1.195* 
(-1.690) (1.588) (0.048) (-2.062) (1.155) (1.718) 
MAT -0.134* 0.341*** -0.087 -0.331*** 0.077 -0.202 
(-1.643) (5.368) (-0.689) (-3.013) (0.852) (-0.346) 
TLS -0.208** 0.228** -0.058 -0.328** 0.158 0.364 
(-2.043) (2.019) (-0.372) (-2.395) (1.230) (0.445) 
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.098 0.088 0.018 0.004 0.074 
N 595   595 595 595 595   595 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
both access to debt and cost of debt.  T300 is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
company is in the Top300 listed companies on the ASX and zero otherwise.  The t-values, 
given in parenthesis below each estimate, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table K.25: Impact of Corporate Governance on the Debt Contracting 
Variables for Small Companies Including Industry Dummies   
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVQUANT +++++= βββββ  
ii5i4i3i21iR eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVTYPE +++++= βββββ,  
 
ii5i4i3i21i eINDUSTRYCOLLTAGEGOVCOST +++++= βββββ  
Quantity of 
Debt                       Type of Debt   
  Cost of 
Debt 
Variables QUANT   ASFIN BANK NONBANK NONINT   COST 
Intercept  0.512* -0.134 -0.006 1.105*** 0.035 12.039*** 
(1.878) (-0.2920 (-0.085) (2.664) (0.093) (27.187) 
GOV -0.016* 0.034** -0.007 -0.024* -0.003 0.030 
 
(-1.859) (2.343) (-0.688) (-1.863) (-0.252) (0.400) 
AGE 0.005* -0.008* 0.005* 0.004 -0.002 -0.022 
(1.929) (-1.853) (1.773) (1.078) (-0.480) (-1.131) 
COLLT 0.114 0.017 -0.114 0.229 -0.132 -1.098 
(1.078) (0.096) (-1.032) (1.428) (-0.911) (-1.302) 
CON -0.248 0.406 0.142* -0.811* 0.263 -2.783*** 
(-0.901) (0.875) (1.783) (-1.937) (0.697) (-5.178) 
STP 0.022 0.203 0.375** -0.803* 0.226 -3.419*** 
(0.076) (0.422) (2.503) (-1.849) (0.576) (-5.903) 
EGY -0.091 0.456 -0.018 -0.800* 0.362 -2.707*** 
(-0.314) (0.937) (-0.353) (-1.819) (0.911) (-3.405) 
HTH -0.089 0.488 0.045 -0.859** 0.325 -2.477*** 
(-0.325) (1.061) (1.338) (-2.066) (0.868) (-2.864) 
IND -0.249 0.429 0.283** -0.817* 0.105 -1.333* 
(-0.898) (0.920) (2.443) (-1.940) (0.276) (-1.712) 
IT -0.195 0.480 0.075 -0.685 0.130 -1.978** 
(-0.697) (1.019) (0.865) (-1.610) (0.340) (-2.414) 
MAT -0.165 
 
0.673 0.016 -0.843** 0.154 
 
-3.221*** 
(-0.607) (1.469) (0.422) (-2.038) (0.414) (-8.158) 
TLS -0.317 0.166 0.128 -1.078** 0.785* -1.669** 
(-1.052) (0.327) (0.853) (-2.354) (1.900) (-2.479) 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.077 0.096 0.031 0.052 0.008 
N 119   119 119 119 119   119 
 
Notes:   
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, two-tailed respectively.   
This table presents regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and 
debt contracting variables for small companies only.  SIZE is excluded because the analysis is 
applied to small firms only.  The t-values, given in parenthesis below each estimate, are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
